Morrison v. Galyon Motor Co.

• Citation: 64 S.W.2d 851
• Parties: MORRISON v. GALYON MOTOR CO.
• Decision Date: 03 February 1932
• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee

64 S.W.2d 851

MORRISON v. GALYON MOTOR CO.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section.

February 3, 1932.

Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court April 17, 1932.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Roane County; J. H. Wallace, Chancellor.

Bill by Carl Morrison against the Galyon Motor Company, in which defendant filed a cross-bill. From a decree dismissing the original bill, sustaining the cross-bill, and rendering judgment thereon against complainant for $239.75, as balance due after resale of a truck repossessed from complainant under a conditional sales contract, complainant appeals.

Affirmed.

R. H. Ward, of Kingston, for appellant.

Burn & Michael, of Sweetwater, for appellee.

SNODGRASS, Judge.

Original complainant, Carl Morrison, who was defendant to the cross-bill, appealed from the decree above indicated.

The assignments of error, eight in number, set forth the conditions more fully and are as follows:

"I. The Chancellor erred in dismissing complainant's bill and declining to grant the relief therein prayed. The Chancellor should have sustained the bill and held that under the law there is only two methods by which a conditional seller can regain property sold under a conditional sale contract, after default in the payment of installment provided for in the contract, namely, (a) Process of law, or (2) by the voluntary surrender by the conditional purchaser.

"II. Because the Chancellor erred in holding that the conditional seller had the right to enter upon the premises of the conditional purchaser and remove the truck therefrom, without process of law, or without consent. The Chancellor should have held that under the law the conditional seller would not have the right to arbitrarily enter upon the premises of a conditional purchaser and remove the property therefrom without process of law.

"III. Because the Court erred in holding that as a matter of law the temporary removal of property sold under conditional sales contract into another State would constitute a default that would give the conditional seller the right to enter upon the premises and remove property sold under conditional sale contract without process of law, or permission or consent of the conditional purchaser.

"IV. Because the Chancellor erred in holding as a matter of law that by reason of the conditional purchaser having given a check for part of the original consideration and it remaining unpaid, and the possession of property having been delivered to the conditional purchaser and the check remaining unpaid would constitute a default and would give the conditional seller the right to take possession of the property sold under the conditional sale law, without process of law. The Chancellor should have held that under the law, after the execution and delivery of the check, and the delivery of the possession of said truck to the conditional purchaser, that the failure to pay said check when presented at the payee bank would not be such default as contemplated by the conditional sale law to give the conditional seller the right to regain possession of the property.

"V. Because the Chancellor erred in holding that the temporary removal of property purchased under conditional sales contract into another state, and the failure to pay a check given as part of the original consideration constitute such a default in the conditional sale contract as would give the conditional seller the right to enforce the conditional sale contract, and sell the property in accordance with the conditional sale law. The Chancellor should have held that the temporary removal of the property into another state, and the failure to pay the check given as part of the original consideration for the property sold under conditional sale contract is not such a default known to the law, and the only default known to the law is a default in the payment of a deferred installment of the remaining unpaid consideration, as provided for by statute.

"VI. Because the Chancellor erred in holding that the defendant, the conditional seller, had legally obtained the possession of said truck, as shown by the term of the conditional sale contract there was no installment past due at the time the conditional seller acquired possession thereof.

"The Chancellor should have held that the conditional purchaser was not in default in payment of a deferred installment of the remaining unpaid consideration, and by reason of not being in default in payment, the defendant acquired possession unlawfully.

"VII. Because the Chancellor erred in sustaining the cross-bill, and granting the relief prayed.

"The Chancellor should have held that there was no showing in the cross-bill or in the proof, of a default in the payment of the consideration at maturity, and without such showing denied relief.

"VIII. Because the Chancellor erred in holding that a check given as part of the original considerations, and a conditional note given for the deferred balance, and the possession of the property delivered to the conditional purchaser, and upon nonpayment of the check the conditional seller would have the right to take possession of the property under the conditional sale statute.

"The Chancellor should have held that upon...