Morton v. GTE North Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 3:94-CV-0424-P.,3:94-CV-0424-P.
• Citation: 922 F. Supp. 1169
• Parties: Linda Susan MORTON, Plaintiff, v. GTE NORTH INCORPORATED, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

922 F. Supp. 1169

Linda Susan MORTON, Plaintiff, v. GTE NORTH INCORPORATED, Defendant.

No. 3:94-CV-0424-P.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

January 23, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Nancy DeLeon, Gabriel H. Robles, Robles & Associates, Dallas, TX, for Linda Susan Morton.

Lawrence J. McNamara, Charles W. Rhodes^*, David G. Cabrales, Liddell, Sapp, Zivley, Hill & LaBoon, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, Glenda R. Beard, GTE North Incorporated, Irving, TX, for GTE North Incorporated and GTE Service Corporation.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SOLIS, District Judge.

Now before the Court are:

1) Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed April 6, 1995;

2) Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed April 28, 1995;

3) Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed March 17, 1995.

4) Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 28, 1995;

5) Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 25, 1995;

6) Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 9, 1995.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Linda Susan Morton's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed April 6, 1995 and Defendants GTE Service Corporation and GTE North Incorporated's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed April 28, 1995. Because Plaintiff has since dismissed its case against Defendant GTE Service Corporation, (Pl.'s First Am. and Supp.Compl.), this Order accordingly addresses these motions from the standpoint of the dispute remaining between Plaintiff and Defendant GTE North.

For the reasons stated, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of Plaintiff's claims, and accordingly DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff, Linda Susan Morton, was an employee of different GTE subsidiaries from 1969 until 1993. The most relevant period being from October 1989 through March 1993, during which Plaintiff was employed by Defendant GTE North Incorporated.

Plaintiff has a history of bouts with severe depression that dates back to at least 1985. As a result, during her employment with GTE, she required intermittent medical leave: In early 1989, Plaintiff was hospitalized after attempting suicide. And again in both March 1990 and spring 1991, Plaintiff was hospitalized for depression.

Plaintiff claims that her depression was brought on by increased job stress. She was originally hired by GTE North as a programmer. Subsequently, however, GTE decided to centralize the bulk of its programming efforts, which resulted in GTE removing the programming function from Plaintiff's department at GTE North. Allegedly because of her inability to cope with new nonprogramming responsibilities, Plaintiff's depression escalated.

From early 1990 through early 1992, Plaintiff underwent therapy and took medication to combat the stress. However, the medication allegedly had a negative effect on her long-term memory and caused her physical side effects (i.e., shaking and rocking back and forth while sitting at her desk). These effects exacerbated her stress to the point that it impaired her job performance. By early 1992 Plaintiff was excessively missing work.

Because of these problems, Plaintiff requested, either personally or through her physician, a number of accommodations from GTE. On October 7, 1991, Plaintiff's psychiatrist, Dr. Davinder Dhingra, sent a memorandum to Plaintiff's supervisor, Douglas J. Rounds, stating that Plaintiff was capable of continuing work, but that her condition required that GTE provide her a more "structured work setting." Mr. Rounds sent a copy of the memorandum to the company nurse, Donna Kennedy. Allegedly confused about what Dr. Dhingra meant by the phrase, "structured work setting," Nurse Kennedy sent a letter requesting clarification on October 14, 1991. After receiving no response, Nurse Kennedy resent the letter on October 24, 1991. Dr. Dhingra then responded with another memorandum attempting to clarify what she meant.

Based upon the Court's best determination from the record, the response memo stated that GTE should provide Plaintiff with a more structured work setting, to last for three weeks, by limiting Plaintiff's amount of overtime (i.e., not allowing Plaintiff to work more than a total of forty-eight hours per week). Furthermore, Nurse Kennedy determined from a conversation with Plaintiff that it would be helpful if GTE limited the number of deadline-intensive projects assigned to Plaintiff. For the agreed three weeks, GTE contends that it accommodated both of Plaintiff's requests.

Because Plaintiff continued to have noticeable difficulties at work, Plaintiff's supervisor, Douglas Rounds, sent Plaintiff to see Nurse Kennedy on November 3, 1991. In their meeting, Plaintiff requested that she be transferred to a less stressful position. In response to Plaintiff's request, Nurse Kennedy referred Plaintiff to Holly MacRae, GTE Manager of Employee Relations. In their meeting on November 3, 1991, Ms. MacRae recommended that Plaintiff contact the staffing department to determine the mechanics of applying for a position within GTE. Nothing in the record indicates that Plaintiff ever contacted staffing or ever formally applied for a transfer. On November 4, 1991, Plaintiff informed her supervisor, Douglas Rounds, of her desire for a transfer. Mr. Rounds reviewed with Plaintiff the available jobs, which were posted on GTE's computer bulletin board. Neither Mr. Rounds nor Plaintiff identified a vacant job meeting Plaintiff's criteria (i.e., low stress programming). GTE contends that no such position has ever, nor presently, exists. Moreover, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence apart from argument that such a position existed.

Unfortunately, Plaintiff's mental condition and ability to perform her job continued to deteriorate. On June 17, 1992, Plaintiff threatened to commit suicide on the GTE premises. This incident triggered the following events, which culminated in Plaintiff's termination: On June 18, 1992, through her physician, Plaintiff requested short-term disability leave (STD), which GTE granted. While on STD, Plaintiff applied for disability benefits with the Social Security Administration and for long-term disability (LTD) benefits under a disability policy that she had purchased from The Travelers insurance company. On December 17, 1992, before receiving approval from either the Social Security Administration or The Travelers, Plaintiff's six-month STD expired. GTE then allowed Plaintiff to immediately take all of her vacation for 1992 and 1993, which effectively extended her leave until February 12, 1993. Having still not received an answer from either the Social Security Administration or The Travelers, GTE placed Plaintiff on a departmental leave in order to maintain Plaintiff's status as an employee for another thirty days or until she received a decision from the Social Security Administration and The Travelers, whichever occurred first. On February 16, 1993, Plaintiff was approved for disability payments from the Social Security Administration to be retroactively effective as of December 17, 1992, when her STD leave expired. On March 4, 1993, The Travelers notified Plaintiff that she had been approved for twelve months of LTD benefits (the maximum amount), also to be retroactively effective as of December 17, 1992. Finally, pursuant to its policy of terminating any employee requiring more than six-months of short-term disability or ninety days of leave for any other purpose, GTE terminated Plaintiff.

Plaintiff contends that she was unaware that qualifying for LTD would result in her termination. She contends that Tom Hausmann, a GTE Senior Benefits Administrator, assured her in November 1992 that she would be able to take a twelve-month LTD leave and be placed in another position upon her return.

Thus, upon receiving an oral release from her physician verifying her ability to return to work, Plaintiff sought reemployment with GTE in July, August, and November of 1993. Plaintiff never provided GTE with a written release from her physician. Because she had been previously terminated, GTE treated her as an external applicant and refused her request for reassignment. Plaintiff claims that this was the first time that she realized that she had been terminated. Plaintiff alleges that GTE should have treated her as an employee on indefinite leave returning to work for reassignment.

SUMMARY OF CLAIMS AND DEFENSES

Plaintiff raises three causes of action in her complaint: (1) violation of the ADA, (2) violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), and (3) breach of contract. With respect to the ADA action, Plaintiff argues that she was a "qualified individual with a disability" as that term is defined in the ADA and that she was summarily terminated, despite her requests for reasonable accommodations, in violation of the ADA. Plaintiff contends that the ADA required GTE to personally notify her of her right to reasonable accommodations and required GTE to assess what accommodations would be reasonable independent of any specific requests. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that the ADA recognizes indefinite unpaid leave followed by subsequent reassignment as a reasonable accommodation and that the ADA required GTE to inform her of such an option.

Given the above, Plaintiff contends that she would have requested an indefinite unpaid leave as an alternative to termination had GTE presented her the option. Because Plaintiff contends that GTE was required under the ADA to provide her an indefinite unpaid leave and reassignment, she moves this Court to grant her partial summary judgment on the issue of liability under the ADA. Plaintiff makes no motion concerning her TCHRA or breach of...