Morris v. Travisono
| Decision Date | 25 August 1980 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 4192,77-0283. |
| Citation | 499 F. Supp. 149 |
| Parties | Joseph MORRIS et al. v. Anthony TRAVISONO et al. John CARILLO v. John J. MORAN et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Robert B. Mann, Providence, R. I., for plaintiffs.
Paul L. Foster, R. I. Dept. of Corrections, Cranston, R. I., for defendants.
Plaintiff John Carillo, an inmate at the Adult Correction Institutions (ACI), has been housed in some form of segregated or isolated confinement since June 22, 1973. He brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the conditions of his confinement are cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, and deprive him of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The case is also before the Court on plaintiff's motion to adjudge the defendants in civil contempt for failing to adhere to the April 20, 1972 consent judgment and order of this Court in Morris v. Travisono, C.A. 4192.
In addition to defending on the merits of plaintiff's § 1983 action, defendants filed an objection to the motion for contempt, thus bringing before the Court the question of whether intervening decisional law requires vacation of the Morris Rules.1
John Carillo has spent most of the last twenty-one years in the ACI as punishment for various crimes. He is currently serving a life sentence for the 1973 murder of a correctional officer. Since June 22, 1973, he has been in some form of segregated or isolated confinement in either the medium security Cell Block South (CBS), the maximum security Behavioral Control Unit (BCU), or in the, back area of the infirmary in maximum security. Except for a period of approximately fourteen months, he has been confined to his cell 23 to 24 hours a day, often having to choose between exercise and a shower during the one hour a day he is allowed out of his cell. According to an agreed statement of facts, plaintiff has had no work opportunities, no educational opportunities (except for one correspondence course in psychology), and no vocational programs for over six years. Moreover, the defendants have not devised a treatment or rehabilitation program for him as required by both the Morris Rules and R.I.G.L. § 42-56-29.
Carillo has had only limited access to newspapers, magazines, and other reading materials, and he has not been allowed to have in his cell such items as a coffee pot or a radio. Although he has been allowed limited visiting privileges—generally, one visitor a week or less—plaintiff has often declined to see visitors because he must wear handcuffs during visits. Plaintiff is allowed occasional visits with religious representatives, but he is not permitted to attend group religious services. Nor has he been allowed physical access to a law library, although in at least two instances, requested legal materials were brought to his cell.
According to psychologist Dr. Augustus Kinzel, plaintiff's expert, Carillo's segregated confinement has resulted in a traumatic neurosis with acute depression manifested by periods of intense irritability, withdrawal, inability to concentrate, a preoccupation with his body, insomnia, and a development of physical symptoms with little or no physical basis. Dr. Kinzel further testified that in his opinion plaintiff was not receiving adequate psychiatric treatment at the ACI, and that the care he was receiving was negligent.
Defendants' expert, psychologist Dr. Ronald Stewart, disagreed. He testified that Carillo has no definable psychotic disorder, although Dr. Stewart did concede that Carillo suffers from a "personality disorder, antisocial type," and could benefit from psychiatric treatment.
Since June 1973, Carillo has been classified other than "A" status, the normal category of inmate classification.2 From June, 1973 to January, 1974 he was in administrative segregation; on January 25, 1974, plaintiff appeared before a classification board and was reclassified to "B" status;3 since April, 1974 he has been in "C" status.4
The defendants have reviewed plaintiff's status every ninety days as required by the Morris Rules. Despite recommendations from both the Health Care Administrator for the ACI and a prison psychologist that Carillo be returned to general population, the defendants have not seen fit to change his classification status. According to prison officials the Board's decisions have been based on Carillo's conviction for murdering a correctional officer, his disciplinary record, and the fear that other inmates and correctional officers would harm Carillo. Deposition of Robert Black (I) at 6; Deposition of John Moran at 13; Deposition of Matthew Gill at 15; Deposition of John Brown at 5-6.
The Board's fears are not altogether unwarranted. Since June 22, 1973—the date Carillo was arrested for the murder of correctional officer Donald Price-he has been found guilty of more than thirty-five disciplinary infractions, including two bookings for assaults on correctional officers, and five bookings for creating a disturbance or inciting a riot. In the last two years, however, Carillo's disciplinary record has improved markedly; he has been found guilty of only seven disciplinary infractions, none of them of a violent nature. Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. Indeed, John Moran, the Director of the Department of Corrections, stated that except for an unspecified recent booking, Carillo has been essentially free from serious infractions for almost two years. Deposition at 12. Although Moran acknowledged that such behavior would normally merit placement in a higher classification status, he admitted that even if Carillo's attitude and adjustment were to be of a superior nature, it is unlikely that he would be released to general population, given the hostile attitude of the correctional officers toward Carillo and the possibility that they would harass him by "setting him up". Id. at 12-17; Letter of 9/7/79 to Special Master J. Michael Keating. The belief that Carillo would be harassed by correctional officers if he were returned to general population was shared by chief of classification services, Robert Black, deposition (II) at 15-16, deputy assistant director for adult services, John Brown, deposition at 6, and assistant director for adult services, Matthew Gill, deposition at 15, although none of them could recall instances of specific threats from correctional officers.
The adoption of the Morris Rules has been recounted in prior decisions of this Court, see, e. g., Morris v. Travisono, 373 F.Supp. 177 (D.R.I.1974); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F.Supp. 857 (D.R.I.1970), and needs only brief repetition here. On October 11, 1969, a group of inmates at the ACI brought suit in this Court challenging the constitutionality of the classification and disciplinary procedures at the prison and alleging that the quality of life at the ACI violated the eighth amendment to the constitution. After the trial began, the parties met to discuss a possible resolution. These negotiations, overseen by the Court, led to a detailed set of procedures for the discipline and classification of prisoners, which I approved and incorporated into an interim consent decree. The Court retained jurisdiction for eighteen months while the parties continued to formulate a final decree and set of rules. This was accomplished, and on April 20, 1972, a consent judgment was entered as a final decree establishing "Regulations Governing Disciplinary, Classification, and Mail Procedures for all inmates at the Adult Correctional Institutions, State of Rhode Island" (The Morris Rules).
In addition to establishing procedures for classification and discipline, the Morris Rules spelled out the privileges afforded inmates in each classification as well as the restrictions imposed upon them, Morris Rules at 5-8; they established minimum conditions of confinement which could not be altered or withdrawn as a form of punishment, Morris Rules at 17-19; and they enumerated those actions by inmates that would constitute "punishable conduct", Morris Rules at 16-17. The Morris Rules have remained in force since 1972.
Defendants argue that in light of recent decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976), as well as "massive improvements at the ACI" there is no longer a valid basis for continuing to enforce the Morris Rules.5
Their motion to vacate, although not labeled as such, is judged by the same standard that applies to a motion for relief from final judgment, since a consent judgment is a judicial act with the same force and effect as a judgment rendered following a contested trial. Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Southworth, 76 F.R.D. 115, 123 (D.R.I. 1977). Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 60(b) spells out the relevant criteria:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
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