Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler

• Decision Date: 05 May 1997
• Citation: 678 N.E.2d 853,424 Mass. 813
• Parties: , 65 USLW 2734, 7 A.D. Cases 691, 9 NDLR P 319 Alan J. LABONTE v. HUTCHINS & WHEELER. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 853

678 N.E.2d 853

424 Mass. 813, 65 USLW 2734, 7 A.D.

Cases 691, 9 NDLR P 319

Alan J. LABONTE v. HUTCHINS & WHEELER. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued Oct. 7, 1996.

Decided May 5, 1997.

Richard W. Renehan (Joshua M. Davis, with him), Boston, for defendant.

David Rapaport (Jerry E. Benezra, with him), Boston, for plaintiff.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and ABRAMS, O'CONNOR and FRIED, JJ.

ABRAMS, Judge.

The defendant, the law firm of Hutchins & Wheeler (law firm), appeals from a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Alan J. Labonte, based on handicap discrimination. See G.L. c. 151B, § 4. The law firm argues that: (1) the plaintiff is estopped from pursuing his claim because he sought disability benefits; (2) the evidence was insufficient to withstand a motion for directed verdict; and (3) the judge erred in denying its motion for remittitur or a new trial based on excessive damages. We allowed the law firm's application for direct appellate review. We affirm the determination of liability. We remand the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings on the issue of damages.

1. Facts. In June, 1990, the plaintiff, Alan J. Labonte, was hired as the executive director of the law firm. When hired, he was informed that his job would have a "continuously high" stress level. He was told that he would be required to perform many functions, although the exact functions never were incorporated explicitly into a written job description. At the job interview the law firm implied that the hours would be long. The plaintiff was to receive $115,000 per year for his services.

The plaintiff, a Greenfield resident, took up residence in an apartment near the law firm. His family remained in Greenfield. The plaintiff stayed in Boston during the week and traveled to Greenfield on weekends to be with his family. After a year, the plaintiff bought a home in the Boston area so that his family could be with him. Various partners of the law firm knew of and assisted with the mechanics of the purchase of the home and none dissuaded him from making the purchase or gave any indication that his job was in jeopardy.

During the first year, the plaintiff created a timekeeping system that saved the law firm $13,000 per month, arranged for a better life insurance package for the attorneys, rearranged leasing agreements to save rental payments of $43,000, lowered client disbursement costs by $200,000, and devised a system to cut overtime expenses to save $40,000. In June, 1991, the plaintiff received an evaluation stating that the partners were "very satisfied" with the work that he was doing. The plaintiff received a raise of $4,600 a year. ²

Approximately one year after starting at the law firm, the plaintiff developed a limp. A partner at the law firm suggested that he visit a doctor who was a client of the law firm. The plaintiff did so. The plaintiff learned that he had multiple sclerosis. He was referred to a neurologist, who specialized in the disease.

After learning that the plaintiff had multiple sclerosis, the partners on the management committee began to shun him. Despite a request to do so by the plaintiff, the partners never communicated with the specialist to determine what measures could be taken to accommodate the plaintiff in light of his condition. The only effort made was to meet over lunch on one occasion with the plaintiff's referring doctor. The doctor told them to limit the amount of walking that the plaintiff would be required to do. He also stated that the plaintiff might need to rest during the day. The plaintiff continued to work long hours, ³ including taking on additional tasks assigned by the partners such as leading a search committee for a replacement for an employee who had left.

The partners at the law firm made no effort to move the plaintiff's office or to limit his need for walking. On one occasion, one partner did tell the plaintiff that he should go home if he was tired so that he would not wear himself out and then be ineffective. The partners continued to maintain a heavy work load for the plaintiff, and also pressured him to cancel a personal trip to Florida that he had planned in December, 1991. In January, 1992, the plaintiff was terminated by the law firm. With the exception of the one lunch meeting with the referring doctor, the partners never met with any of the plaintiff's doctors or the plaintiff himself prior to his termination to discuss whether reasonable accommodation to assist the plaintiff was possible. The reason given for his termination was poor work performance due to his disability. The law firm claimed that the plaintiff's thinking was not as "crisp" as it needed to be.

After being terminated, the plaintiff applied for and received disability benefits from a law firm insurance policy, stating that he was "unable to work long hours in a stressful job; [and] need[ed a] flexible work schedule." As a result of being terminated, the plaintiff became very depressed and sought therapy. Soon after his termination, he began consulting for a hospital in the greater Boston area. By the fall of 1993, the plaintiff was enrolled in a doctoral program at Boston University, taking classes and teaching.

2. Estoppel. The law firm claims that the plaintiff is estopped from pursuing this discrimination claim because he sought disability benefits after being terminated by the law firm. The law firm asserts that a plaintiff claiming disability benefits admits that he is totally disabled and is unable to perform his job. Therefore, the plaintiff is not a "qualified handicapped person." ⁴ A majority of courts have rejected a defendant's claim that seeking benefits automatically disqualifies a plaintiff from pursuing a handicap discrimination claim. ⁵

Courts are wary of allowing plaintiffs to play "fast and loose with the courts" by claiming to be too disabled to perform the functions of a job and also claiming that they were terminated from their positions despite being able to perform those same functions. See McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir.1996). However, if the evidence creates a disputed issue of fact whether the handicapped person can perform the essential functions of the job, then estoppel is not appropriate. See Pegues v. Emerson Elec. Co., 913 F.Supp. 976, 980-981 (N.D.Miss.1996) (application for disability benefits does not "necessarily foreclose" a claim of handicap discrimination); Parisi v. Jenkins, 236 Ill.App.3d 42, 177 Ill.Dec. 496, 603 N.E.2d 566 (1992); Department of Transp. v. Grawe, 113 Ill.App.3d 336, 69 Ill.Dec. 250, 447 N.E.2d 467 (1983); Jishi v. General Motors Corp., 207 Mich.App. 429, 526 N.W.2d 24 (1994); Paschke v. Retool Indus., 445 Mich. 502, 519 N.W.2d 441 (1994). Only one court has explicitly adopted a strict rule maintaining that a person filing for disability benefits is estopped from pursuing any claim for discrimination, solely because that person sought and received disability benefits. See Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc., 873 F.Supp. 547, 557 (D.Kan.1995).

Other "courts [applying estoppel] did not find it dispositive that the plaintiff had made representations of disability in order to receive benefits. Rather, some of the courts considered such representations as factors to be weighed in determining whether a fact question existed." Morton v. GTE North, Inc., 922 F.Supp. 1169, 1182 (N.D.Tex.1996) (rejecting the notion that cases other than Garcia-Paz, supra, apply estoppel based solely on a claim for disability benefits). ⁶

Relying on Beal v. Board of Selectmen of Hingham, 419 Mass. 535, 646 N.E.2d

131 (1995), and August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576 (1st Cir.1992), the law firm asserts that the plaintiff should be estopped from pursuing this action. We do not agree. In Beal, a police officer was on paid disability leave for two years after suffering severe injuries sustained in a head-on automobile collision while on duty. When ordered to return to duty, the officer claimed that she was "permanently and totally disabled." Beal, supra at 543, 646 N.E.2d 131. The officer was terminated and thereafter claimed handicap discrimination. Id. at 537, 646 N.E.2d 131. We concluded that her declaration of total disability on being asked to return to work was proof that she could not have performed the essential functions of the position. Id. at 539-543, 646 N.E.2d 131. We also noted that a police officer's job, even a desk job, necessitated the ability to react quickly in emergency situations and that the plaintiff's propensity to blackouts in stressful situations made her unable to perform the essential functions of the job. Id. at 542-543, 646 N.E.2d 131. These factors together eliminated any dispute as to whether the plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job.

Similarly, in August, the plaintiff, a salesman, had taken a continuous leave of absence due to clinical depression. His six-week leave began on March 27, 1989, and was later extended an additional two weeks to end on May 22, 1989. At a May 11 meeting, August expressed his concern over his ability to perform on a full-time basis and was told that a part-time schedule was inappropriate. Unsure of his ability to return to work, the plaintiff filed for disability benefits on May 12, 1989. August, supra at 578-579.

On May 25, 1989, August was terminated because "it [was] certainly unclear when and if [August would] be able to return to work." Id. at 579. He sought and received disability benefits for the rest of the year and renewed his claim in December, 1989; February, 1990; April, 1990; and June, 1990, on the basis that he was totally and continuously disabled. The application for benefits included a statement from the plaintiff's doctor that the plaintiff had been "totally disabled" since March, 1989. August brought suit claiming handicap discrimination. The court denied August relief because it stated that...