Morrison v. Frantz
| Decision Date | 17 January 1928 |
| Parties | MORRISON v. FRANTZ et al. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted January 11, 1928.
Syllabus by the Court.
Where the indorser of a promissory negotiable note, payable on demand, expressly waives "presentment, protest, and notice of dishonor," in the face of the note, it is not necessary for the holder to present the note at the place of payment, and demand payment, in order to preserve the liability of the indorsers thereon; and he may maintain suit thereon against them when the note becomes payable without having presented it at the place of payment and had the same protested for nonpayment, and notices of dishonor sent to the indorsers.
Case Certified from Circuit Court, Cabell County.
Action by J. A. Morrison against L. N. Frantz, John S. Farr, and J R. Lilly, defended by the last two defendants. The trial court's ruling rejecting a plea of defendants on plaintiff's demurrer thereto was certified for review. Ruling affirmed.
Simms & Staker, of Huntington, for plaintiff.
Via Hardwick & Quinlan and McClure & Winters, all of Huntington for defendants Farr and Lilly.
Plaintiff Morrison sued defendants, L. N. Frantz, John S. Farr, and J. R. Lilly, on a promissory negotiable note by notice of motion for judgment to be made in court on May 27, 1927. The note is as follows:
"Huntington, W.Va., April 14, 1919.
On demand, after date for value received I promise to pay to the order of J. A. Morrison five thousand dollars, negotiable and payable at the American Bank & Trust Company of Huntington, W.Va. The makers and endorsers of this note hereby waive presentment, protest and notices of dishonor.
[Signed] L. N. Frantz."
On the back of the note are the words: "Indorsed, J. R. Lilly, John S. Farr," followed by notations of payment of interest as follows:
"Int. paid to April 14, 1920, $300.00; Int. paid to April 14, 1921, $300.00; Int. paid to April 14, 1922; Int. paid to April 14, 1923."
L. N. Frantz made no defense to the suit. Lilly and Farr appeared, pleaded the general issue, and tendered two special pleas. Plea No. 1 was allowed to be filed, on which issue was joined, but plea No. 2 was rejected. The ruling of the court in rejecting plea No. 2 on demurrer of plaintiff thereto was certified to this court for review, upon the joint application of the parties. The notice of motion copied the above note, and alleged that the waiver of protest, presentment, and notices of protest on the face of the note was a part of the contract agreed to by the maker and indorsers, and therefore it was not necessary for plaintiff to present the note for payment, nor to protest same, nor to give notices of dishonor in order to bind the indorsers. Plea No. 2 set up the fact that no demand for payment was made within a reasonable time after the execution of the note either upon the maker or indorsers, for the eight years (the time between the date of note and time when suit was begun) was not a "reasonable time" in which payment should be demanded. Plaintiff contended that presentment for payment is the same as demand for payment, and that defendants had waived presentment for payment, and no demand for payment was necessary within the period of limitation on the right to maintain suit. Thus the controlling question on the correctness of the trial court's ruling was clearly presented.
In England it seems to be the rule that a demand note is a continuing security, and it is not necessary to present it for payment on the next day, but, as a general rule in the states, presentment for payment must be speedily made in order to hold the indorsers. Daniel, Neg. Insts. (6th Ed.) § 606. However, our statute (chapter 98A, § 71, Code) provides that, if the instrument is payable on demand, presentment must be made within a reasonable time after it is due; and it is very generally held that what is a "reasonable time" depends upon the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade with respect to such instrument, and the facts of the particular case. 5 Uniform Laws Anno. p. 529, § 193, and section 71; Davis National Bank v. Kight, 86 W.Va. 319, 103 S.E. 482. The rejected plea avers that eight years in this case is an unreasonable delay in making demand for payment of the $5,000 note. Plaintiff counters by saying that presentment for payment was expressly waived on the face of the note by the maker and indorsers. Chapter 98A, § 82, Code. Defendants say there is a distinction between "presentment" and "demand for payment." What is "presentment" within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Law? What is the purpose of presenting the note to the maker or to the bank where payable? Presentment in the law merchant is the production of a bill of exchange or promissory note to the party on whom the former is drawn for his acceptance, or to the person bound to pay either, for payment. Century Ed. Bouvier's Law Dic. p. 970; Rawles' Bouvier's Law Dic. (3d Ed.) p. 2674; Black's Law Dic. (2d Ed.) p. 934. Where the instrument has been executed and the parties bound thereby,...
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