M.K. ex rel. Mrs. K. v. Sergi
| Decision Date | 06 June 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:96CV00482 (WIG).,3:96CV00482 (WIG). |
| Citation | 554 F.Supp.2d 201 |
| Parties | M.K., by and through his Mother and Next Friend, MRS. K., Plaintiffs, v. Theodore SERGI, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Andrew Alan Feinstein, David C. Shaw, Law Offices of David C. Shaw, Bloomfield, CT, for Plaintiffs.
Ralph E. Urban, Thomas M. Fiorentino, Paula D. Sullivan, Susan T. Pearlman, Attorney General's Office, Jody Pagano Benbow, Frederick L. Dorsey, Siegel, O'Connor, Zangari, O'Donnell & Beck, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.
RULING ON PUTNAM DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [#227]
Mrs. K., on behalf of and as next friend of her son, M.K., (collectively "plaintiffs"), has brought this action alleging that defendants violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution, made actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Named as defendants are Theodore Sergi, the former Commissioner of the Department of Education ("DOE"); Darlene Dunbar, the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Children and Families ("DCF"); Karl Kemper, the Regional Administrator for the Eastern Region of DCF; Carla Lebrun, Kemper's subordinate; the Putnam Board of Education ("Putnam"); John Shea, the former Director of Student Services for Putnam from October 5, 1994 to June 30, 1999, who is sued in his individual capacity; and Patricia Kline, his successor as Director of Student Services from August 2, 1999, to May 20, 2002, and who is also sued in her individual capacity.1
As to the Putnam defendants, plaintiffs' consolidated complaint2 alleges that Shea and Kline were familiar with M.K. and participated in virtually all team meetings, hearings, and court proceedings relating to M.K.'s case. They allege that these defendants were in a position to provide the professional and residential supports M.K. needed to remain at or to return home but they refused to pay for these services as well as any other services they deemed to be "non-educational." (Pis.' Consol. Compl. ¶ 6.) The complaint contains seven counts. The first count alleges that, as prevailing parties in the special education due process proceedings, plaintiffs are entitled, under 20 U.S.C. § 1415, to an award of attorneys' fees and costs against Putnam and DCF. The second count appeals certain aspects of the hearing officer's decisions in the Connecticut State Department of Education due process proceedings, No. 03-087 and No. 95-353. Plaintiffs' third, fourth, sixth, and seventh counts are expressly directed at defendants other than the Putnam defendants. The fifth count is the only count addressed exclusively against the Putnam defendants and alleges that they acted intentionally and/or in reckless disregard of plaintiffs rights under the ADA, § 504 of the Rehabination Act, the IDEA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by:
a. Establishing and implementing policies and procedures which ensured that M.K. could not receive the support needed to be educated in the Putnam schools; and
b. Refusing to authorize the Putnam PPT to make placement or program decisions after DCF placed M.K. with DCF-funded services.
As a result of these alleged actions, plaintiffs charge that the Putnam defendants denied them the opportunity to use the IDEA dispute resolution and hearing process to resolve disputes over program and placement decisions made by the DCF treatment team, and M.K.'s ability to establish relationships with adults and children has been impaired. (PL's Consol. Compl. ¶¶ 135 & 136.)
As relief against the Putnam defendants, plaintiffs seek an order requiring defendants to fully and faithfully implement the orders of the Hearing Officer; an order requiring defendants to pay attorneys' fees and costs in connection with these consolidated lawsuits and underlying administrative hearings; an order requiring defendants to maintain funding for M.K.'s therapeutic foster placement until transition planning is completed; an order requiring defendants to provide an appropriate array of support services in the community and school so that M.K. can continue to live in the community and attend public school; an order reversing certain aspects of the hearing officer's decisions; and an award of compensatory and punitive damages against defendants for acting in reckless disregard of plaintiffs' rights under the ADA, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the IDEA, the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and for defendants' failure to provide necessary individualized services to M.K. that has resulted in his prolonged and unnecessary separation from his family. (Pis.' Consol. Compl. § V, ¶¶ 1, 2, 4-6,12-13.)
The Putnam defendants answered denying any liability to plaintiffs, and Putnam asserted a counterclaim appealing that portion of the hearing officer's decision in Case No. 03-087 that directed Putnam to pay for M.K.'s psychotherapy and for the psychiatric supervision of his medication regimen, which were services already being paid for by DCF and which, it maintained, were not necessary educational services. (Counterclaim ¶¶ 1, 39, 40.)
The Putnam defendants have moved for the entry of summary judgment in their favor on the second and fifth counts of plaintiffs' consolidated complaint3 and on its counterclaim.
The standard governing motions for summary judgment is well-settled. A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the non-moving party on a material issue of fact, summary judgment is improper. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir.1994).
However, with respect to IDEA appeals, the court's inquiry is not directed to ascertaining whether there are disputed issues of material fact, but rather whether the administrative record, together with any additional evidence, establishes that there has been compliance with the IDEA processes and that the child's educational needs have been appropriately addressed. A.E. v. Westport Bd. of Educ, 463 F.Supp.2d 208, 215 (D.Conn.2006). "The Supreme Court and [the Second] Circuit have interpreted the IDEA as strictly limiting judicial review of state administrative decisions." Collins v. Board of Educ. of Red Hook Central School Dist, 164 Fed. Appx. 19, 21 (2d Cir.2006).
The IDEA provides that "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision" made by a hearing officer "shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented ... in a district court of the United States." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). The district court "(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) bas[e] its decision on the preponderance of the evidence." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.512. Summary judgment has been described as the "most pragmatic procedural mechanism in the Federal Rules for resolving IDEA actions." AS. v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ, 183 F.Supp.2d 534, 539 (D.Conn.2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Federal courts reviewing administrative decisions under the IDEA must base their determinations on a "preponderance of the evidence developed at the administrative proceedings and any further evidence presented by the parties." Walczak v. Florida Union Free School Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122-23 (2d Cir.1998); see also Grim v. Rhinebeck Central School Dist, 346 F.3d 377, 380 (2d Cir.2003). Although the district court is required to engage in an independent review of the administrative record, this assessment "is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review." Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (); see also Cabouli v. Chappaqua Central School Dist, 202 Fed.Appx. 519, 521 (2d Cir.2006). "The IDEA'S statutory scheme requires `substantial deference to state administrative bodies on matters of educational policy.'" A.E. v. Westport, 463 F.Supp.2d at 215 (quoting Cerra v. Pawling Central School Dist, 427 F.3d 186,191 (2d Cir.2005)). "While federal courts do not simply rubber stamp administrative decisions, they are expected to give due weight to these proceedings, mindful that the judiciary generally lacks the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve persistent and difficult questions of educational policy." Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 208, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Cabouli 202 Fed.Appx. at 521; Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ, 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir.1997); M.H. v. Monroe-Woodbury Central School Dist, 250 Fed.Appx. 428, 430 (2d Cir.2007) (); Lillbask v. Sergi 193 F.Supp.2d 503, 508 (D.Conn.2002) (...
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