Morris v. Peters

• Decision Date: 23 February 1948
• Citation: 46 S.E.2d 729,203 Ga. 350
• Parties: MORRIS v. PETERS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

46 S.E.2d 729

203 Ga. 350

MORRIS v. PETERS.

Supreme Court of Georgia

February 23, 1948

Syllabus by the Court.

Peters instituted against Morris a quo warranto suit to recover the office of chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee of Georgia, alleging in effect that he is the lawful holder of such office, having been duly elected thereto in 1946 for a term of four years, or until the convening of the next regular convention of the party to be held in 1950, and that the respondent is claiming, and exercising the duties of, such office in virtue of a so-called convention held on April 30, 1947, which latter convention was called by persons who had no authority to do so under the rules of the party, and whose action in electing the respondent was void. The respondent's general demurrer was overruled, and he excepted. Held:

1. The office of Chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee of Georgia is not a public office of the State within the ordinary acceptation of that term, but is merely an office of the political party.

2. Nevertheless, Georgia statutes have given to such office a status in law at least equivalent to that of an office in a corporation, so that it is subject to the writ of quo warranto to the same extent as an office of the latter class and this is true although the political party itself is not a corporation.

3. In view of the legal status that has been attached to such office by statute in this State, the quo warranto proceeding in which the relator claims title to such office and seeks to recover it from a rival claimant is not subject to demurrer as asserting a purely political right.

4. Nor was the petition subject to demurrer upon the ground that it appeared from the allegations that the relator was in office and therefore could not maintain an action to recover it.

(b) The allegations contained in the quo warranto suit were sufficient to state a cause of action and the general demurrer thereto was properly overruled.

5. The allegations of the answer were insufficient to show that the convention of April 30, 1947, at which the respondent claims to have been elected, was called by any duly constituted authority of the party having the power to call the same; and accordingly it did not appear that the convention had any right or authority as such either to remove the relator from such office as chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee, or to elect the respondent to such office. It follows that the trial judge did not err in sustaining the general demurrer of the relator and in striking the answer of the respondent.

6. There was undisputed evidence supporting the allegations of the petition, and the judge did not err in entering a finding and judgment in favor of the relator.

James S. Peters, alleging himself to be a citizen, taxpayer, member of the Democratic Party, and chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee of Georgia, brought quo warranto proceedings in the Superior Court of Richmond County against William S. Morris. Briefly, his petition alleged: A Democratic primary election was held in Georgia July 17 1946, for the nomination of a candidate for Governor and other Statehouse officers. On October 9, 1946, pursuant to the rules, regulations, and customs of the Democratic Party a regular State convention was held in the City of Macon Georgia, at which he was duly elected chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee for a term to expire on the convening of the next regular State convention in 1950. He accepted the office to which he was elected, received from the retiring chairman certain funds belonging to the party, entered upon the discharge of his duties, and has since been acting as Chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee, and is now such Chairman. The party, while in regular convention on October 9, 1946, called a State-wide primary election to be held under the State's primary-election law on the second Wednesday in August, 1948, for the nomination of its candidates.

The relator further alleged: There was held in the City of Macon, Georgia, on April 30, 1947, a so-called State Democratic Convention, which was not called pursuant to the rules adopted by the party, but contrary to the same; and those persons who called the convention were without any authority whatsoever to do so. As thus assembled, the convention selected a new State Democratic Executive Committee and elected the respondent, William S. Morris, as Chairman of the committee, who is now performing duties appertaining to the office which he has no legal right to discharge, and preparing to hold a State Democratic-primary election in 1948 on the date other than that fixed by the party while in convention on October 9, 1946.

Besides for process and general relief, the petition prayed that the court inquire into the right of Morris to hold the office in controversy.

The petition was demurred to upon the grounds: (1) the application and information filed pursuant thereto set forth no cause of action; (2) the matters and things complained of relate solely to a political question which the courts are without power to adjudicate, but which can and should be submitted to the proper tribunals of the Democratic Party for determination; (3) the question sought to be presented to the court is peculiarly of a political nature and is not justiciable; (4) the allegations of the application and information show that the court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the question sought to be presented and to grant the relief prayed; and (5) the information shows affirmatively that the petitioner has not attempted to pursue the remedies available to him in the forums of the Democratic party, although the exhaustion of such remedies is prerequisite to a resort to the court for relief, even if relief by judicial process were otherwise available to him. The demurrer was overruled upon each and every ground thereof, and that judgment is excepted to.

The respondent admitted that the relator was duly elected Chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee of Georgia at a regular convention of the party held October 9, 1946, in the City of Macon, but contends that for party disloyalty he was removed from his chairmanship by a State Democratic Convention lawfully assembled at Macon, Georgia, on April 30, 1947.

In the response, it was alleged that an immediate necessity for calling a second convention existed because the regular convention held October 9, 1946, fixed a date for the 1948 primary election too late to file with the Secretary of State the notice required by law of the party nominees.

Further answering, the respondent alleged: After it became publicly known that the relator had bolted the Democratic Party by refusing to support its nominees in the general election in 1946, and had thereby forfeited his right to membership in the party and the right to hold a party office, and was no longer discharging the duties of his position as Chairman of the Executive Committee, the 'rank and file membership' of the party in Georgia demanded relief through the regular party channels of a State convention. In obedience to that demand, the Acting Governor of Georgia, who is by custom, usage, and tradition titular head of the party, the National Democratic Committeeman, and the National Democratic Committeewoman, who are by usage, tradition, custom and rules of the party liaison officers between the National and State organizations, called a State convention to be held at Macon, Georgia, on April 30, 1947, and requested each County Democratic Executive Committee in the State to send delegates. A great majority of the County Committees, conforming to rules of the party, duly certified delegates to the convention, but in those few instances where the County Committees refused to certify delegates, they were chosen at local mass meetings called for that purpose, which is the traditional method of selecting delegates in such cases. The convention as thus called and assembled was a valid, legal, and truly representative Democratic Party convention. The convention on being legally assembled considered charges against the relator, and on finding them to be well founded declared vacant his office as well as the offices of those members of the Executive Committee, who were also found to be guilty of disloyalty and a failure to discharge their duties, and proceeded to elect a new Executive Committee which elected the respondent as its Chairman. The respondent accepted the position to which he was elected, and has since faithfully and loyally carried out the will and mandate of the party as expressed through its members in convention assembled, and he is now the Chairman of the State's Democratic Executive Committee; and the Rules Committee appointed by the respondent in accordance with instructions from the convention has functioned and called a primary election to be held on the second Wednesday in July, 1948, which is a date that will permit the nominees selected therein to be legally placed on the official ballot in the general election. The National Democratic Party, which is the sole and supreme authority for determining such controversies, has in various alleged ways recognized and accepted the respondent and the other officers selected at the convention of April 30, 1947, as the only true and valid officers of the party.

It was further alleged that, since the Democratic Party in Georgia is a branch of the National Party, the tribunal having jurisdiction to try and determine the issues between the relator and the respondent is the Democratic National Convention, if it be assembled, otherwise, the Democratic National Committee, when assembled, meanwhile the officials of...