Burnett v. Ocean Props., Ltd.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2019
• Docket Number: 2:16-cv-00359-JAW
• Citation: 422 F.Supp.3d 369
• Parties: Ryan D. BURNETT, Plaintiff, v. OCEAN PROPERTIES, LTD. and AmeriPort, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

422 F.Supp.3d 369

Ryan D. BURNETT, Plaintiff,

v.OCEAN PROPERTIES, LTD. and AmeriPort, LLC, Defendant.

2:16-cv-00359-JAW

United States District Court, D. Maine.

Signed September 30, 2019

Laura H. White, Danielle M. Quinlan, Bergen & Parkinson LLC, Kennebunk, ME, for Plaintiff.

Maureen M. Deskins, Ocean Properties Ltd, Tampa, FL, Timothy J. Bryant, Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau, & Pachios, LLP, Elizabeth A. Germani, Robert P. Hayes, Germani Martemucci & Hill, Portland, ME, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING AMERIPORT LLC'S POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Faced with an adverse verdict in this action for failure to accommodate in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S. §§ 4551 et seq. , and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. , a defendant filed several post-trial motions to vacate, or in the alternative, reduce the jury's verdict. The Court denies the motions.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 1, 2018, at the close of a three-day trial, a jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff Ryan Burnett and awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. Jury Verdict at 1 (ECF No. 179) (Verdict ); Jury Punitive Damages Verdict at 1 (ECF No. 180). As part of its verdict on compensatory damages, the jury made the following findings of fact: (1) that Ocean Properties was an employer or joint employer of Mr. Burnett; (2), that Ocean Properties and AmeriPort were integrated employers of Mr. Burnett; and (3) that Mr. Burnett's employer had more than 500 employees when he worked there. Verdict at 1-2. Judgment was entered on behalf of Mr. Burnett on November 13, 2018. J. (ECF No. 188).

On December 11, 2018, AmeriPort, LLC (AmeriPort) filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, a motion for a new trial, and a motion for remittitur. Def. Ameriport, LLC's Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law (ECF No. 196) (Def.'s Rule 50(b) Mot. ); Def., Ameriport LLC's Mot. for New Trial (ECF No. 197) (Def.'s Mot. for New Trial ); Def., Ameriport, LLC's Mot. for Remittitur (ECF No. 198) (Def.'s Mot. for Remittitur ). On February 5, 2019, Mr. Burnett responded in opposition to each of AmeriPort's motions. Pl.'s Opp'n to Def. Ameriport's Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law (ECF No. 213) (Pl.'s Opp'n to Rule 50(b) Mot. ); Pl.'s Opp'n to Def. Ocean Properties, LTD.'s Mot. for New Trial (ECF No. 214) (Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. for New Trial ); Pl.'s Opp'n to Def. Ameriport's Mot. for Remittitur (ECF No. 211) (Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. for Remittitur ). On March 1, 2019, AmeriPort replied. Def., Ameriport, LLC's Reply to Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law (ECF No. 219) (Def.'s Reply Rule 50(b) Mot. ); Def., Ameriport, LLC's Reply in Support of the Mot. for New Trial (ECF No. 220) (Def.'s Reply Mot. for New Trial ); Def., Ameriport, LLC's Reply in Support of the Mot. for Remittitur (ECF No. 221) (Def.'s Reply Mot. for Remittitur ).

II. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

A. Positions of the Parties

1. AmeriPort's Motion

AmeriPort LLC (AmeriPort) moves for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 and 59 and District of Maine Local Rule 7. Def's Rule 50(b) Mot. at 1. AmeriPort advances three arguments in support of its position.¹ First, it contends that Mr. Burnett's administrative charge is defective and does not put Ocean Properties on notice of the conduct raised in Mr. Burnett's Complaint. Id. at 2 (citing First Am. Compl. (ECF No. 7); Pl.'s Tr. Ex. 63, EEOC Complaint of Discrimination (EEOC Charge )). According to AmeriPort, because Mr. Burnett failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit for damages under the ADA and the MHRA, compensatory and punitive damages are not available. Id. Second, AmeriPort argues that the trial record established that Mr. Burnett was "able to perform the essential functions of his job without accommodation ... [and] his claim must fail as a matter of law because he never established that automatic or push-button doors were necessary for him to perform the essential functions of his job." Id. at 9-10. Third, AmeriPort contends that Mr. Burnett "failed to establish that the Defendants acted with malice or reckless indifference," therefore, the Court erred in instructing the jury on punitive damages, and the jury's punitive damages verdict should be overturned. Id. at 11.

As evidence of its first argument, AmeriPort states, "Plaintiff's trial was about a single failure to accommodate, that [Ocean Properties] and AmeriPort purportedly ignored, an August 28, 2014 request for an accommodation for heavy wooden doors—this was never included in the Charge. " Id. at 2 (emphasis supplied). AmeriPort contends that this argument "has been raised and is ripe" because AmeriPort and Ocean Properties raised Mr. Burnett's failure to exhaust administrative remedies in its Partial Motion to Dismiss, its Answer and Affirmative Defenses, and its Final Pretrial Memoranda. Id. (citing Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction at 4 (ECF No. 19); Answer to Am. Compl. at 12 (ECF No. 20); Final Pretrial Mem. at 1 (ECF No. 84)). According to AmeriPort, "discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges." Id. at 4 (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) ; Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. , 550 U.S. 618, 639, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007) ). AmeriPort states that "the administrative claim serves the important purpose of giving notice to the EEOC and the employer of the alleged violation, which allows the employer to take corrective action." Id. at 5 (citing Thornton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 587 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2009) ; Powers v. Grinnell Corp. , 915 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1990) ).

Second, AmeriPort contends that judgment as a matter of law should be granted in its favor because Mr. Burnett's request for push-button door access was not necessary for him to perform the essential functions of his job, and therefore was not a "reasonable accommodation." Id. at 7. It cites this Court as stating in its prior order on the Defendants' motion for summary judgment that when an employer has already taken "plainly reasonable" measures to accommodate an employee's disability, summary judgment should be granted in the Defendant's favor. Id. (citing Mot. for Summary J. at 63 (ECF No. 81) (Mot. for Summary J. )). AmeriPort also states that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the requested accommodation would effectively enable him to perform his job. Id. (citing Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc. , 244 F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 2001) ; Corujo-Martin v. Triple-S, Inc. , 519 F. Supp. 2d 201, 216 (D.P.R. 2007) ). The Defendant claims that "the record evidence established that Mr. Burnett was able to perform the essential functions of his job without accommodation." Id. at 9 (citing Trial Tr. Vol. I at 85, 107 (ECF No. 190) (Trial Tr. I ); Trial Tr. Vol II at 284-85 (ECF No. 191) (Trial Tr. II )).

Finally, AmeriPort argues that Mr. Burnett failed to satisfy his burden of providing malice or reckless indifference by a showing of clear and convincing evidence as required to prove punitive damages. Id. at 10 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) ; 5 M.R.S. § 4613(2)(B)(8)(c) ; Batchelder v. Realty Res. Hosp., LLC , 2007 ME 17, ¶ 20, 914 A.2d 1116, 1123 ). AmeriPort notes that courts have exercised caution in allowing punitive damages and have set limits on their availability. Id. at 11 (citing Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assoc. , 527 U.S. 526, 535-36, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999) ; Kinnon v.Kwong Wah Rest. , 83 F.3d 498, 508 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Lee v. S. Home Sites Corp. , 429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970) ); Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. , 116 F.2d 708, 717 (1st Cir. 1941) (alteration in ordering)). AmeriPort also cites Marcano-Rivera v. Pueblo Intern., Inc. 232 F.3d 245, 249 (1st Cir. 2000), in which the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision not to instruct the jury on punitive damages where the plaintiff "had failed to generate any facts that would demonstrate that the defendant was aware that its actions were in violation of federal law." Def.'s Rule 50(b) Mot. at 12-13 (citing Marcano-Rivera , 232 F.3d at 254 ). Here, AmeriPort states that "Plaintiff presented no evidence that AmeriPort or Ocean Properties, Ltd., knew that their failure to provide Plaintiff with automatic or push-button doors was a violation of federal law." Id. at 14.

2. Ryan Burnett's Opposition

In response, Mr. Burnett argues that AmeriPort is "severely limited in the arguments it can advance at this stage" because "a post-trial motion for judgment can be granted only on grounds advanced in the pre-verdict motion." Pl.'s Opp'n to Rule 50(b) Mot. at 1-2 (quoting Robles-Vazquez v. Tirado Garcia , 110 F.3d 204, 206 (1st Cir. 1997) ). According to Mr. Burnett, AmeriPort made no motion for judgment as a matter of law prior to the verdict in this case, and Ocean Properties only moved for judgment as a matter of law on whether Mr. Burnett had established Ocean Properties and AmeriPort to be integrated or joint employers. Id. at 2 (citing Trial Tr. II 269:16-21). Mr. Burnett avers that if the Court were to proceed on the merits of AmeriPort's arguments, the burden for successfully challenging a jury's verdict is that the Defendant "must prove that ‘as a matter of law, the facts and inferences are such that no reasonable fact finder could have reached a verdict against the movant.’ " Id. at 2 (citing Palmquist v. Shinseki , 808 F. Supp. 2d 322, 338-339 (D. Me. 2011) (quoting Webber v. Int'l Paper Co. , 326 F. Supp. 2d 160, 165 (D. Me. 2004) )). Furthermore, Mr. Burnett states that in ruling on a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, "drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor." Id. (quoting McMillan v....