Morrison v. City of Lawrence

• Citation: 186 Mass. 456,72 N.E. 91
• Parties: MORRISON v. CITY OF LAWRENCE.
• Decision Date: 18 October 1904
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

186 Mass. 456

72 N.E. 91

MORRISON v. CITY OF LAWRENCE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

October 18, 1904

COUNSEL

Sweeney, Dow & Cox, for plaintiff.

J. P Kane, for defendant.

OPINION

BRALEY, J.

This is an action of tort to recover damages for the wrongful exclusion of the plaintiff as a scholar from the high school maintained by the defendant, and, the plaintiff having obtained a verdict, the case is here on exceptions taken by the defendant to the admission of evidence, and to adverse rulings as to its liability. If these are taken up in their order, the exception to the admission of certain evidence is to be first considered.

It was obligatory on the plaintiff to show that he did not voluntarily leave school. For this purpose it was open to him to prove that he left because suspended by the superintendent of schools, and that his suspension, which was confirmed by the committee, had followed immediately upon a statement made in his presence by the principal of the school, who had taken him for this purpose before the superintendent. It also became important to describe the character or show the object of the act which formed a part of the transaction in issue and what was said at the time became admissible, although neither the superintendent nor the principal were parties to the suit. Haynes v. Rutter, 24 Pick. 242, 245; Lund v. Tygnsborough, 9 Cush. 36, 42.

Besides, after the plaintiff had testified, the statement containing the charges then made, and afterwards repeated by the principal before the committee, and who became a witness at the trial, was admitted without objection, and the defendant fails to show that it was prejudiced by the introduction of evidence claimed by it at one time to be irrelevant, and afterwards unopposed when introduced in another form, though covering the same subject. Peebles v. Boston & Albany Railroad Co., 112 Mass. 498. Moreover, it is shown by the exceptions that the principal had been his accuser from the beginning, and his cross-examination of what he had said and done concerning the plaintiff, and which included a narration of the proceedings before the superintendent, was competent, in connection with the issue presented, as indicating the nature of the relations between them, and it would be for the jury to determine how far, if at all, it affected his credit as a witness. Commonwealth v. Jennings, 107 Mass. 448, 491. See, also, Proprietors of Liverpool Wharf v. Prescott, 4 Allen, 22.

The remaining exceptions to the refusal to rule that upon all the evidence there was no issue of fact for the consideration of the jury, and the defendant was entitled to a verdict, present the principal questions raised and argued. It must be taken as settled in the management of the public schools that, when a school committee acts in good faith while exercising the plenary powers conferred upon them by statute, and order the permanent exclusion of a scholar therefrom, no suit can be maintained by him because of their action. Watson v. Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561, 563, 32 N.E. 864; Bishop v. Rowley, 165 Mass. 460, 462, 43 N.E. 191.

But before such an order can be considered final, under St. 1898, p. 455, c. 496, § 9, in force at this time, the pupil, if his parent or guardian desires, must be granted a hearing, otherwise such exclusion becomes unlawful. Bishop v. Rowley, ubi supra. See, also, in this connection, Rev. Laws, c. 44, § 8. And it was said in the former decision of this case, when discussing the action of the committee, which, it was then claimed, prevented the plaintiff from introducing evidence of certain witnesses at such a hearing held for the purpose of ascertaining the facts, that 'it may or may not have had an important bearing upon the hearing, but it has not been contended that the committee acted otherwise than in good faith,' and the verdict for the plaintiff was set aside and a new trial ordered. Morrison v. City of Lawrence, 181 Mass. 127, 131, 63 N.E. 400.

At the second trial the plaintiff rested his right to recover solely on the ground that after notice of his exclusion from school, though the committee granted to him an opportunity to be heard, they did not act in good faith, because they refused to allow him to fully present his side of the case, and he contends that their action was equivalent to a denial of a hearing, and his exclusion, which was treated by them as final, became unlawful, and it is therefore necessary to determine whether there was any evidence to be submitted to the jury in support of his contention. A hearing of this nature does not take on all the formalities of a trial usual in a court of law, nor is it necessarily governed by the strict rules of evidence, and a school committee is apparently not included among those special tribunals which have power to summon or compel the attendance of witnesses, or before whom witnesses may be compelled to attend and give evidence. Pub. St. 1882, c. 112, § 25; Id. c. 169, §§ 7, 8; St. 1882, p. 211, c. 267; St. 1883, p. 494, c. 195; St. 1885, p. 778, c. 323, § 2; St. 1891, p. 745, c. 140; St. 1898, p. 314, c. 374; St. 1900, p. 194, c. 267, § 1; Rev. Laws, c. 175, §§ 8-11; Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 118, 123, 21 Am. Rep. 502; First National Bank of Chicago v. Graham, 175 Mass. 179, 55 N.E. 991. If the plaintiff had summoned witnesses, their attendance could not have been enforced, or, if voluntarily present, they might have refused to testify, and the committee could not have aided him, and, so far as his case depended on their evidence, he would have been remediless. Nevertheless, they were required to grant him a full opportunity to be heard upon the facts, to hear and consider the testimony of such witnesses as he might call, and permit him to fully present his case in such orderly manner as they might direct. The hearing afforded may be of no value if relevant evidence, when offered, is refused admission, or those who otherwise would testify in behalf of the excluded pupil prevented by the action of the committee. How far an administrative board clothed with quasi judicial powers, which has decided upon a definite course of action in a case, will be willing to review its decision, must depend largely upon the sound judgment and sense of justice of its members; but in granting this right to a pupil whom they propose to permanently exclude from the benefit of the public schools, the law presumes that when called upon to reconsider their purpose they will listen patiently to his case as fully as he wishes to present it, so long as such presentation does not range beyond the legitimate limits of the issue involved. When it appears that a fair trial has been given, and the pupil allowed to present the merits of his cause, mere errors committed in the admission or exclusion of evidence are not enough to make invalid a final adverse decision. See Bishop v. Rowley, ubi supra; Morrison v. Lawrence, ubi supra.

It was claimed by the plaintiff that the controversy between him and the principal arose out of an article derogatory to the latter, published in his father's newspaper, and that his exclusion was caused by the publication of this criticism and not because of inattention to his studies or for want of correct deportment. After his 'indefinite suspension' had been ordered, and remained unmodified, the plaintiff's father asked for a hearing before the committee, and, upon this being granted, the plaintiff appeared at the time and place designated by them. The principal of the high school was also...