Morrow v. State
Decision Date | 15 August 1913 |
Docket Number | 4,880. |
Citation | 79 S.E. 63,13 Ga.App. 189 |
Parties | MORROW v. STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
Assuming that the female in this case was mentally capable of giving an intelligent consent to the act of sexual intercourse, the offense proved was no greater than an attempt to commit fornication, without an element of assault with intent to rape.
Under the law of this state, sexual intercourse with an infant under 10 years of age is rape, as under that age the female is conclusively presumed to be incapable of giving consent and the man is conclusively presumed to have used force. Between the ages of 10 and 14 years the law raises a presumption that the female is incapable of giving intelligent assent or dissent to the sexual act, and casts upon the man the burden of overcoming this presumption. After the age of 14 years the legal presumption arises that the female is mentally capable of giving consent, and the burden is on the prosecution, when consent is shown, to overcome this presumption. After the age of 14 years the question of physical development is relevant only for the purpose of illustrating the question of mental capacity. The test after this age is mental capacity to understand the sexual act and to give intelligent assent to its commission.
On the trial of an indictment for rape, where the female was over 14 years of age, and the evidence showed that she was neither "a lunatic, idiot, imbecile, or affected by insanity," and that, although weak in mental development, she was nevertheless mentally capable of comprehending and consenting to the sexual act, and did consent to the act, only expressing dissent to its consummation when she saw that she and the accused were discovered in flagrante delicto; that she neither then nor subsequently made any complaint, but afterwards on the same day saw the accused, and agreed to meet him on the next day for the purpose of renewing the illicit relations that had been interrupted--the conviction of the accused of the crime of assault with intent to rape was unauthorized by the evidence, and therefore was contrary to law.
There was ample evidence to authorize the jury to find that Lillie Jones was mentally incapable of expressing any intelligent assent or dissent, or of exercising any judgment, in the matter of the sexual intercourse proposed by the defendant. In my opinion the case is fully controlled by the ruling of the Supreme Court in Gore v. State, 119 Ga. 418 423, 46 S.E. 671, 100 Am.St.Rep. 182, and the judgment refusing a new trial should be affirmed. (Per Russell, J dissenting.)
Error from Superior Court, Haralson County; Price Edwards, Judge.
B. R Morrow was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape, and brings error. Reversed.
Morrow was indicted for rape, and was convicted of the offense of assault with intent to commit rape. He made a motion for a new trial upon the general grounds and upon numerous special assignments of error. The motion being overruled, the case is here for review.
The evidence, substantially stated, is as follows: The accused was 63 years of age. The female alleged to have been assaulted was in her fifteenth year. The girl gives the following account of the occurrence:
On cross-examination she further stated:
Two men who saw the accused and the girl talking together in town testified substantially as follows: They saw the girl and the accused talking together in town, and thought they were fixing to do something, and decided to watch them and to follow them. The accused went on down Head avenue in front of the girl, the girl following on behind; and when they got to the place where they finally stopped, the girl was about 100 yards behind him. The witnesses were about 40 yards distant, and saw that the accused was lying on top of the girl in the attitude of having sexual intercourse. He was making no motion, and neither was she. Neither one said anything.
In addition to the evidence relating to the actual occurrence the state claimed that the girl alleged to have been assaulted was mentally incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse; that this mental incapacity was known to the accused, and for these reasons the accused was guilty, although no actual force was used by him in the endeavor to accomplish his purpose, and no resistance was made by the female. On the subject of the mental capacity of the girl, the following evidence, in substance, was introduced: The girl's mother testified that she was in her fifteenth year; that she had been to school in Carroll county about five months; that she started to school when she was eight or nine years old; that she learned to read by the pictures in the book; that she was not bright, and acted around the house like a child eight or nine years old; that she...
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