Morrissey v. State, 41547
| Decision Date | 16 January 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 41547,41547 |
| Citation | 174 N.W.2d 131,286 Minn. 14 |
| Parties | John Bruce MORRISSEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Restoration of civil rights under Minn.St. 609.165 does not remove or remit the real and substantial prejudice which flows from a wrongful conviction. A wrongfully convicted person may be prejudiced in civil life and, among other things, may be exposed to impeachment of credibility should be a witness in the trial of any action. Minn.St. 595.07.
2. Before granting a full evidentiary hearing under the postconviction statute, Minn.St. c. 590, the trial court has the discretion to ascertain whether the claim has merit and substance was is not required to grant the full evidentiary hearing where the petition for relief rests upon bald assertions of denial of constitutional rights and subjects the judicial process to an exploratory investigation in the hope that some excuse might be discovered for expunging a conviction from the record.
C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Robert E. Oliphant, Asst. Public Defender, Roberta K. Levy, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., Richard Kyle, Sol. Gen., St. Paul, George Scott, County Atty., Theodore Rix, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.
Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and NELSON, MURPHY, PETERSON, and FRANK T. GALLAGHER, JJ.
This is an appeal from an order of the district court dismissing a petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a hearing pursuant to the Postconviction Remedy Act, L.1967, c. 336, Minn.St. c. 590, notwithstanding the fact that his petition was filed subsequent to his discharge from custody. He states this to be the issue involved:
'Is one convicted of a serious crime, who has been unconditionally and fully discharged from his sentence for that crime, entitled to a hearing pursuant to the provisions of Minn.Stat. 590.01 et seq. when his petition is filed subsequent to the discharge?'
From the record it appears that petitioner, John B. Morrissey, was charged by information on May 13, 1959, with third-degree burglary contrary to Minn.St. 1961, § 621.10. He pleaded not guilty and was tried and convicted by a jury. He was sentenced from 0 to 5 years to the Youth Conservation Commission at St. Cloud on June 4, 1959. While on parole, he was convicted of unlawful possession of narcotics, and on March 28, 1962, he was sentenced from 0 to 20 years to run consecutively with the prior sentence. On May 25, 1962, petitioner was unconditionally discharged from his June 4, 1959, sentence. On May 2, 1968, he filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging, among other grounds, that the evidence used against him at the burglary trial was secured by an unlawful search. The trial court felt that since petitioner was not in custody under the June 4, 1959, sentence and had been unconditionally discharged from that sentence, he was not entitled to a hearing.
1. Petitioner's claim that the trial court was in error is supported by Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554, which holds that, even though a defendant's sentence has expired and he has been completely discharged from his parole status, he may nevertheless seek to have his conviction expunged from the record for the reason that--
'* * * (i)n consequence of his conviction, he cannot engage in certain businesses; he cannot serve as an official of a labor union for a specified period of time; * * * he cannot serve as a juror. Because of these 'disabilities or burdens (which) may flow from' petitioner's conviction, he has 'a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him." 391 U.S. 237, 88 S.Ct. 1559, 20 L.Ed.2d 558.
We agree with petitioner that, even though his civil rights may have been restored by Minn.St. 609.165, the consequent disabilities flowing from the stigma of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Turnage
...566 N.W.2d at 695 (holding that anonymous letter was insufficient to entitle petitioner to hearing); see also Morrissey v. State, 286 Minn. 14, 16, 174 N.W.2d 131, 133-34 (1970) ("[P]ostconviction procedures * * * do not comprehend that a petitioner may have a full evidentiary hearing on th......
-
In re McCaskill
...we do not require actual evidence of collateral consequences but presume such consequences will result. Morrissey v. State, 286 Minn. 14, 16, 174 N.W.2d 131, 133 (1970) (holding collateral consequences attach to criminal conviction because "the consequent disabilities flowing from the stigm......
-
Aziz v. Fabian
...S.Ct. 1148, 1152, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971). But a criminal conviction has far-reaching collateral consequences. See Morrissey v. State, 286 Minn. 14, 16, 174 N.W.2d 131, 133 (1970) (noting collateral consequences that attach to criminal conviction because of its stigma). By contrast, prison di......
-
OWB REO, LLC v. Tyus
...completion of appeal does not render appeal moot because of a civil commitment's collateral consequences); Morrissey v. State, 286 Minn. 14, 16, 174 N.W.2d 131, 133 (1970) (holding that collateral consequences attach to a criminal conviction because of the "the stigma of conviction"). A jud......
-
Conforming doctrine to practice: making room for collateral consequences in the Missouri mootness analysis.
...to a civil proceeding. Id. at 329. The court introduced the doctrine, in its current form, in a criminal case. See Morrissey v. State, 174 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Minn. (70). McCaskill, 603 N.W.2d at 329. (71.) Id. (72.) Id. (73.) Id. (citing Morrissey, 174 N.W.2d at 133). (74.) Id. (alteration in......