Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc.

Decision Date12 September 1996
Docket NumberNo. 96-1224,96-1224
Citation108 F.3d 429
Parties73 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 789, 70 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,696, 46 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 847, 6 A.D. Cases 985 Darlene F. MORRISON, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. CARLETON WOOLEN MILLS, INC. and Michael Riley, Defendants, Appellants. . Heard
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

David J. Kerman, Boston, with whom Robert Lewis and Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman were on briefs, for appellants.

Peter B. Bickerman with whom Robert J. Stolt, Walter F. McKee, Augusta, and Lipman & Katz, P.A. were on brief for appellee.

Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOYLE, * Senior District Judge.

CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge.

These appeals and cross-appeals relate to actions heard in the district court arising from federal and state claims of sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and disability discrimination brought by Darlene F. Morrison against her employer Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc. (the "Company"), and two of her supervisors, Michael Riley and Lee Moody. We affirm certain parts of the district court's judgment and reverse others.

I.

In Count I of her amended complaint, Morrison alleged that she was subjected by Carleton and the other defendants to sexual harassment, in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 4551, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In Count II, she alleged violation of the same state and federal statutes by reason of sex discrimination. In Counts III and IV, Morrison alleged that defendants had subjected her to discrimination on account of disability, in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

Trial before a jury began in the district court on October 4, 1994. 1 The Title VII claims of sexual harassment (Count I) and sex (gender) discrimination (Count II) were presented to the jury but only insofar as these claims were based upon conduct occurring on or after November 21, 1991, the effective date of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). The ADA disability discrimination claim (Count IV) was likewise presented to the jury. However, the Maine law claims for sexual harassment, sex discrimination and disability discrimination, and the Title VII claims for pre-November 21, 1991 conduct did not go to the jury but rather were reserved for later decision by the magistrate judge.

During the jury trial, the court, upon defendants' motion, dismissed as a matter of law all the claims (jury and non-jury) against Moody and many of the claims against Riley, to wit, the claims for sexual harassment (Count I) after November 21, 1991, for sex discrimination (Count II), and for disability discrimination (Counts III and IV). The court denied the Company's motions to dismiss the claims against itself.

On October 14, 1994, the jury returned verdicts in Morrison's favor on her Title VII post-November 21, 1991 sexual harassment claim (Count I) and her ADA disability claim (Count IV). The jury awarded Morrison $50,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The jury found against Morrison, and in favor of the Company, on her Title VII gender discrimination claim (Count II).

On April 10, 1995, the court issued its Memorandum of Decision deciding the non-jury claims that it had reserved for bench determination. On Count I, the court found that Morrison had been subjected to sexual harassment sufficiently severe and pervasive to create a hostile work environment prior to November 21, 1991. Consequently, it ruled in Morrison's favor, and against the Company and Riley, on her Maine law sexual harassment claim, and also on her Title VII sexual harassment claim for conduct prior to November 21, 1991. The court assessed a civil penalty for $10,000 under state law. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613(2)(B)(7) (West Supp.1996).

On Count II (gender discrimination) the court found no incidents of gender discrimination before November 21, 1991. It, therefore, ruled in favor of the defendants and against Morrison under Title VII. The court determined, however--contrary to the jury's Title VII verdict--that, after November 21, 1991, Morrison had been subjected to gender discrimination, finding the Company liable under the Maine Human Rights Act. 2 The court declined, however, to award her back pay, because it would be duplicative of the jury's damages award.

Finally, as to Count III, the court determined that plaintiff had not been disabled within the meaning of Maine law, and hence found against Morrison and for defendants on the Maine law disability claim. In determining that Morrison was not disabled, the court found that the Company "did not perceive her to be unable to perform a major life activity, specifically work." The court noted that the Company had only perceived Morrison as incapable of performing the single position of floorperson.

Defendants' post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, for new trial, and other relief were denied. Plaintiff's own motion for new trial was also denied.

The Company and Riley appeal, and Morrison cross-appeals, from the judgment and the rulings on the various motions below. Morrison has since expressly waived her cross-appeal from the jury's adverse verdict under Count II (gender discrimination).

II.

The evidence at trial, construed in the light most favorable to Morrison, showed essentially the following.

On August 23, 1983, Morrison was hired by the Company to work as a "spinner" in the spinning department. Later that year, Morrison bid on and was awarded the position of "sewer." Months later, she bid on and was awarded the position of "coner" in the yarn preparation department. Morrison held this position from approximately May of 1984 until January of 1987. All the positions held by Morrison up to this time were traditionally filled by female employees.

In December 1986, Morrison bid on the position of "temporary floorperson" on the third shift in the yarn preparation department. At this time, Riley was the shift supervisor on the third shift in the yarn preparation department. Riley was angry with Morrison for bidding on the floorperson position. Prior to December 1986, Morrison had once had an angry encounter with Riley when they both worked on the second shift. Riley had screamed at her for leaving her machine to go to the restroom.

A month later, Morrison was awarded the temporary floorperson position. As shift supervisor, Riley approved her transfer to the position and certified her satisfactory completion of the thirty-day probationary period. However, he had no discretion under the Company's contract with the Union to refuse a position to the most senior qualified person who bid on it, which, in this case, was Morrison.

When Morrison told Fred DeVaudreuil, the department supervisor and Riley's superior, that she had been awarded the floorperson position, he asked her to reconsider taking it. He indicated that the Company was not happy with her getting the job. Morrison believed that he was concerned that she would be injured and assured him that she would be careful.

In April 1987, seven female employees of Carleton filed a formal grievance against Riley, charging that he was harassing employees at the Company by yelling, making false accusations and threatening their jobs. The Company responded by stating that it did not condone shouting by anyone, but that employees must recognize that they are not at liberty "to ignore management directives or to be tardy in following them." Ultimately, this grievance was resolved informally, with Plant Manager Everett Owens advising Riley about the need to be more "low key."

In February 1988, Morrison bid on the permanent opening for the position of floorperson on the third shift. Once again, Riley became very angry, telling Morrison that the job was not for her, and that she was taking jobs away from men. Days after Morrison was awarded the floorperson bid, Riley told her that she was going to regret it, and that sooner or later he was going to get her out of the job.

The floorperson is responsible for bringing boxes of yarn on bobbins to the machine operators, for taking full cones of yarn, weighing them and storing them, and for changing the warp beams. Changing a warp beam, which can weigh up to 1,100 pounds when full of yarn, involves several steps. First, the warp is removed from its cradle with a crow-bar type of tool. The warp then drops about two inches, after which it must be rolled to where it can be picked up by a hydraulic lift and moved into a storage area.

Morrison remained in the floorperson position until March of 1989. During that time various incidents occurred that are relevant to the present action.

After changing a warp beam, Morrison went to wash her hands. When she left the restroom moments later, Riley was waiting for her. He accused her of being in the restroom for a long time and threatened to write her up.

Riley took Morrison into the plant manager's office. He then told her that he was a big person within the Company and that "any woman would be proud to have a man in a position like this."

Several female employees complained that the room was too hot because of the machinery. They asked Riley if he could open more of the ceiling vents. Riley said he thought that they were just having "hot flashes", and walked away.

Riley threatened to fire Morrison if she did not drive his girlfriend (and future wife) and co-employee, Juanita Courtney, to her house from work during her shift.

Riley told several people in Morrison's presence that the other female floorperson, Linda Paul, was able to stay in such a position because she and Moody patted each other on the rearend.

Morrison reported a problem with a box of yarn to Riley, who told her she was probably so dumb s...

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