Morris v. Stanford

• Decision Date: 10 November 1938
• Docket Number: No. 26910.,26910.
• Citation: 199 S.E. 773,58 Ga.App. 726
• Parties: MORRIS . v. STANFORD.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

58 Ga.App. 726

199 S.E. 773

MORRIS .

v.STANFORD.

No. 26910.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

Nov. 10, 1938.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Where the seduction of the plaintiff by the defendant is an issue on the trial of a suit for the breach of a contract of marriage, it is not error, on the ground that it is irrelevant and prejudicial to the defendant, to permit the plaintiff to exhibit before the jury the child which she testifies is the result of the seduction of her by the defendant with the statement that he is the father of the child.

2. The act of 1935 (Ga.L.1935, p. 120), which makes the parties to an action for the breach of a contract of marriage competent witnesses on the trial goes only to the remedy and does not affect any vested rights of the parties. The parties are competent witnesses on the trial of such an action notwithstanding the cause of action may have arisen before the enactment of the act of 1935, when under the law as it then stood, parties in such actions were not competent as witnesses.

3. Under the evidence it does not appear that the verdict in the amount found by the jury was so excessive as to indicate undue influence, bias, or prejudice on the part of the jury.

4. The evidence authorized the verdict for the plaintiff.

Error from Superior Court, Montgomery County; Eschol Graham, Judge.

Suit for breach of promise to marry by Winnie Stanford against D. E. Morris. To review a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant brings error.

Judgment affirmed.

B. P. Jackson, of Vidalia, and Lankford & Rogers, of Lyons, for plaintiff in error.

Sharpe & Sharpe, of Lyons, and L. C. Underwood, of Mount Vernon, for defendant in error.

STEPHENS, Presiding Judge.

This is the second appearance of this case in this court. Morris v. Stanford, 53 Ga. App. 722, 187 S.E. 159. The plaintiff sued out an attachment against the defendant and filed her declaration charging him with breach of promise of marriage. The defendant denied the allegations of the plaintiff's petition. The case came on for trial and resulted in a verdict for damages in the plaintiff's favor. The defendant moved for a new trial which was overruled. On exceptions to this court that judgment was reversed. Morris v. Stanford, supra.

On the second trial there was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff and the defendant became engaged to be married; that some six months after the defendant's promise to marry the plaintiff he began having sexual intercourse with her; that she yielded to his entreaties therefor because of the great love she bore him, because she trusted him implicitly, and because of his promise to marry her, which she believed; that she became pregnant; that the defendant kept going with and paying court to her until about two weeks before the birth of her child, when the defendant ceased calling upon and paying court to her, remaining at home with the statement that he was sick; that during all this time the defendant kept promising to marry the plaintiff but would put the date of the marriage off for various reasons; that plaintiff was desirous of marrying the defendant, having prepared her trousseau; and that after the birth of the child the defendant refused to marry the plaintiff. The defendant denied that he promised to marry the plaintiff, denied having sexual intercourse with her, and denied that the child was his. The second trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $3000. The defendant moved for a new trial which was overruled and he excepted.

1. There is no merit in the ground of the motion for new trial that the court erred in allowing the plaintiff to testify "This is my child and defendant is the fath-er of this child, " the child being in court with its mother and so near the jury and plaintiff's attorney that he could point to the child and ask "whose child is that?" to which the plaintiff replied "It is his, " meaning the defendant's. This question followed the question by the plaintiff's counsel whether the defendant had ever had sexual intercourse with her to which she answered "Yes." On a trial for breach of promise of marriage the injured female may prove that she has been seduced and has given birth to a child by reason of the defendant's promise of marriage, and all of this may go to show to the jury the extent of...