Morris v. Warwick

• Decision Date: 29 March 1906
• Citation: 42 Wash. 480,85 P. 42
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: MORRIS v. WARWICK.

85 P. 42

42 Wash. 480

MORRIS v. WARWICK.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 29, 1906

Appeal from Superior Court, Lincoln County; W. T. Warren, Judge.

Action by Joseph N. Morris against Maynard Warwick. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

H. N Martin, J. T. Mulligan, and N. T. Caton, for appellant.

Merritt & Merritt, for respondent.

DUNBAR J.

This is an action brought by the appellant against the respondent for damages for alienating the affections of his wife. At the close of plaintiff's testimony defendant's motion for a nonsuit was denied, and at the close of the case the defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of the testimony and also moved the court for an instructed verdict. The court was of the opinion that the proper procedure would be to discharge the jury and enter judgment, which it proceeded to do, entering judgment in favor of the defendant.

In speaking of the case of Clark v. Great Northern Ry Co., 37 Wash. 537, 79 P. 1108, the court intimated that it was its duty to discharge the jury in this case and decide the case on the weight of the testimony making the following statement: 'I wish you would read that Clark Case all through. I do not know as I exactly understand it yet myself. If it means what it says, as I understand it, the jury would be simply an ornament.' The court, then proceeding, said: 'In this case the duty devolves upon the court under the law laid down to take the case from the jury and render a verdict in accordance with the court's opinion, and in view of the fact that the court in this case has listened to the testimony and is satisfied that a verdict in this case must be in favor of defendant, that the plaintiff has failed entirely to make out a case, and that the facts in this case, as applied to the law, would compel a verdict of that kind, and in view of the fact that you, gentlemen, not understanding the law, probably might bring in a vedict some other way, which I would be compelled to set aside, I think the proper thing to do would be to discharge the jury and render a verdict myself. So you are excused from any further duty in this case, and judgment will go for the defendant in this case.' The court evidently misinterpreted the Clark Case, for it was not the intention of this court in that case to subjugate the discretion of the jury in passing upon questions of fact to the will of the court, or to go beyond the provisions of the statute. In that case it appeared from statements made by the court that he thought a new trial ought to be granted for insufficiency of the evidence, but that the court did not have the legal authority to grant such new trial; and it was held by this court that the court erred in its construction of the law, for the statute (subdivision 7, § 5071, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St.) especially makes insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict a ground for granting a new trial. But it will be observed that it does not authorize the court to take the case from the jury and make a final determination of the issues itself; but that, acting on the supposition that substantial justice has not been done by reason of some mistake or inadvertence of the jury, simply gives the parties another trial.

As to how often the court would be justified in granting a new trial on the same testimony in the same case is a question to be determined by the appellate court in passing upon the proper exercise of such discretion on the part of the trial court. Under the theory of the law, however, the ultimate decision upon the question of fact involved is the province of the jury. Section 4994, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St provides that 'in all cases tried in the superior court with a jury in which the legal sufficiency of the evidence shall be challenged, and the court shall decide as a matter of law what verdict should be found, the court shall thereupon discharge the jury...