Mosby v. Michael Reese Hospital

• Decision Date: 11 June 1964
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 49235
• Citation: 199 N.E.2d 633,49 Ill.App.2d 336
• Parties: Rowena MOSBY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL REESE HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 633

199 N.E.2d 633

49 Ill.App.2d 336

Rowena MOSBY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL REESE HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee.

Gen. No. 49235.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

June 11, 1964.

Arthur S. Gomberg, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, Chicago, for defendant-appellee.

DEMPSEY, Justice.

The question posed by this appeal is this: is the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries tolled in a malpractice case if the plaintiff is unaware of the negligent act which caused her injury and through no fault of her own does not learn of it until more than two years after it occurred?

The question, which has not been passed upon heretofore by a court of review in this State, arises from these facts, admitted by the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint: Rowena Mosby was operated on by agents of the defendant on March 25, 1956. A surgical needle used during the course of the operation was left in her body. On December 30, 1960, during an operation at another hospital, the needle was discovered in the area of her right knee. The needle had worked its way through her body and had caused serious and permanent injury.

The complaint filed on January 11, 1962, was in two counts. Court I charged that the defendant carelessly permitted the needle to be placed in her body, negligently permitted it to remain there and negligently failed to remove it at the conclusion of the operation. The plaintiff further alleged that she had no means of knowing about the needle and did not learn of it until the second operation was performed four years and nine months later. Count II repeated the allegations of count I but added thereto the charge that the negligence had been fraudulently concealed.

The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. The motion was sustained as to the first count but denied as to the second. The court certified that there was no just reason for delaying an appeal. The plaintiff has appealed from the dismissal of count I; the defendant has not cross-appealed from the order denying its motion to dismiss count II.

The applicable statute is section 15, chapter 83, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1961: 'Actions for damages for an injury to the person * * * shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of action accrued.' The plaintiff contends that where an operation has taken place and the incision is closed with a foreign object such as a needle, gauze or sponge left in a patient's body, the cause of action accrues upon discovery of the act of malpractice, or when, by the exercise of reasonable care, the patient could have learned of the negligent act. There are cases from other jurisdictions which support the plaintiff's contention. Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959); Louisell and Williams, Trial of Medical Practice Cases, ch. 13, pp. 363-415 (1960). In some instances the hardship imposed by limitations statutes is alleviated by somewhat tenuous theories of tort law which extend the time of the wrongful act. One is that the tortious insertion of a foreign substance in the body of a patient creates a duty to remove the substance and that the duty continues until the wound is closed in a proper way and all the appliances used in the operation removed; another, and the more prevalent, is that the negligence of the operating physician continues as long as there is the relationship of physician and patient and that the statute does not begin to run until the post-operative treatment is terminated. Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal.2d 302, 57 P.2d 908; Bowers v. Olch, 120 Cal.App.2d 108, 260 P.2d 997; Thatcher v. DeTar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760.

The greater weight of authority is that the statute of limitations commences when the negligent act takes place and that the statute is not tolled by the plaintiff's ignorance of his injury. The cases comprising both the majority and minority rules are collected in annotations in 74 A.L.R. 1317, 144 A.L.R. 209 and 80 A.L.R.2d 368. If any trend is discernible it is in the direction of the minority rule. Even in the opinions of those courts which have more recently followed the majority rule, there is an occasional expression of regret. The harshness of the rule is recognized but the statutes which compel the rule are followed, albeit reluctantly. Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 383 P.2d 250 (1963); Tantish v. Szendey, 158 Me. 228, 182 A.2d 660 (1962); Summers v. Wallace Hospital (construing the Idaho statute), 276 F.2d 831 (9th Cir.) (1960).

In Illinois it has been held (in non-personal injury cases) that a plaintiff's ignorance of the cause of action does not delay the operation of the statute. In Lancaster v. Springer, 239 Ill. 472, 88 N.E. 272, a suit to establish a trust and for an accounting, the court said: 'The failure of the complainants to learn of the existence of their cause of action does not prevent the operation of the Statute of Limitations.' Jackson v. Anderson, 355 Ill. 550, 189 N.E. 924, was an action by stockholders to cancel an issue of corporate stock which had not been paid for. The stockholders alleged that they were unaware of the issuance of the stock by the officers of the corporation until after the statute of limitations had run. The court said that this did not prevent the running of the statute. In personal injury cases it has been held that the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations starts to run when the act complained of took place. In Leroy v. City of Springfield, 81 Ill. 114 (1876), the court stated:

'Appellant asks, when shall it be said the cause of action arose, as, in many cases, the extent of the injury cannot be known for a long time?

'The principle, we understand, is, that the cause of action arises at the time the injury was done, and the statute begins to run from that day.'

In Calumet Electric St. Ry. Co. v. Mabie, 66 Ill.App. 235 (1896) the court said:

'In action for injuries resulting from the negligence or unskillfulness of another, the statute attaches and begins to run from the time when the jury was first inflicted, and not from the time when the full extent of the damages sustained has been ascertained.'

The same rule was followed in Gangloff v. Apfelbach, 319 Ill.App. 596, 49 N.E.2d 795, a malpractice case. The plaintiff's fractured elbow was placed in a cast by the defendant physician. When the cast was removed the elbow could not be moved. The defendant operated upon the plaintiff in June 1936. Following this operation the plaintiff's fingers lost their power of movement. A second operation in 1936 brought no improvement. In January 1938 the defendant performed a third operation; it was also a failure. The defendant continued to treat the plaintiff until March 1940 with unsatisfactory results. In 1941 ...