Morton v. Board of Registered Nursing

Decision Date15 November 1991
Docket NumberNo. G009757,G009757
Citation235 Cal.App.3d 1560,1 Cal.Rptr.2d 502
PartiesAudrey T. MORTON, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REGISTERED NURSING, etc., Respondent.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Lawrence A. Morse, San Francisco, for appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., Susan Fitzgerald and Margaret Lafko, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

JACKMAN, Associate Justice, Assigned. *

The Board of Registered Nursing disciplined Audrey T. Morton for unprofessional conduct by revoking her license, staying revocation, and placing her on probation for one year, subject to ten enumerated terms and conditions. Morton challenged the discipline in a petition of writ of mandate to the superior court, ostensibly per Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. The board argued Morton could seek relief only under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 and that her petition was filed too late.

The superior court rejected the board's contentions, but determined the discipline was not in excess of its statutory authority. The court denied Morton's petition on the merits. We find the board's procedural arguments dispositive and affirm.

I

In 1985, the Board of Registered Nursing filed a multi-count accusation against Morton. The allegations arose from her ownership and operation of two licensed board and care homes. 1 An administrative law judge determined three allegations should be sustained. The board did not adopt the hearing officer's findings, but held an independent review. Nevertheless, it reached the same result as the administrative law judge and revoked her registered nursing license, effective July 6, 1988.

Morton did not seek a stay of the revocation. She petitioned the superior court for a writ of administrative mandate. It was granted in part; the court determined substantial evidence supported but one of the charges and remanded the matter to the board for reconsideration of the appropriate discipline. Morton accepted the superior court decision and did not appeal.

On remand, the board again revoked Morton's license, "provided, however, that said revocation is stayed and [Morton] is placed on probation for one year under [ten enumerated] terms and conditions." 2 The board's order further provided that "[u]pon full compliance with the above terms and conditions and upon expiration of the stay order herein set forth, [Morton's] license shall be fully restored, free and clear of the terms and conditions imposed. [p] If, during the period of probation, [Morton] violates any of the terms of probation, the Board, after notice to [her] and an opportunity to be heard, may in its discretion set aside the stay order and direct that the order of revocation become effective[ ] immediately, or make such other order as it may deem appropriate."

The decision, rendered July 31, 1989, was originally slated to be effective on August 31. Before then, however, Morton complained to the board that the penalty was excessive. The board treated her letter as a petition for reconsideration and denied it on September 29, 1989. In that order, the board rescheduled the effective date for its decision to October 13, 1989.

On November 30, 1989, Morton filed an "EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR STAY OF ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTY." She asked for an immediate stay of the impending order that she report to her probation officer. She also sought a court order directing the board "to strike its order imposing probation ... [and] to reinstate [her] license as a registered nurse." 3

The board argued the petition was untimely. Per Government Code section 11523, her petition could only be for administrative mandate and must have been filed within 30 days of the effective date of the board's order. Because she petitioned for reconsideration, the effective date became October 13, 1989. Accordingly, her petition was required to be filed no later than Monday, November 13, 1989.

The superior court determined the petition was properly and timely filed under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 and Government Code section 11523 did not apply. Nevertheless, the judge concluded Business and Professions Code section 2759 gave the board authority to discipline Morton and "Government Code [s]ection 11522 expressly authorize[d] [the board] to impose condition[s] on a license."

Both sides appealed. Morton characterizes the issue as follows: "[T]his appeal does not attempt to test or review any act of discretion exercised by the BOARD or [ ] the finding by the BOARD which was upheld [in the first superior court writ petition]. This appeal merely seeks to raise the legality of the combined penalties assessed against [Morton]. This legality must be determined in the context of the statutory authority given to the BOARD by the Legislature and the interpretations placed upon this grant of authority." (Italics in original.) She adds, "The [board's] failure to take into consideration the previously imposed penalty [the 1988 revocation that was reversed by the superior court] is a failure to perform a ministerial duty. There is nothing in this omission which can be said to involve discretion on the part of the BOARD." The board, while satisfied with the trial court's result, challenges the path it took. For the following reasons, we agree with the position taken by the board. 4

II

In determining the board properly placed Morton on probation, the superior court cited Government Code section 11522, which expressly permits the imposition of conditions on the reinstatement of a nursing license after suspension or revocation. Although the parties' debate concerning the section has been spirited, both sides essentially agree the provision has no application in this case. We concur in that conclusion.

Section 11522 is not triggered unless a nurse "whose license has been revoked or suspended [ ] petition[s] the agency for reinstatement or reduction of penalty after a period of not less than one year has elapsed from the effective date of the decision or from the date of the denial of a similar petition." Neither of Morton's superior court writ petitions fell within the purview of this section. It has no direct application here.

III

The board's power to discipline is conferred by section 2750: "Every certificate holder or licensee ... may be disciplined as provided in this article. The proceedings under this article shall be conducted in accordance with Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 11500) of ... the Government Code, and the board shall have all the powers granted therein." (Italics added.) Section 2750 is a specific statute directed to a specific agency; its mandates control over the more general provisions found elsewhere in this state's statutory scheme. And what section 2750 requires is that disciplinary proceedings involving registered nurses "be conducted in accordance with" Government Code section 11500 et seq.

Government Code section 11523 governs judicial review of board actions. It succinctly and unambiguously explains, "[j]udicial review may be had by filing a petition for a writ of mandate in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, subject, however, to the statutes relating to the particular agency. Except as otherwise provided in this section, any such petition shall be filed within 30 days after the last day on which reconsideration can be ordered...." The parties have not referred us to any statute relating to the Board of Registered Nursing that alters the 30-day requirement.

Per section 11521, the board's last day to order reconsideration was "the date set by the agency itself as the effective date of the decision if that date occurs ... at the termination of a stay...." Here, the effective date was originally August 31, 1989. The board stayed execution, however, to consider Morton's request for reconsideration. The September 29, 1989 order denying reconsideration specified the decision would become effective October 13. Accordingly, per section 11523, a petition for judicial review was required to be filed in the superior court no later than November 12, 1989.

Morton missed the deadline by more than two weeks. Her petition was not timely. It should have been denied on that basis.

In an attempt to avoid the unavoidable, Morton argues her petition (which she characterized as a challenge to the legality of the board's action, as opposed to an attack on a discretionary act by the board) sought traditional mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, instead of administrative mandate per section 1094.5. 5 For that reason, she contends, Government Code section 11523 and its 30-day time limit did not apply.

But simply calling a goose a duck will not make it quack. Traditional mandate may apply to review an agency's action if that action is compelled by law and does not involve a factual determination by the agency. 6 Under that circumstance, "[r]evocation ... constitute[s] a ministerial action by the board rather than quasi judicial action" (DiGenova v. State Board of Education (1955) 45 Cal.2d 255, 260, 288 P.2d 862, internal quotation marks omitted.)

The facts here are considerably different, however. After a hearing, the Board of Registered Nursing concluded Morton engaged in unprofessional conduct. That finding was affirmed by the superior court and not challenged on appeal. The board, having previously made a factual determination concerning a licensee's conduct, was still vested by the Legislature with the power and discretion to assess the appropriate discipline. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (f).) No statute compelled revocation or any other particular action. Indeed, Business and Professions Code section 2759 authorized the board to "[take] such other action in relation to disciplining [her] as the board in its discretion may deem proper." 7 This is grist for judicial review by administrative mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Unnamed Physician v. Board of Trustees
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 1 Noviembre 2001
    ...Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5; Keeler v. Superior Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 596, 599, 297 P.2d 967; Morton v. Board of Registered Nursing (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1560, 1566, fn. 5, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 502; Alta Loma School Dist. v. San Bernardino County Com. on School Dist. Reorganization (1981) 124 Cal.A......
  • TARTRE. v. CITY Of POWAY.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 21 Junio 2010
    ...by the agency. (Harris Transportation Co. v. Air Resources Board (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1480-1481; Morton v. Board of Registered Nursing (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1560, 1566.) "Two basic requirements are essential to the issuance of the writ: (1) A clear, present and usually ministerial du......
  • Hansen v. Bd. of Registered Nursing
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 16 Agosto 2012
    ...30 days after the last day on which reconsideration can be ordered.” (Gov.Code, § 11523; see Morton v. Board of Registered Nursing (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1560, 1565, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 502( Morton ) [Gov.Code, § 11523 governs judicial review of Board's decisions].) If, however, the licensee “with......
  • Harris Transportation Co. v. Air Resources Board
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 31 Enero 1995
    ...for challenging a ministerial act of an agency, such as a mandatory duty to issue regulations. (Morton v. Bd. of Registered Nursing (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1560, 1566 fn. 5, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 502.) Writ relief must be granted "in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT