Moseley v. Oswald

Decision Date16 February 2011
Docket Number2011-UP-067
PartiesMary Lou Moseley, Appellant, v. Jim Oswald, Respondent.
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Submitted February 1, 2011.

Appeal From Lexington County R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge.

William E. Booth, III, of West Columbia, for Appellant.

Robert Merrel Cook, II and Ralph S. Kennedy, Jr., both of Batesburg-Leesville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM

Mary Lou Moseley appeals the trial courts granting of Jim Oswald's motion to conform vehicle titles pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRCP. We reverse. [1]

In 1998, Moseley brought suit against Oswald seeking in part the return of seven automobiles and damages for conversion. In 2008, a jury found Oswald did not have to return the vehicles and therefore did not reach the second cause of action for conversion. Thus, at trial, it was not expressly determined who owned the vehicles. The jury verdict form stated only that Oswald did not have to return the vehicles to Moseley. In March 2009, Oswald moved "pursuant to Rule 60, SCRCP and/or such other law as may be applicable" for an order conforming title in the vehicles. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and issued another order, referring repeatedly to Rule 60, SCRCP, requiring the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles to issue titles to the vehicles in Oswald's name.

Oswald contends the trial court did not err by issuing the order because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in providing relief through Rule 60(b). Moreover, Oswald argues the trial court did not err by issuing the order because the trial court has the inherent power to issue an order to give practical effect to the jury verdict. Oswald also argues Moseley lacks standing to bring an appeal because she has no property interest or rights which were adversely affected by the post-trial order.

Rule 60(b), SCRCP, provides:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.

Furthermore "[w]hether to grant or deny a motion under Rule 60(b) lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Therefore, our standard of review is limited to determining whether there was an abuse of discretion.... [which] arises when the order was controlled by an error of law...." Se. Hous. Found. v. Smith, 380 S.C. 621, 636, 670 S.E.2d 680, 688 (Ct. App. 2008). Rule 60(b) is not the proper procedural vehicle to address Oswald's unique situation. Rule 60(b) does not provide a means by which a trial court can grant a prevailing defendant a remedy ...

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