Morton v. Supreme Council of Royal League

• Decision Date: 03 March 1903
• Citation: 100 Mo. App. 76,73 S.W. 259
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: MORTON v. SUPREME COUNCIL OF ROYAL LEAGUE.<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL>

73 S.W. 259

100 Mo. App. 76

MORTON v. SUPREME COUNCIL OF ROYAL LEAGUE.^*

Court of Appeals at St. Louis, Missouri.

March 3, 1903.

BENEFIT CERTIFICATE—CONSTRUCTION—SUBSEQUENT BY-LAWS—LIMITATION OF LIABILITY—FOREIGN LAWS—PLEADING—INTERVENTION—TIME OF MOTION.

1. Where a beneficial association had so interpreted its contracts as to render itself liable thereunder though the certificate holder committed suicide while sane, by providing that the company should not be liable if insured committed suicide within two years after the issuance of the certificate, and by thereafter passing by-laws that if insured committed suicide his beneficiary should be entitled to only one-half of the face of the policy, it could not be contended that a certificate was invalidated by suicide on the ground of public policy.

2. Where, in an action on a policy made in Illinois and subject to its laws, such laws relating to the defense urged were not pleaded, defendant's liability must be determined according to the common law.

3. A benefit certificate bound insured to comply with all the laws and usages of the society then in force or which might be thereafter adopted by the order. At the time the certificate was issued one of the by-laws provided that, if any member should commit suicide within two years, defendant should be liable for one-half of the face of the policy, and thereafter such by-law was amended at various times until it finally provided that if any member should die by suicide his beneficiary should only receive one-half of the certificate. Held, that the provision of the certificate requiring compliance with future regulations related only to such regulations as effected the member's duties as a member, and that such member was therefore not bound by the by-law as amended.

4. Motions to intervene in an action and to be substituted as curator for the plaintiff, not filed until after judgment, were properly overruled.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Action by Gertrude F. Morton, by William G. Richardson, curator, against the Supreme Council of the Royal League. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Louis R. Steber, for appellant. Wm. R. Gentry, for respondent.

Statement of Facts and Opinion.

GOODE, J.

Plaintiff's petition states that William C. Richardson is public administrator and ex officio public curator of the city of St. Louis, in charge of the estate of Gertrude F. Morton, a minor; that on June 26, 1893, the appellant, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Illinois, insured the life of Charles Morton for the benefit of said Gertrude in the sum of $4,000, the certificate of insurance being pleaded in full; that said Charles Morton died May 6, 1900, having complied with the regulations governing the appellant association, with his certificate in full force; that appellant refused to pay the amount of the certificate or any part thereof, wherefore judgment was demanded for the same.

The answer was as follows (omitting caption):

"Now again comes defendant, and, by leave of court first had and obtained, files this its second amended answer to plaintiff's petition, and denies each and every allegation thereof as therein stated.

"Defendant, further answering, says that it is a corporation, duly incorporated under the laws of the state of Illinois as a fraternal beneficial association, order, or society; that now, at and prior to the times hereinafter mentioned, it has operated and still operates as such under the laws of the states of Illinois, Missouri, and other states, and that it is duly licensed to operate in said states as a fraternal beneficial association as in the laws of said states defined; that in conformity with the laws of the state of Illinois pertaining to fraternal beneficial associations, and as in said laws of the state of Illinois provided and defined, the defendant association was and is formed, organized, and carried on for the sole benefit of its members and beneficiaries, and not for profit; that it has, and always has had, a lodge system with ritualistic form of work and a representative form of government; that it has made and still makes provision for the payment of benefits, in case of death, out of a fund derived from assessments collected from its members; that its death benefits are payable only to the families, heirs, blood relatives, affianced husband, or affianced wife of, or to persons dependent upon, the member; that it operates and conducts, and always has operated and conducted, its business as such fraternal beneficial association, order, or society, under the provisions of the laws of the state of Illinois as hereinbefore defined and set forth; that it does not do, and never has done, what is known as the business of life insurance anywhere, or at any time, and is not a life insurance corporation, and that its principal office now and always has been located in the city of Chicago and state of Illinois.

"Defendant, further answering, says that it operates and conducts its business through subordinate bodies known as subordinate councils, and that its subordinate councils, under defendant's constitution and by-laws, are authorized to admit acceptable persons to beneficiary membership; that each member of the order has a voice and vote in the government and management of the order, through duly elected representatives, as provided by its constitution and by-laws, duly enacted by defendant, through such elected representatives, as members of its Supreme Council, or governing body.

"Defendant, further answering, admits that one Charles Morton, while a resident of the city of Chicago, state of Illinois, and in said city and state, duly presented his written application for membership to one of defendant's subordinate councils, known as Bankers' Council, No. 56, located at Chicago, in the state of Illinois, and that in said application, duly signed by him, and as a condition precedent to being made a beneficiary member of the defendant association or order, he agreed in said application to comply with all its laws, rules, and usages then in force or which might be thereafter adopted by the defendant order; that thereupon he was duly initiated in said Bankers' Council, and a benefit certificate of defendant, No. 4,973, was issued and delivered in said city and state aforesaid to said Charles Morton on June 19, A. D. 1889, in which Pauline E. C. Morton, wife of the said Charles Morton, was made the beneficiary.

"Defendant further states that the said benefit certificate No. 4,973, issued as aforesaid, was in form, substance, and language identical with the benefit certificate set forth in plaintiff's petition, saving and excepting the date, number, and the name of the beneficiary, and contained a clause therein reading as follows: `Upon condition that the said member [meaning Charles Morton] complies in future with the laws, rules, and regulations now governing the said council and fund, or that may hereafter be enacted by the Supreme Council to govern said council and fund, all of which are also made a part and parcel of this contract;' that said benefit certificate was duly accepted in writing by said Charles Morton, on the face thereof in words as follows: `I accept this certificate on the conditions named therein'—and duly evidenced by his signature thereto attached.

"Defendant further says that it was and is provided in its constitution and by-laws that a member may at any time surrender his benefit certificate and change his beneficiary, and that in pursuance of said provision of defendant's constitution and bylaws, and with the consent of defendant, the said Charles Morton, on June 26, 1893, while still a resident of said city of Chicago, and a member of said Bankers' Council, surrendered the original benefit certificate as aforesaid, and in writing on the back of the said surrendered certificate directed a new benefit certificate to be issued and delivered to him, payable to Gertrude F. Morton, related to him as his daughter; that in said benefit certificate, as issued and delivered by defendant to said Charles Morton in the city of Chicago, state of Illinois, it was and is provided, among other things, as a part and parcel of the contract therein made with the said Charles Morton, as an express `condition that the said member complies in future with the laws, rules, and regulations now governing the said council and fund, or that may thereafter be enacted by the Supreme Council to govern such council and fund, all of which are also made a part of this contract'; that the fund therein referred to is the widows' and orphans' benefit fund, which is obtained by defendant by levying and collecting assessments therefor from the beneficiary members of defendant's association as are needed, from time to time, to pay its losses by death, etc., and out of which payments to beneficiaries are made, as provided in the constitution and by-laws of defendant; that the said Charles Morton, in writing, on the face of such certificate, by his signature thereto subscribed, accepted the said certificate on the conditions named therein, as in plaintiff's petition set forth and stated.

"Defendant, further answering, says that in the exercise of its powers, through its Supreme Council duly and regularly assembled in the city of Chicago, state of Illinois, on March 13, 1893, and on March 28, 1893, it adopted a by-law which reads as follows: `If any member shall, within two years subsequent to his admission into this order, die by his own act or hand, sane or insane, his beneficiary or beneficiaries shall receive only one-half of the face value of his certificate.' That said by-law was promulgated to the membership of defendant's association, and went into force and effect April 1, 1893.

"Defendant, further answering, says that at a subsequent session of its Supreme Council, duly and regularly assembled in the city of Chicago, ...