Morton v. Califano
Decision Date | 09 June 1978 |
Docket Number | No. CIV-2-77-133.,CIV-2-77-133. |
Citation | 481 F. Supp. 908 |
Parties | Rhea D. MORTON, Plaintiff, v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., etc., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
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Carleton W. Smith, Greeneville, Tenn. and Thomas D. Dossett, Kingsport, Tenn., for plaintiff.
John Cary, U. S. Atty., Knoxville, Tenn., for defendant.
This is an action for the judicial review of the final decision of the defendant Secretary, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), denying the plaintiff's claim for widow's insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e), 423(d)(2)(B). The defendant moved for a judgment on the pleadings. Rule 12(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1
The plaintiff filed an application for such benefits on June 17, 1976, alleging that she had been unable to engage in gainful activity all of her life because of a heart condition, nerve trouble, and a thyroid disorder. That claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. An administrative law judge also denied that application on May 26, 1977, and this became the final decision of the defendant Secretary when an appeals council approved it.
The administrative law judge found, inter alia:
Such findings by the Secretary are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence in this record. Wokojance v. Weinberger, C.A. 6th (1975), 513 F.2d 210, 212 3. The Court may determine only whether the Secretary's decision is based upon such evidence. LeMaster v. Weinberger, C.A. 6th (1976), 533 F.2d 337, 339 1; Ingram v. Richardson, C.A. 6th (1972), 471 F.2d 1268, 1271 4. * * *" Consolo v. Federal Maritime Com. (1966), 383 U.S. 607, 619-620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L.Ed.2d 131, 140-141 9.
To qualify for benefits as a disabled widow, the plaintiff must have established that she was at least 50 years of age but, not 60; that she was the widow of a wage-earner who died fully insured; and that she had physical or mental impairments which, under regulations promulgated by the Secretary, was deemed to be of such severity as to preclude her from engaging in any gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e), 423(d)(2)(B). Sullivan v. Weinberger, C.A. 5th (1974), 493 F.2d 855, 857 1, certiorari denied (1975), 421 U.S. 967, 95 S.Ct. 1958, 44 L.Ed.2d 455; Barnes v. Richardson, D.C. Tenn. (1970), 322 F.Supp. 699, 700 1, 2; Henry v. Richardson, D.C.Tenn. (1970), 320 F.Supp. 296. The plaintiff was required also to have shown that her impairments became manifest within 7 years from the month of the insured wage-earner's death. Sullivan v. Weinberger, supra.
The test of disability for a widow claiming benefits is more stringent than that for a wage-earner. A widow must have established her inability to engage in any gainful activity, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2)(B), while a wage-earner need establish only his inability to engage in substantial gainful activity, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Furthermore, nonmedical factors, such as age, education and work experience, are not considered in adjudicating a widow's claim. Sullivan v. Weinberger, supra, 493 F.2d at 862 10.
Pursuant to the authority delegated by the Congress in the 1967 amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B), the Secretary prescribed a listing of medical impairments which he deemed to be sufficiently severe to preclude an individual from engaging in any gainful activity. This listing was adopted as part of the Social Security Administration regulation no. 4, § 404.1501, et seq., as appendix to subpart P (Appendix to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501, et seq.).
Section 404.1504 of the Social Security Administration regulations no. 4, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504, provides that a widow may be found to be under a disability only if her impairment(s) are either listed in such appendix or are, singly or in combination, medically the equivalent of an impairment listed in the appendix. Thereunder, medical findings must be demonstrated by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques; and on the question of medical equivalence, the record must include a medical judgment furnished by one or more physicians designated by the Secretary. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505 and 404.1506.
The plaintiff Mrs. Rhea D. Morton was born on March 28, 1920. The wage-earner, her deceased husband, Mr. Brownie E. Morton, died on June 5, 1976. Mrs. Morton has not remarried.
Mrs. Morton complained of a heart condition stemming from a childhood bout with rheumatic fever. Section 4.00B of the appendix to subpart P of the aforementioned regulations no. 4 states that "* * * congestive heart failure is not considered to be established for the purpose of § 4.02 unless there is evidence * * * of signs of vascular congestion such as hepatomegaly, peripheral or pulmonary edema as well as other appropriate findings. * * *" Dr. John B. McKinnon, an internist who examined the plaintiff on September 13, 1976, stated in his report that "* * * she has no significant pain, dyspnea, or any other symptoms of congestive heart failure. * * *" He reported further that "* * * the baseline electrocardiogram was normal with no evidence of any old myocardial disease, * * *" and that the plaintiff's heart was not enlarged.
The plaintiff alleged disability because of a thyroid disorder. She underwent a thyroidectomy sometime in the 1950's. Section 9.00 concerns problems with the endocrine system. Section 9.00A states that "* * * disability is caused by overproduction or underproduction of hormones resulting in structural and/or functional changes in the body. * * *" The medical evidence of record herein includes no mention of any continuing problem in this area.
Mrs. Morton also complains of a mental disorder. She alleges that she has suffered 5 nervous breakdowns, but there is no record that she received any psychiatric treatment. The pertinent regulation provides as follows:
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501, et seq., appendix to subpart P.
Dr. William Wiley, a psychiatrist, examined Mrs. Morton on September 1, 1976. In his report of September 8, he commented on the plaintiff's ability to function in family and work environments, as follows:
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