Morrissey v. Morrissey
| Decision Date | 08 April 1964 |
| Citation | 18 McCanless 112,214 Tenn. 112,377 S.W.2d 944 |
| Parties | Margaret Wilcox MORRISSEY v. Paul G. MORRISSEY, Jr. 18 McCanless 112, 214 Tenn. 112, 377 S.W.2d 944 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Henry & Henry, Pulaski, for appellant.
John W. Nolan, III, Nashville, for appellee.
The appellant filed this suit in the Chancery Court of Davidson County for the specific performance of a contract with the appellee, her former husband. Prior to the filing of this suit, the parties hereto had been divorced by the General Sessions Court at Springfield, wherein that court had approved a property settlement between the parties and incorporated it into the final divorce decree. Both of the parties are presently residing in Davidson County. The appellant's bill alleges that the appellee has failed to carry out the provisions of the property settlement which was incorporated into the decree of the Springfield General Sessions Court. This suit was filed in Davidson County seeking specific performance of the property settlement.
A plea in abatement was filed by the appellee, the husband and defendant in the divorce suit, wherein it was asserted that the General Sessions Court, which granted the divorce decree and ordered the alimony and property settlement between the parties, had exclusive jurisdiction in these matters. The Chancellor sustained that plea and dismissed the bill. This appeal followed.
The divorce decree ordered the cause retained in the court granting this decree for future orders with reference to the welfare and support of the children. Such an express retention was superfluous since in this State every divorce decree, wherein an order is made for the support and maintenance of the wife and children, by statute remains in the court wherein the divorce decree was granted. These statutes so retaining the cause are now codified as Sec. 36-820 and Sec. 36-828, T.C.A. These Code Sections, particularly Sec. 36-828 and certain amendments to Sec. 36-820, were passed to meet the holdings of this Court in Going v. Going, 144 Tenn. 303, 232 S.W. 443 (1921); Taylor v. Taylor, 144 Tenn. 311, 232 S.W. 445 (1921); and Crane v. Crane, 26 Tenn.App. 227, 170 S.W.2d 663 (1942). This Court so held in Perry v. Perry, 183 Tenn. 362, 364, 192 S.W.2d 830 (1946), wherein certain portions of these Code Sections were quoted in support of this statement. Since that time all of our judicial decisions wherein this question has been presented have so held. Thus it is that this property settlement, which the appellant is now attempting to specifically enforce in Davidson County should be enforced by the court wherein the divorce, alimony, child support and property settlement were originally decreed.
This Court in Kizer v. Bellar, 192 Tenn. 540, 241 S.W.2d 561 (1951), so specifically held. The Kizer case is identical with the case now before us in every particular except that in the Kizer case the conflict in the courts was between the Chancery and Circuit Courts of Davidson County while the conflict of the courts here is between the General Sessions Court of Robertson County and the Chancery Court of Davidson County. This fact though makes no difference because even though both parties resided in Davidson County at the time this divorce was granted and were so residing at the time the present suit was filed the court which had jurisdiction of the divorce case still retains jurisdiction over the enforcement of its decree. Our case of Darby v. Darby, 152 Tenn. 287, 277 S.W. 894, 42 A.L.R. 1379 (1925), supports this statement. In the Darby case this Court held that the mere change of domicile and the absence from the forum does not affect the court's jurisdiction which is regarded as continuing once acquired in the original action and that notice was sufficient to empower the court to make subsequent appropriate orders upon application of either party to the court granting...
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...court will fix the amount . . . The agreement becomes merged in the decree and loses its contractual nature.' Morrissey v. Morrissey, 214 Tenn. 112, 377 S.W.2d 944, 946(2) (1964). Doty v. Doty, 37 Tenn.App. 120, 260 S.W.2d 411, 413(5) (1952), in commenting upon the effect of Sec. 8446 (Sec.......
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...law, once a term of court ended,14 trial courts had only limited authority to modify divorce decrees. See Morrissey v. Morrissey, 214 Tenn. 112, 377 S.W.2d 944, 945–46 (1964) (discussing the statutes that were enacted to abrogate the common law rule regarding a court's lack of power to modi......
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...entertain an action to modify or enforce the decree. See Sutton v. Sutton, 220 Tenn. 410, 417 S.W.2d 786 (1967); Morrissey v. Morrissey, 214 Tenn. 112, 377 S.W.2d 944 (1964); Kizer v. Bellar, 192 Tenn. 540, 241 S.W.2d 561 (1951); Mayhew v. Mayhew, 52 Tenn.App. 459, 376 S.W.2d 324 (1963); Cr......
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