Mortgage & Acceptance Corp. v. Stewart
| Decision Date | 22 December 1927 |
| Docket Number | 12340. |
| Citation | 140 S.E. 804,142 S.C. 375 |
| Parties | MORTGAGE & ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION v. STEWART. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; M. S Whaley, Judge.
Action by the Mortgage & Acceptance Corporation against T. M Stewart, in which defendant entered a counterclaim. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
James Y. Perry and Edward B. Guerry, both of Columbia, for appellant.
D. W Robinson and D. W. Robinson, Jr., both of Columbia, for respondent.
This is an action in claim and delivery commenced in the county court of Richland county on the 18th day of October, 1926, for the recovery of the possession of a certain Ford automobile as described in the affidavit of the plaintiff, or, if possession could not be had, then for the sum of $126 as value thereof; plaintiff claiming right to the possession of the Ford automobile in question under a certain conditional sale agreement, the terms and conditions of which having been broken.
The defendant in his answer admitted buying the Ford automobile in question, and set up payment in full, and entered a counterclaim for damages for the unlawful taking of the Ford automobile in question by claim and delivery papers by the plaintiff.
This action came up for trial on the 17th day of March, 1927 before Hon. M. S. Whaley, judge, Richland county court, and a jury. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant for the possession of the car and for the sum of $25 actual damages.
A motion for a new trial was made upon grounds contained in the exceptions in this appeal hereinafter set out, and argument had thereon, which motion was refused.
The appellant by his exceptions raises the following question: The sole question presented by the appeal is whether the finance company, which has intrusted to an automobile dealer the collection of the payments on the chattel mortgage owned by the finance company, and has received payments through the automobile dealer, can deny the dealer's agency.
Stewart purchased an automobile from Floyd Motor Company, giving as part payment of the purchase price an old car and a mortgage on the car made out to the finance corporation. The mortgage called for monthly payments which were made by Stewart to Floyd Motor Company, and by them remitted to the finance company. The action was brought for the balance due on this note; the finance company claiming there was a balance due of $126. Stewart claimed the entire amount had been paid to Floyd Motor Company, and exhibited his receipts in full. The issue was submitted to the jury as to whether Stewart had paid the mortgage in full to Floyd Motor Company, and the jury found Stewart had paid the mortgage debt in full.
The court instructed the jury that Floyd Motor Company, for the purpose of this collection, was the agent of the finance company, and from that portion of the judge's charge the finance company has appealed.
The question therefore presented to this court is whether Stewart, having paid his mortgage in full to the Floyd Motor Company, will have to pay it over again to the finance company because of the alleged failure of Floyd Motor Company to transmit in full to the finance company.
The undisputed facts in the case show that all of the payments made on the mortgage and received by the finance company were paid by Stewart to Floyd Motor Company and remitted by them to the Mortgage & Acceptance Company. The Mortgage & Acceptance Company admits receiving these payments on five separate and distinct occasions. They were received from Floyd Motor Company. After these payments commenced to come in through Floyd Motor Company, no objection was made by the finance company, either to Stewart or to the Floyd Motor Company.
The contention of the appellant is untenable under the particular facts as developed in the case, the judge's charge is sustained, as the material facts are not in dispute, and agency is a matter of law for the court whether Floyd Motor Company was the implied agent of the appellant or its agent by estoppel. Mayfield v. British & American Mortg. Co Ltd., 104...
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