Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Medical

• Decision Date: 07 November 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-14082.,06-14082.
• Citation: 506 F.3d 1317
• Parties: Cynthia MORRISSETTE-BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOBILE INFIRMARY MEDICAL CENTER, Infirmary Healthcare Systems, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

506 F.3d 1317

Cynthia MORRISSETTE-BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOBILE INFIRMARY MEDICAL CENTER, Infirmary Healthcare Systems, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 06-14082.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

November 7, 2007.

Ronnie L. Williams, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Celia J. Collins, Wade B. Perry, Jr., Johnstone, Adams, Bailey, Gordon & Harris, L.L.C., Mobile, AL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.

Before MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and LAND,^* District Judge.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

Cynthia Morrissette-Brown, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, appeals the district court's entry of final judgment after a bench trial, in favor of her former employer, the Mobile Infirmary Medical Center, Infirmary Healthcare Systems ("Mobile Infirmary"), on her religious discrimination claim alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Morrissette-Brown asserted that she was terminated in February 2003 from her position as a unit secretary because her "deep religious convictions" as a Seventh-day Adventist prevented her from working any scheduled Friday or Saturday shift from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. On appeal, Morrissette-Brown challenges the district court's factual findings: (1) that she was not terminated and was still employed by Mobile Infirmary after a meeting on February 24, 2003, and (2) that the hospital reasonably accommodated her religious beliefs and observances. After thorough review of the record, we affirm.

We review for clear error factual findings made by a district court after a bench trial. Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 425 F.3d 1325, 1350 (11th Cir. 2005); Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). "Clear error is a highly deferential standard of review." Holton, 425 F.3d at 1350. A factual finding is clearly erroneous "when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)). In Anderson, the Supreme Court explained that the clear error standard

plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently. The reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule 52(a) if it undertakes to duplicate the role of the lower court. In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo. If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.

Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Morrissette-Brown first challenges the district court's finding that after being on an involuntary one-month leave of absence and attending a meeting with William Stembridge, Director of Employee Relations for Mobile Infirmary, and Laura Hobson, who was in charge of hiring unit secretaries, Morrissette-Brown was not terminated but remained employed by Mobile Infirmary. Both Stembridge and Hobson testified about the meeting, which took place on February 24, 2003. Although they recommended terminating Morrissette-Brown after the meeting, they testified that she was not terminated because the appropriate personnel never signed the necessary documentation.

In fact, the district court found as a fact that Morrissette-Brown was not terminated at this time, but instead was offered a flex certified nursing assistant ("CNA") position. As the district court found, Mobile Infirmary offered Morrissette-Brown the position "several times by telephone, but received no response." Moreover, Mobile Infirmary offered the position to Morrissette-Brown in several letters. A representative of the plaintiff's church, rather than the plaintiff herself, contacted Mobile Infirmary and requested that all further communication be made through the representative, but Morrissette-Brown, either herself or through the church representative, never responded to the flex CNA job offer.¹

In addition to the testimony of Stembridge and Hobson, Mobile Infirmary presented evidence that after the February 24th meeting, Mobile Infirmary: (a) attempted to contact Morrissette-Brown via telephone on at least three occasions about the flex CNA opening, including once on the day of the meeting or the following day; (b) sent her numerous letters offering her the flex CNA position and stating that she was still "active" in the system; (c) communicated and negotiated with a Seventh-day Adventist church leader about the flex CNA position; (d) made certain that she could take a refresher course for the flex CNA position; (e) continued to pay its portion of her health insurance premiums through May or June 2003; and (f) responded to the notice of her claim for unemployment benefits that she was "still employed" with the hospital.

On this ample record, we conclude that the district court's finding that Morrissette-Brown was not terminated on February 24, 2003 was plausible and did not constitute an impermissible view of the evidence, nor does the finding leave this Court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504.² Morrissette-Brown has shown no clear error in the district court's factual finding as to when her employment was terminated.

Next Morrissette-Brown challenges the district court's determination that Mobile Infirmary reasonably accommodated her. As with all factual findings, a district court's finding on an employer's reasonable accommodation under Title VII is subject to clear error. See Lake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 837 F.2d 449, 451-52 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that "[i]n Title VII cases the district court's findings on discrimination may not be reversed unless the court of appeals concludes that the findings are clearly erroneous," and concluding that the district court's findings regarding reasonable accommodation and undue hardship were "not clearly erroneous"). Even the parties agree that this determination is a factual finding subject to clear error, and many of our sister circuits have reached this same conclusion. See Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 902-03 (7th Cir.1978) ("Each case involving [a reasonable accommodation] determination necessarily depends upon its own facts and circumstances, and comes down to a determination of `reasonableness' under the unique circumstances of the individual employer-employee relationship . . . . We conclude that the trial court's determination of the issue of `accommodation' must be accepted unless it is `clearly erroneous' . . . .") (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir.1977); United States v. City of Albuquerque, 545 F.2d 110, 111 (10th Cir.1976); Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483, 488-89 (10th Cir.1976)); accord Riselay v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 929 F.2d 701, 1991 WL 44319, *5 (Table) (6th Cir.1991) ("the district court's determination on the issue of accommodation must be accepted unless it is clearly erroneous"); Turpen v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex.R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir.1984) ("We must uphold the district court's factual determinations on the interlocking issues of `reasonable accommodation' and `undue hardship' unless they appear clearly erroneous."); Yott v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904, 908 (9th Cir.1979) ("The conclusion that the proposal to transfer Yott to a position that did not require him to be a member of a union or pay union dues was an unreasonable accommodation is not clearly erroneous.").

A Title VII plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination by "present[ing] evidence sufficient to prove that (1) he had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement; (2) he informed his employer of his belief; and (3) he was discharged for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement." Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sheriff's Dep't, 29 F.3d 589, 592 n. 5 (11th Cir.1994) (citing Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 144 (5th Cir.1982)). With a prima facie case established, the burden shifts to the defendant to "demonstrate[] that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); Beadle, 29 F.3d at 591-92. See also Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 475 (7th Cir.2001).³

The phrase "reasonably accommodate" is "not defined within the language of Title VII." Beadle, 29 F.3d at 592. "Thus, the precise reach of the employer's obligation to its employee is unclear under the statute and must be determined on a case-by-case basis." Id. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has explained that a reasonable accommodation is one that "eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices." Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 70, 107 S.Ct. 367. An employer is not required "to accommodate at all costs[,]" however. Id. As we have discussed:

[C]ompliance with Title VII does not require an employer to give an employee a choice among several accommodations; nor is the employer required to demonstrate that alternative accommodations proposed by the employee constitute undue hardship. Rather, the inquiry ends when an employer shows that a reasonable...