Morton v. Haynes

• Decision Date: 18 September 1971
• Docket Number: No. N71 C 36.,N71 C 36.
• Parties: David Louis MORTON, Petitioner, v. Edward E. HAYNES, Superintendent, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

332 F. Supp. 890

David Louis MORTON, Petitioner, v. Edward E. HAYNES, Superintendent, Respondent.

No. N71 C 36.

United States District Court, E. D. Missouri, N. D.

September 18, 1971.

David Louis Morton, pro se.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen. of Missouri, Jefferson City, Mo., for respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WEBSTER, District Judge.

David Louis Morton, presently in state custody serving a twenty-three year sentence after being convicted of first degree robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, petitions this court for writ of habeas corgus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In support of his application, petitioner alleges that he was denied the right to speedy trial by purposeful and oppressive maneuvers on the part of the prosecution designed to cause delay in bringing his case to trial. Petitioner also maintains that he was denied equal protection of the law since Missouri law did not require petitioner's case to be brought to trial in the city court as soon as it would have required the case to be tried in a rural area.

Petitioner raised the first of these contentions on direct appeal from his conviction (State v. Morton, 444 S.W.2d 420 (Mo.1969)). He subsequently raised both of the points he presents in his petition to this court by way of motion to vacate sentence pursuant to Missouri Criminal Rule 27.26, V.A.M.R. (Morton v. State, 468 S.W. 638 (Mo. 1971)). On both occasions, the Missouri Supreme Court found that petitioner's allegations were without merit. This court finds that petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).

On January 22, 1967, the K & G Market, located in St. Louis, Missouri, was robbed by two men. Fingerprints discovered on a package which one of the robbers had handled were compared and found to be those of petitioner. Petitioner was arrested on February 1, 1967. On March 9, 1967, an indictment was returned charging him with the robbery. Petitioner appeared with appointed counsel to enter a plea of not guilty on March 16 and trial was set for April 17. Shortly before that date, petitioner's counsel was appointed to state office and was permitted to withdraw from the case. The trial date was reset for May 22 so that petitioner's new counsel would have time to familiarize himself with the case. On May 22 the prosecution requested a continuance because its fingerprint expert was on vacation and would not be able to appear if the trial was held as scheduled. The trial court granted the continuance, and the case was reset for June 6, 1967. Trial proceedings were commenced on June 6, but ended in a mistrial declared on petitioner's motion after the prosecution improperly referred to petitioner's criminal record while examining a witness. A new trial was set for September 18. On this date the petitioner announced ready for trial. However, the state asked for a delay of several days because the attorney assigned to prosecute the case had been injured in an automobile accident. When the trial court indicated that the trial must proceed, the state entered a nolle prosequi. Petitioner alleges that he was rearrested immediately after the prosecution had entered its nolle prosequi and held until he was reindicted on October 17. Trial was set for December 11, was commenced on that date and subsequently completed.

On appeal from his conviction, the Missouri Supreme Court found that petitioner had not been denied the right to speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and had been brought to trial within the time limits prescribed by Missouri law.¹ A federal court will not review state court's application of state law on petition for writ of habeas corpus, but will limit its inquiry to whether federally guaranteed rights have been abridged. Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001, 89 S.Ct. 483, 21 L.Ed.2d 466 (1968); Jackson v. People of California, 336 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1964); Carter v. State of New Mexico, 358 F.2d 710 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873, 87 S.Ct. 146, 17 L.Ed.2d 100 (1966).

The right to speedy trial secured by the Sixth Amendment has by decision been incorporated into the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and applies to the States. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L. Ed.2d 607 (1969). Where a state prisoner has been convicted after being denied the right to speedy trial, a federal district court may issue a writ of habeas corpus and, in appropriate cases where the delay has affected the basic fairness of the trial, void the conviction and cause the charges to be dropped. Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1968); Luckman v. Burke, 299 F. Supp. 488 (E.D.Wis.1969). However, the Writ will not issue unless it is shown that undue delay was purposeful and oppressive, or that it prejudiced a defendant's ability to rebut the prosecution's case against him. Basker v. Crouse, 426 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Solomon v. Mancusi, 412 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1969); Matzner v. Davenport, 288 F.Supp. 636 (D.N.J. 1968), aff'd 410 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1015, 90 S. Ct. 570, 24 L.Ed.2d 506 (1970); United States ex rel. Watts v. Harrison, 308 F.Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y.1969); United States ex rel. Wilson v. Follette, 316 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y.1970).

The United States Supreme Court has held that nineteen months between original arrest and subsequent hearing is not necessarily undue delay and does not, in and of itself, constitute a violation of the right to speedy trial. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966).² Petitioner was tried approximately ten months after he was first arrested. This length of time between arrest and trial is not unduly long and, unaccompanied by purposeful oppression or prejudice to petitioner's ability to defend himself at trial, creates no inference that petitioner was denied the right to speedy trial.

In his application to this court, petitioner does not allege that the delay in the conduct of his trial prejudiced his ability to defend himself. Rather, he maintains that the repeated delays, brought about when he was ready for trial, were purposeful and oppressive. Upon examination of the petition and the opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court on petitioner's appeal from conviction, we find this allegation to be without merit. None of the causes for delay was unjustified or unreasonable. The state sought delay in bringing petitioner to trial when circumstances occurred which materially affected its ability to prosecute. There is nothing to indicate that the prosecution purposefully sought to delay the trial.

Even if this court were to conclude that the prosecutions' conduct was purposeful and oppressive, there is little it could offer at this time by way of habeas corpus relief. The court would not invalidate the conviction, since the delay did not prejudice petitioner's ability to defend and thus...