Morton Community Unit School Dist. No. 709 v. J.M., 97-1056.

• Citation: 986 F.Supp. 1112
• Decision Date: 23 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. 97-1056.,97-1056.
• Parties: MORTON COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 709, Plaintiff, v. J.M. a minor; M.M. and S.M., individually and as parents and next friends of J.M., and the Illinois State Board of Education, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois

986 F.Supp. 1112

MORTON COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 709, Plaintiff, v. J.M. a minor; M.M. and S.M., individually and as parents and next friends of J.M., and the Illinois State Board of Education, Defendants.

No. 97-1056.

United States District Court, C.D. Illinois.

October 23, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thomas R. Davis, Michael J. Tibbs, Douglas G. Griffin, Miller Hall & Triggs, Peoria, IL, for Morton Community Unit School District No. 709.

Janet M. Cartwright, Karen Ward, Equip for Equality Inc., Rock Island, IL, for J.M.

Brian J. Dees, Office of Attorney General, Springfield, IL, for Illinois State Board of Education.

ORDER

McDADE, District Judge.

Before the Court are Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. # 14], and cross motions for summary judgment. [Docs. 17 & 22]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED as MOOT.

BRIEF OVERVIEW

On September 23, 1996, a Level I Hearing Officer for the Illinois State Board of Education ordered Plaintiff, the Morton Community Unit School District ("Morton School District"), to identify and contract with a qualified individual in order to provide health related services to Defendant, J.M., a minor. (Administrative Record ("R.") at p. 793-799). On January 23, 1997, a Level II Reviewing Officer for the Illinois State Board of Education affirmed. (R. at p. 1-28). Despite the directive handed down by the Illinois State Board, the Morton School District has refused to provide the services for J.M. (Doc. # 25 at ¶ 37). Rather, in the instant appeal of the administrative decision, Plaintiff argues that the State Board erred and consequently seeks judicial review of the administrative decision pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) of the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA").

BACKGROUND

J.M. is a 14 year old who suffers from Noonan's Syndrome, chronic fibrotic lung disease, cystic hygroma, and receives treatment for corneal abrasions (hereinafter collectively referred to as J.M.'s "disabilities") (Doc. # 25 at ¶ 1). J.M. uses a portable ventilator system known as an oxygen trach collar to maintain respiratory functioning. (Doc. # 25 at ¶ 17). In addition, J.M. has a tracheostomy and gastrostomy.¹ (Doc. # 18 at ¶ 7; Doc. # 25 at ¶ 18).

Because of his disabilities, J.M. requires a "pediatric nurse" or "trained" individual to monitor him throughout the day. (Doc. # 25 at ¶¶ 13, 14; Doc. # 18 at ¶ 8). During the school day, J.M. requires suctioning of his airways, application of an eye ointment every hour, and monitoring of his portable life support equipment. (Doc. # 25 at ¶ 28). It is undisputed that J.M.'s parents were able to provide the above services after one week of training at a hospital. (Doc. # 25 at ¶ 13; Doc. # 27 at ¶ 13).

The Morton School District describes J.M.'s needs somewhat differently:

J.M. is ventilator dependent with a tracheostomy, gastrostomy and is dependent in the activities of daily living. J.M. requires either a skilled pediatric nurse or one of his parents with him at all times. J.M. requires a skilled pediatric nurse with him while he attends school. The duties of the skilled pediatric nurse ... would include assessment of J.M.'s respiratory status with appropriate interventions (suctioning, trach care or replacement, oxygen administration, etc.), administration of medication (requires hourly eye lubricant to prevent corneal abrasions), administration of nebulized breathing treatments, monitoring of equipment function with troubleshooting as indicated, and assistance with activities of daily living (feeding, toileting, and transfers).

(Doc. # 18 at ¶¶ 6-10).

J.M. attended Maycrest School in the Lisbon Community Consolidated Grade School District for approximately five years. (Doc. # 25 at ¶¶ 3-6). The Lisbon School District contracted with a nurse, Ms. Faith Read, to provide the health services for J.M. while he attended school. (Doc. # 25 at ¶ 30). Ms. Read was also contracted by the Lisbon District to aid in J.M.'s transportation to and from school. (Doc. # 25 at ¶ 31).

In May of 1996, J.M. and his parents moved to the Morton Community Unit School District when his father was transferred as a result of his employment with Caterpillar Incorporated. (Doc. # 25 at ¶ 2). When J.M. enrolled in school, his parents asked the Morton School District to provide, at its own expense, the services of a trained individual to monitor J.M. during the school day. (Doc. # 23 at p. 2). However, after considering J.M.'s request, the School District determined that it was under no obligation to provide the health services. (Doc. # 18 at ¶ 5). The School District refused to provide the health services not because of the potential financial burden on the District:² (Doc. # 25 at ¶ 37), rather, the District has refused because the District believes that it is prohibited from doing so by federal law. (Doc. # 25 at ¶ 37).

In response to the School District's refusal, J.M. sought review of the decision before the Illinois State Board of Education. (Doc. # 19 at p. 1). Two successive administrative hearings were held. (Doc. # 19 at p. 1-2). The issue at both hearings was singular and the same: whether the services required by J.M. to attend school were "related services" within the meaning of the IDEA. (Doc. # 25 at ¶ 43). After finding that the services required by J.M. were in fact "related services," the Illinois State Board ordered the School District to identify and contract with a qualified individual to provide the necessary health related services to J.M. while he attends school. (Doc. #25 at ¶ 42). The School District has refused to provide the health services for J.M. until this Court reviews the administrative decision pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). (Doc. # 1 at p. 1).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of judicial review under the IDEA differs from that governing the typical review of a motion for summary judgment. Heather S. v. State of Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1052 (7th Cir.1997); Hunger v. Leininger, 15 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir.1994). The IDEA dictates that the district court "shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). When neither party has requested that the district court hear additional evidence, "there is nothing new presented to the district court; thus `[t]he motion for summary judgment is simply the procedural vehicle for asking the judge to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record.'" Heather S., 125 F.3d at 1052.

Despite being termed summary judgment, the district court's decision is based on the preponderance of the evidence. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2); Hunger, 15 F.3d at 669. The party challenging the outcome of the state administrative decision bears the burden of proof. Board of Educ. of Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 938 F.2d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 1991). In reviewing the administrative record, the district court is required to give "due weight" to the results of the administrative proceedings and not "to substitute [its] own notions of sound education policy for those of the school authorities," whose decision it is reviewing. Heather S., 125 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3050-51, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982)).

LEGAL ANALYSIS

The IDEA requires a school district to provide, at its own expense, "related services" and/or "school health services" to eligible disabled children, however, the Act does not require a school district to expend funds on "medical services" unless the "medical services" are rendered for the purpose of "diagnosis" or "evaluation." See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17). Thus, the issue in the instant action is simple: are the health services that J.M. requires excluded "medical services" or included "related services" within the meaning of the IDEA? The Illinois State Board of Education determined that J.M. required "related services." The Morton School District argues that the State Board erred because J.M. requires "medical services." As the party challenging the outcome of the state administrative decision, the Morton School District bears the burden of proof. See Heather S., 125 F.3d at 1052.

Before considering the arguments raised by the Morton School District, the Court will first set forth the statutory and regulatory framework that governs this action. Because the Seventh Circuit has not addressed the issue raised here, Skelly v. The Brookfield Lagrange Park School District 95, 968 F.Supp. 385, 392 (N.D.Ill.1997), the Court will also describe the manner in which other federal courts have resolved similar disputes.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, which amended the Education of the Handicapped Act, was enacted in 1990 for the congressional purpose articulated in the IDEA:

(c) It is the purpose of this chapter to assure that all children with disabilities have available to them, within the time periods specified in section 1412(2)(B) of this title a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of children with disabilities and their parents or guardians are protected, to assist States and localities to provide for the education of all children with disabilities, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate children with disabilities.

20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (emphasis added). The statutory definition of "special education" is:

(16) The term "special education" means specifically designed instruction, at no cost to parents or...