Mosier, In re
Decision Date | 17 November 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 4129,4129 |
Citation | 394 N.E.2d 368,59 Ohio Misc. 83 |
Parties | , 13 O.O.3d 290 In re MOSIER. |
Court | Ohio Court of Common Pleas |
Donald L. Johnson, Pros. Atty., and George F. Crummey, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff.
Fuller, Henry, Hodge & Snyder and Stephen B. Mosier, Toledo, for defendant.
The minor child has been charged with being an unruly child by virtue of allegedly violating Ordinance 509.08 of the city of Van Wert commonly referred to as the curfew ordinance.
The minor child filed a motion to dismiss based upon among other things, the constitutional invalidity of the ordinance. The court at the hearing overruled all branches of the motion except that of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance which the court took under advisement. The parties stipulated that the evidentiary hearing on the merits proceed, with same not to be considered if the court held the ordinance invalid on its face, and to be considered if the court held the ordinance constitutionally valid on its face.
The ordinance the child is charged with violating reads as follows:
In order to determine whether or not the ordinance infringes upon the constitutional rights of the child the court must first determine the meaning of the ordinance and what conduct is prohibited and what is permitted. This legislation not having a preamble setting forth its purpose nor having a definitions section defining the terms used therein, the court must therefore rely on the standard dictionary definitions of the words used therein in construing the ordinance.
All dictionary definitions used herein are taken from Webster Universal Dictionary, Unabridged International Edition, 1970, Harver Educational Services, Inc., New York, New York.
The first term we come to in the Ordinance that must be defined is "remain." The dictionary gives this definition of the verb intransitive form of the word: to stay, to remain behind, to be left, to continue, endure, to stop, to last, continue, to abide, stay, linger, a staying, tarrying, to hesitate, stand still.
The next thing that must be defined is the phrase "public place or establishment." Here there is no dictionary definition of the phrase "public place" or the phrase "public establishment." Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, Words and Phrases, gives no definition for either phrase. 35 Words and Phrases, West Publishing Company, contains 20 pages of definitions and limitations on the meaning of the words "public place."
Many of the definitions given obviously do not apply and choosing the ones that would give some guidance one must look to the way the words are used in the ordinance. Within the context of our ordinance the following general definitions at pages 433-434, would seem to fit:
Therefore, it is the conclusion of the court that a minor may during the prescribed hours go anywhere he pleases as long as he stays in motion. This leads to a dilemma when he comes to a stop sign or traffic light. However, since a municipality is prohibited from enacting ordinances in conflict with the general laws of the state of Ohio, the legislative body apparently did not mean to define "remain" so stringently as to prohibit obedience to the traffic laws. Therefore, the court finds the ordinance prohibits the minor from stopping, staying or remaining on any public street or sidewalk (longer than is necessary to obey the traffic laws) parks, school house or grounds, playground, privately owned premises open to the public such as parks, playgrounds, parking lots, churches, theaters, dance halls, retail establishments, including restaurants during the time they are open to the public, the common public area of motels and hotels, including their lounges and dining rooms.
There are several exceptions to the ordinance all of which seem to be quite clear in their meaning except, "to a minor upon an errand or other legitimate business directed by the minor's parent."
"Errand" is defined as: (1) a particular business intrusted to an agent or messenger; (2) a special business, mission with a definite purpose.
"Legitimate" is defined as: lawful or permitted.
"Business" is defined as: (1) regular, habitual, occupation, trade, profession, followed for a livelihood; (2)(a) commercial transactions, trade, finance etc. contracted with one of the learned or liberal professions, (b) particular commercial enterprise; (3) that which has to be done, a special duty, or service imposed by a person's position, office, or circumstances.
The court interprets this exception to mean something that is directed by the parent and is furtherance of the parent's business or profession or for the benefit of the parent as opposed to being for the benefit of the minor.
The minor child attacks the ordinance as being violative of the minor's First Amendment rights and the ...
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Appeal In Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JT9065297, Matter of
...(holding that curfew ordinance violated minors' right to attend religious services and right to move freely); In re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83, 394 N.E.2d 368, 372-77 (C.P.1978) (invalidating juvenile curfew ordinance as overbroad, vague, and violative of minors' First Amendment, Due Process,......
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Allen v. City of Bordentown
...which have considered the question have gone in opposite directions. Bykofsky applied the rational basis test. In re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83, 394 N.E.2d 368 (Ct.Comm.Pl.1978), applied the compelling interest test. Aladdin's Castle v. Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5 Cir.1980) considered an ordin......
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City of Maquoketa v. Russell
...the ordinance it would prohibit older minors from attending alone any church services beyond 11:00 p.m. Cf. In re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83, 89-90, 394 N.E.2d 368, 372 (1978) (holding that curfew ordinance deprived minor of First Amendment right of religion because it prohibited older minors......