Morris v. Travisono

• Decision Date: 08 March 1974
• Docket Number: 5280.,Civ. A. No. 4192
• Citation: 373 F. Supp. 177
• Parties: Joseph MORRIS et al. v. Anthony P. TRAVISONO et al. Ralph Ben DAVID et al. v. Anthony P. TRAVISONO et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

373 F. Supp. 177

Joseph MORRIS et al. v. Anthony P. TRAVISONO et al.

Ralph Ben DAVID et al. v. Anthony P. TRAVISONO et al.

Civ. A. Nos. 4192, 5280.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

March 8, 1974.

Cary Coen, John M. Roney, R. I. Legal Services, Richard A. Boren, Providence, R. I., for plaintiffs in Civ.A. No. 4192.

Richard Israel, Atty. Gen. of R. I., Donald P. Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ira L. Schreiber, Edward F. Burke, Everett A. Petronio, Providence, R. I., for defendants in Civ.A. No. 4192.

Ralph J. Gonnella, Thomas C. Angelone, Richard A. Boren, Providence, R. I., Max D. Stern, Boston, Mass., Stanley A. Bass, New York City, for plaintiffs in Civ.A. No. 5280.

Donald P. Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raymond R. Coia, Providence, R. I., for defendants in Civ.A. No. 5280.

OPINION AND ORDER

PETTINE, Chief Judge.

This is an action in the nature of Motion for Further Relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2202 seeking an injunction based on a declaratory judgment and decree entered by this court on April 20, 1972, in Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I.1970).

A review of the travel and some of the historical facts is necessary to fully appreciate the present controversy between inmates of the Adult Correctional Institution ("ACI") and the Rhode Island officials who administer and operate that facility. In one form or other this has been a four year serial of continuous agitation between the litigants. In some consecutive incidents the parties have admirably reconciled their differences after employing the intervention of the court. However, this case, pressed to a conclusion, necessitates a court ruling.

Findings of Fact

Based upon certain stipulated facts and on the testimony offered at a hearing on this motion, as well as testimony offered at the hearing for a preliminary injunction in Ben David v. Travisono, C.A. No. 5280 (August 8-10, 1973), the transcript of which, by agreement of the parties, is made a part of this record, the court makes the following finding of facts reiterating much of the stages of the litigation as is set out in Morris v. Travisono, supra.

On October 11, 1969, an inmate, Joseph Morris, filed Civil Action No. 4192 against Anthony Travisono, then Commissioner of Social Welfare, who at the time had jurisdiction over the Adult Correctional Institutions, and Acting Warden, John Sharkey, alleging certain brutal conduct in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. After the commencement of the trial on an amended complaint, the hearing was suspended so that the parties might discuss a possible resolution of the case. As a result of these negotiations, overseen by the court, a detailed set of procedures for the disciplining and classification of prisoners was approved by me and incorporated in an interim consent decree. The court retained jurisdiction for eighteen months while the parties continued their efforts to formulate a final decree and set of rules. To their great credit this was accomplished and on April 20, 1972 a judgment was entered as a final decree establishing "Regulations Governing Disciplinary, Classification, and Mail Procedures for all inmates at the Adult Correctional Institutions, State of Rhode Island." (hereinafter referred to as the "Morris Rules").¹

No injunctive relief was added to the declaration in the final decree because defendants agreed to adopt the "Morris Rules" and promulgate them pursuant to the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter "APA"), R.I. Gen.Laws sec. 42-35-1 et seq. within ninety (90) days of the judgment. This was done on October 10, 1972 and then filed with the Secretary of State on October 12, 1972.

Commencing in April 1973 a parade of horribles set in at the prison. On the 2nd there was an extensive riot in the maximum security section which resulted in a quarter to one half million dollars worth of damages; on May 27, an inmate was stabbed to death; June 22, was marked by the tragedy of a correctional officer being murdered by an inmate; additionally numerous other incidents took place including an alleged escape plot. In the end it became necessary to call upon the State Police to assist in the administration of the correctional duties.

On May 7, a new warden was appointed and finally on June 22, the defendant Travisono instructed the Secretary of State to suspend the "Morris Rules". The defendants effected this suspension by letter to the Secretary of State without filing any motion to modify or vacate this Court's judgment of April 20, 1972.²

At the hearing before me, the Warden stated as follows:

a) that he was advised by members of the State Attorney General's office, that to give the inmates, charged with the various violations resulting from the disturbances recited, supra, notices and hearings as required by the "Morris Rules" might prejudice the criminal cases being investigated by the state b) the disciplinary hearings were "unworkable" in that they led to fights between the inmates and guards and between the inmate being charged and inmate witnesses and that the prison staff was reluctant to administer such hearings during the suspension period;

c) he couldn't even follow the "emergency provisions" of the "Morris Rules", which permit a temporary reassignment of an inmate by a guard or supervisory official without prior hearing, because eventually the staff members' unilateral determination would have to be reviewed at a disciplinary hearing; the Warden flatly stated he could not allow this under the circumstances;

d) compliance with the "Morris Rules" was "a hassle all the way".

Additionally, he testified that the ACI was understaffed during the period leading up to and following the suspension of the "Morris Rules", apparently offering that fact in further justification for his determination that disciplinary hearings were simply impossible.

From June 22, 1973 to the date of the hearing on this motion, December 10, 12, 1973, the "Morris Rules" were suspended and there is some conflict as to exactly what took place during this period at the institution regarding disciplinary and classification procedures.

However, it appears that beginning on June 22, there was a general lockup³ for eighteen days after which different sections were opened on a trial basis. Visitation rights were restored after two weeks but according to the Warden's testimony the prison did not return to "normal" until late November 1973.

Since June 22, 1973 approximately eighteen inmates have been transferred, without the benefit of any procedural safeguards, to the "Behavioral Correction Unit" ("BCU"), a segregated cell-block in the Maximum Security Section, as a result of information given to the Warden from inmate informants alleging these men were involved in the aforementioned escape plot; and as of the date of the hearing on this motion 11-13 of these inmates were still there.

It must be noted that on August 6, 1973 part of the rules governing mail procedures at the institution was reinstituted by the defendants; and on November 26, 1973, while not reinstituting the "Morris Rules", as such, the defendants did promulgate without sanction or notification to this court new rules of procedural due process and classification (hereinafter "Revised Rules") and filed such rules with the Secretary of State, pursuant to the emergency provisions of the R. I. Administrative Procedures Act, R.I.G.L. sec. 42-35-1 et seq.⁴

Though I have made these findings of fact, I need not discuss them in relation to their legal implications. For the purpose of rendering injunctive relief, I need only consider the fact, as I do find and explain infra, that as of July 5 a state of emergency no longer existed at the "ACI"; order and safety had been restored; and that, nevertheless, the defendants deliberately and intentionally did not reinstitute the "Morris Rules" but rather continued to disregard any and all procedural due process rights to which the prisoners were entitled.⁵

There is no evidence in this record that the events recited had been caused by the "Morris Rules".

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The court readily asserts that a temporary deprivation of due process hearing requirements prior to disciplinary action may be justified under exigent circumstances. Indeed, the "Morris Rules" embody "Emergency or Temporary Provisions".

"Emergency or Temporary Provisions

When faced with an immediate threat to the security or safety of the Adult Correctional Institutions or any of its employees or inmates, officials of the institution may temporarily reassign inmates in accordance with the following regulations.

I. Reassignment by a correctional officer on approval of his immediate supervisor:

A. When correctional officer or other employee witnesses an inmate commit a serious wrongdoing.

B. When other inmates state that they saw an inmate commit a serious wrongdoing.

C. When inmate seeks safety or protection from others.

II. By supervisory officials of rank of Lieutenant or above, pending investigation:

A. When inmate is suspected of serious wrongdoing, either committed or planned.

B. When inmate is suspected of being a witness to overt acts which constitute a serious violation of institution regulations or a violation of state law.

C. When requested by prosecuting attorney or Superintendent of State Police.

1. When inmate is suspected as perpetrator of a crime.

2. When inmate is a material witness to a criminal act.

Requests under C will be honored upon oral request but shall not be observed beyond 72 hours in absence of receipt by Warden of a written confirmation by requesting authority.

III. All inmates assigned temporarily under the preceding provisions will as soon as security permits, be informed in writing of the reason for their assignment and will be afforded all other rights due them under institution disciplinary and classification procedures.

IV. A written record of all temporary reassignments shall be

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