Moseley v. Welch
Decision Date | 20 November 1950 |
Docket Number | 16433. |
Citation | 62 S.E.2d 313,218 S.C. 242 |
Parties | MOSELEY v. WELCH et al. STATE ex rel. MOSELEY et al. v. WELCH et al. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Connor & Connor, Kingstree, Samuel Want, Darlington, for appellants.
Edward W. Cantwell, Kingstree, Henry E. Davis, Florence for respondents.
The history of the litigation leading up to this appeal is succinctly stated in the following agreed statement:
'The action from which this appeal stems was commenced on September 26, 1949, in which the petitioners pray that T. J. Appleby, the present Superintendent of Education, be made a party to the action; that the County Board of Education and the acting trustees of Salters School District No. 32 be required to account for all funds alleged to have been illegally diverted and misused; that the County Board of Education and the County Superintendent of Education be enjoined from transferring to any other school district any white pupils of grammar school age residing in Salters School District No. 32, and also from furnishing at public expense transportation to other school districts; and that the members of the County Board of Education and the Superintendent of Education be enjoined from paying out any public funds by way of attorneys' fees or other expenses of litigation, and to further enforce Judge Mann's order and orders subsequent thereto.
It might be well to supplement the foregoing facts by stating that the closing of the Salters School resulted from the adoption by Williamsburg County of the 'County Unit Plan' of education. Act No. 502 of the Acts of 1944, 43 St. at L. 1368. The constitutionality of this legislation was promptly challenged but it was finally determined that while certain parts of the Act were invalid, the general scheme was free from constitutional objections. Moseley v. Welch, 209 S.C. 19, 39 S.E.2d 133.
As heretofore pointed out, all issues involved in this lengthy litigation have been settled except the question of whether the intervenors, appellants on this appeal, who reside in Salters School District No. 32 but who own real estate in Kingstree School District No. 16, have a right to send their children to the schools of the latter district and to use bus transportation furnished at public expense. They claim that they are entitled to this privilege under the following proviso contained in Section 5346 of the 1942 Code:
Respondents contend, and the Court below held, that the exemption of certain counties has the effect of rendering the foregoing provision unconstitutional as denying due process of law and the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article 1, Section 5 of our State Constitution. This contention is apparently based on the claim that this provision unjustly discriminates against residents of the counties that are excluded. We pass over the question of whether those who live in a non-exempt county are in a position to challenge the constitutionality of this legislation on the ground now asserted. It should be further stated that no attack is made on this provision upon the ground that it constitutes special legislation of the sort prohibited by Article 3, Section 34 of the State Constitution. We shall, therefore, confine our consideration solely to the question of whether this provision constitutes a denial of the constitutional guaranty of due process of law and equal protection of laws.
It was long ago decided that this constitutional guaranty 'does not require territorial uniformity'. Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 34 S.Ct. 712, 715, 58 L.Ed. 1231. 'The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit legislation merely because it is special, or limited in its application to a particular geographical or political subdivision of the state.' Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Board of Improvement of Paving District No. 16 of City of Ft. Smith, 274 U.S. 387, 47 S.Ct. 595, 597, 71 L.Ed. 1112. 12 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Section 488, page 167. It is only necessary that there be a reasonable basis for the limitation or differentiation and that all persons similarly situated in the same territory are treated alike. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 506. In State v. Berlin, 21 S.C. 292, the Court quoted with approval the following: 'To make a statute a public law of general obligation, it is not necessary that it should be equally applicable to all parts of the state; all that is required is, that it shall apply equally to all persons within the territorial limits described in the act.'
It is our conclusion that the Court below erred in holding that the proviso in...
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