Morse v. Morris

• Decision Date: 20 January 1910
• Citation: 106 P. 468,57 Wash. 43
• Parties: MORSE v. MORRIS, Sheriff, et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

106 P. 468

57 Wash. 43

MORSE v. MORRIS, Sheriff, et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 20, 1910

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; C. M Easterday, Judge.

Action by Amelia C. Morse, individually and as executrix of the will of Charles H. Morse, deceased, against Thomas N. Morris Sheriff of Pierce County, and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

H. W Lueders, for appellants.

James J. Anderson, for respondent.

CHADWICK J.

Plaintiffs brought this action to restrain the sale of property claimed as a homestead. Amelia C. Morse and Charles H. Morse, husband and wife, were the owners of lots 20, 21, 22, and 23 in block 7, and lots of the same description in block 8 of Mayhew's addition to the village of Fern Hill, a suburb of Tacoma, Wash. Prior to June 22, 1909, defendant John S. Strickland had obtained judgment against them, and upon that date sued out an execution which was levied upon the lots in block 7. Plaintiffs' dwelling, wood sheds, and outbuildings were built on the lots in block 8. The lots in block 7 were used as a garden, orchard, chicken run, etc. The two blocks were separated by an alley. The whole property was found to be of the value of $1,600. From a decree in favo-of plaintiffs, defendants have appealed. Pending the appeal Charles H. Morse died, and the appeal is prosecuted by his widow, in her own behalf and as executrix of his last will and testament.

It is contended that the court erred in holding that lots 20 to 23 in block 7 were exempt, for the reason that the property was urban property and divided by an alley. The statutes governing homesteads and their selection, in so far as they apply to our present inquiry are as follows:

'The homestead consists of the dwelling house, in which the claimant resides, and the land on which the same is situated, selected as in this act provided.' Pierce's Code, § 5456 (Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 5214).

'Homesteads may be selected and claimed in lands and tenements with the improvements thereon, not exceeding in value the sum of two thousand dollars. The premises thus included in the homestead must be actually intended and used for a home for the claimants, and shall not be devoted exclusively to any other purposes.' Pierce's Code, § 5479 (Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 5237).

Appellants well say that 'whether a tract of land detached from the tract on which the dwelling house is situated may be recorded as a part of the homestead if used by the owner of the home place in connection therewith is a question about which the courts are not agreed.' But the conflict of authority is more apparent than real, for all such decisions are grounded upon the statutes, and material differences exist in the legislative expression of the right of homestead. As, for instance, counsel relies upon certain Minnesota cases; but the statutes of Minnesota make specific provision for the area to be allowed in cities, villages, and towns. It may be added, in passing, that a more recent decision of the Supreme Court of the state of Minnesota ( Brixius v. Reimringer, 101 Minn. 347, 112 N.W. 273 118 Am. St. Rep. 629) has relieved the burden of some of the earlier decisions in that state, and allowed a homestead in rural property where the property was divided by an open roadway. We must look to the spirit and intent as well as the words of the statute. Homesteads are generally allowed either as a certain area or as of a certain limited value. With the first we have no concern, for not only does our statute ignore that theory, but expressly provides that the home shall be exempt to the value of $2,000. The underlying principle is the use to which the property is put, and if it is actually put to a use consistent with the ordinary domestic affairs of the household, and taken together does not exceed in value $2,000, there can be no justification in law or reason for denying to it that character which the Legislature intended, albeit it may be divided by a street, alley, or a public road. To hold otherwise would read into the law something that is not there, and thus defeat its purpose. Under a statute, in spirit, if not quite in form, the same as our own, it was held, in Gregg v. Bostwick, 33 Cal. 220, 91 Am. Dec. 637, with great emphasis, as it seems to us, that: 'The statute does not provide that 'a quantity of land, not exceeding in value five thousand dollars,...