Morton v. Woodbury
Decision Date | 08 June 1897 |
Citation | 47 N.E. 283,153 N.Y. 243 |
Parties | MORTON v. WOODBURY. |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Appeal from supreme court, general term, First department.
Bill by Levi P. Morton, as sole surviving executor of Lizzie H. Perkins, against Ellen C. Woodbury and Zachariah Jellison and others, executors of Thomas Harward. From a judgment of the general term of the supreme court modifying a final judgment of the special term, and affirming it as modified, the executors of Thomas Harward appeal. Affirmed.
The action was brought by the executors of Lizzie H. Perkins for the construction of her will. The will was as follows: The foregoing will was executed in the city of Paris on the 6th day of January, 1890. The testatrix died at that place the 23d day of September, 1891, although she was at the time a resident of the city of New York. Her will was admitted to probate by a surrogate's court held in and for the city and county of New York on the 22d day of September, 1892. The testatrix left, her surviving, as her only heir at law and next of kin, her father, Thomas Harward, who at the time of her death was 103 years of age, and possessed of nearly as much property as the testatrix, as appears from the provisions of his will, which is made a part of the record. He died shortly after the death of the testatrix, and the appellants are the executors of his last will and testament. The testatrix's mother died previous to the making of the will in question, and at the time it was made her father had married again, and was living with his second wife. Inclosed in an envelope with the will was a paper which was as follows: The testatrix spent much of her time in the city of Washington with the respondent, who resided there and was her most intimate friend; their friendship having begun when they were girls at school, and continued until the death of the former. Her estate consisted of cash, $2,688.14; furniture, clothes, ornaments, and jewels valued at $3,478.10; bonds and stocks valued at $123,624; a lot in Brooklyn valued at $10,000; and a lot in Newport, devised to Florence Matthews, of the value of $6,000; a lot in Washington, devised to the respondent, valued at $2,600. Thus the value of her whole estate was $148,390.24. The specific legacies of money given by the will amounted to $38,500; the land specifically devised, to $8,600; while the things which were denominated on the argument as ‘personal belongings' were only of the value of $3,478.10. The case was tried at special term, where it was held that all the devises and bequests contained in the will were valid and effectual, except the specific bequest of $1,000 to the poor of Bath, which was held void for uncertainty; the bequest to the American Hospital, if erected in Paris, which was held void, because no such institution was in existence at the time of the testatrix's death; and ‘the residuary devise and bequest to Ellen C. Woodbury, and the direction to the executors to sell property, and give the money to hospitals and homes for women in Washington and New York,’ which were held void for ‘want of intrinsic certainty and extrinsic application.’ The special term also held that the residuum of the estate, not specifically and validly devised and bequeathed, passed by intestacy to the executors and heirs of Thomas Harward, and judgment was directed accordingly. Ellen C. Woodbury was the only party who appealed from that decision. On appeal to the general term, that court modified and practically reversed the decision of the special term, so far as it adjudged that the provision of the will appointing Ellen C. Woodbury as the testatrix's legatee was void for uncertainty.
Daniel G. Rollins and George G. De Witt, for appellants.
for Appellants.
William G. Choate, for respondent Ellen C. Woodbury.
William M. Grinnell, for respondent Morton.
MARTIN, J. (after stating the facts).
This court is called upon to construe the will of the testatrix, and, if possible, under existing rules of law, to ascertain her intent, and thereby determine the devolution of her estate. The will was holographic, written by the testatrix when in a foreign land, distant from home and friends, and it is manifest that she was unaided in its preparation by legal counsel or professional advice. Under these circumstances, that we find it to have been inartificially and unskillfully written, rendering the intent and meaning of the testatrix somewhat obscure and uncertain, excites no surprise. Yet its uncertainty of expression and obscurity of meaning in no degree absolve this court from the duty of interpreting it, unless it is so vague and indefinite as to render the purpose and meaning of the testatrix incomprehensible, as it is only when all the established rules of law for the construction of wills have been applied in vain that the court may reject the instrument as impossible of construction. Hence it is our duty to carefully examine and diligently study the provisions of this will, apply to it the proper rules of construction, and, so far as possible, interpret it in accordance with the intent and purpose of the testatrix.
The parties having acquiesced in the decisions of the courts below upon most of the questions originally submitted, the only controversy between them at present is whether the provisions of the fourth article of the testatrix's will, whereby she appointed the respondent her legatee, are sufficient to constitute her the general residuary legatee of her estate. The language of that provision is, ‘I appoint Ellen C. Woodbury my legatee, and give to her all not before specified in this and request her to give as I may direct or sell from what remains.’ It is obvious that the word ‘all’ refers to her property or estate, and that the word ‘this' relates to her will. Therefore, if considered alone, without reference to the other provisions, it is plain that it should be interpreted as though it read, ‘I appoint Ellen C. Woodbury my legatee, and give her all my property or estate not before specified in this will.’ The words, ‘I appoint Ellen C. Woodbury my legatee, and give to her all not...
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