Morrison v. March

• Decision Date: 01 January 1860
• Parties: WILLIAM C. MORRISON et al. vs. GEORGE S. MARCH.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

4 Minn. 325

(4 Minn. R. p. 422.)

WILLIAM C. MORRISON et al.vs.

GEORGE S. MARCH.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Error to district court, Ramsey County.

Smith & Gilman and M. E. Ames, for plaintiff in error.

Allis & Peckham, for defendant in error.

FLANDRAU, J.

Previous to, and on the first day of April, 1857, R. M. Spencer was the owner of lots eight and nine, in block twelve, in St. Paul proper. On the first day of April, 1857, there were upon the said lots three buildings, which said Spencer sold to Langley & Scales. On the 21st day of October, 1857, Scales sold S. S. Eaton an undivided half interest in two of the buildings, one of which was a two-story, and one a one-story, building. On the 22d day of October, 1857, Langley sold to Eaton the other half of the buildings, in which he had already purchased the interest of Scales, and also the third building. On the 8th day of January, 1858, Eaton sold to W. C. Morrison, the plaintiff in error, the one-story building, the whole of which he had purchased from Langley & Scales, and afterwards, and before the 12th day of June, 1858, he sold to Morrison the two-story building. Morrison, previous to the 12th day of June, 1858, went into possession of the buildings by leasing them to tenants who were in the actual occupation of them before, on, and after, the 12th day of June, 1858. All of the leases had expired before the commencement of this action. The original conveyance from Spencer to Langley & Scales contained the stipulation that the buildings were to be removed from the lots between the 1st day of May, 1857, and the 15th day of October, 1858. Morrison, however, did not remove the buildings within the stipulated time, but paid Spencer ground rent for allowing them to remain. On the 12th day of June, 1858, the defendant in error, March, loaned money to Spencer, and took a mortgage on the lots in question, to secure the same, and on the same day had the same duly recorded. None of the conveyances above enumerated were recorded.

After the leases of Morrison's tenants had expired, he commenced to remove the two-story building from the lots, and had actually removed the same entirely off the land when the injunction issued in this case was served upon him. The plaintiff asks a perpetual injunction against Morrison and Spencer, and all claiming under them, from removing the buildings, and for damages, &c. The court granted the relief sought, and made the injunction perpetual against further interference with the buildings, and gave damages for the value of the house removed, in the sum of five hundred dollars.

The court finds as a fact that the lots, exclusive of the buildings, were worth $7,500, and that the plaintiff has foreclosed his mortgage and purchased the land for the full amount of his debt, principal and interest, which was considerably less than the value of the land. The court also finds that March did not make any inquiry of the tenants, who were in possession, as to their interests or that of their landlord, but that Spencer told him that he (Spencer) was unable to collect rent for such tenants.

No case is made, nor bill of exceptions. The record brings up the decision of the court with the findings of fact and law separately, and the judgment thereon. The counsel for the defendant in error insists that the questions can only be reviewed by making a case or bill of exceptions. He cites us to several cases in the court of appeals of New York, which sustain his views so far as a review in that court is concerned, but we do not think that the same rule necessarily applies to this. In the case of Ullman v. Bazille, 2 Minn. [134], we decided that the report of a referee, as well as the decision of the court, should state the facts and conclusions of law separately, and that we should not review any questions which were not properly of record, except upon a case or bill of exceptions. In that case, the referee had attempted to insert in his report all the evidence, and his rulings, and the exceptions of counsel, which we held to be improper, because such questions were not properly of record, unless made so by incorporating them in a case or bill of exceptions, and attaching it to the record; but the question whether the special findings of fact by the court or referee justify the conclusions of law which he draws from them, and the judgment which follows, are properly of record, because they go into the judgment roll and form part of it. Comp. Stat. 566, § 75; id. 562, § 41; id. 564, § 54.

The counsel says that our statute makes it imperative that a case shall be made whenever an appeal is taken, and cites Comp. Stat. 565, § 63. But it will be seen on a careful examination of this section, that it only applies to cases tried by a jury, and not to a trial by the court, where the decision may be filed out of term as well as in term.

It is our opinion that the reason the statute requires the judge to file his decision in writing, stating the facts and conclusions of law separately, is to allow this court to review the question whether the facts sustain the conclusions. It has always been the practice in this court to review a case thus presented, although the question has not been directly made before, of the necessity of a bill of exceptions or case that I now remember. In the case of Baldwin v. Allison, 3 Minn. [83], the judge had made his decision without writing, or a statement of the facts and conclusions separately, and we refused to hear it, and sent it back for correction in this respect; which was accordingly done, and the case entertained and determined upon the decision.

The counsel for the defendant in error urges another reason for the necessity of a case or bill of exceptions, which is more forcible, and may prove the necessity in some cases, while it fails in showing any good reason why it should become an universal rule. He says the judge may have erred in his conclusions of fact, and been right in his conclusions of law, and vice versa; that as this case comes here, if we find the law not sustained by the facts as found, we are obliged to reverse the judgment; whereas, if the evidence upon which the facts were found was before us, as it would be if a case was required, we could correct the facts first, and thus by harmonizing them with the law as found, the judgment would not be disturbed. There are several reasons why this should not be made a general rule, by imposing the duty of making a case upon the appealing party; while there are good reasons also why, in some cases, the successful party below should have the right to present the whole case. The first and insuperable obstacle rests with the statute, which allows the appealing party to come up without a case. The second, and very important reason, is in the rule that in almost all cases the findings of fact by the court are as conclusive as those found by a jury. It is a mistaken idea that a case tried by the court comes to us in the same condition for review, that equity cases formerly came to the chancellor from the decision of the vice-chancellor. Under the practice in chancery, as it formerly existed, the testimony in all cases was taken out of court by examiners, and reported in writing, and upon the written testimony the vice-chancellor (if it came originally before him) made his decree. The appeal to the chancellor took up the same evidence exactly that was before the lower court, and gave the chancellor sitting in review the same opportunity of judging of the facts that was enjoyed by the lower court. Under our practice the case is very different. The testimony is taken in open court orally before the judge, who sits upon the facts in exactly the same manner that a jury does, and enjoys all the advantages possessed by a jury of judging of the credibility of the witnesses from their deportment on the stand, the amount of intelligence displayed by them, and the many other circumstances incident to a personal examination, which are often the most valuable auxiliaries in a search for truth, and which are wholly denied to a court of review. The same reasons, therefore, that restrain appellate courts from interfering with the verdict of juries, apply with nearly the same force, in almost all cases, to decisions made by the court sitting as a jury. These remarks, of course, are addressed to those cases in which the testimony is that of witnesses sworn and examined in the presence of the court. Cases may, and often do, arise, in which the only testimony introduced is documentary, or where the testimony was taken and reported to the court by a referee. In such cases, the court above, if it thought it possessed the same facilities of judging of the facts that were enjoyed by the court below, would look into them with greater freedom, and reverse findings of fact where it otherwise would feel restrained from interfering. This alone is a good reason why a case should not be always required, and is the probable one why the legislature have not exacted it. But suppose a case should arise, as suggested by the counsel, in which he is successful below in obtaining a judgment which he sees cannot be supported upon the facts as the court has found them, and...