Mosier v. Evans
| Decision Date | 17 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-02197-JDB-tmp |
| Parties | TIMMY LEE MOSIER, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH EVANS and CROCKETT COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is the September 29, 2022, motion of Defendants Joseph Evans and Crockett County, Tennessee, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the claims brought by Plaintiff, Timmy Lee Mosier. Plaintiff responded (D.E. 82), Defendants replied (D.E. 93), and Plaintiff submitted a sur-reply. (D.E. 98.)
Mosier filed his complaint in the Circuit Court of Crockett County on February 20, 2020, alleging both state law and federal civil rights law claims. (D.E. 1-2.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserted common law tort claims, Tennessee state negligence claims under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq., and federal civil rights claims pursuant to both the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 and the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (D.E. 1-2 at PageID 10.) On March 17, 2020, counsel for Defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. (D.E. 1.)
On July 29, 2020, the Court granted Defendants' partial motion to dismiss (D.E. 7) and dismissed Mosier's state-law negligence claims. (D.E. 14.)
Rule 56 provides in relevant part that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A dispute of a material fact is genuine so long as ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.'” Thacker v. Ethicon, Inc., 47 F.4th 451, 458 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Edu. of Danville Indep. Schs., 974 F.3d 652, 660 (6th Cir. 2020)).
At summary judgment, a plaintiff “can no longer rest on allegations alone[.]” Reform Am. v. City of Detroit, 37 F.4th 1138, 1148 (6th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted), reh'g en banc denied 2022 WL 2914586 (6th Cir. July 18, 2022). “[C]onclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are not evidence, and are not sufficient to defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment.” Jones v. City of Franklin, 677 Fed.Appx. 279, 282 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)). “[I]n order to defeat summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present affirmative evidence to support [his] position; a mere ‘scintilla of evidence' is insufficient.” Id. (quoting Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 2003)).
“To the extent that videos in the record show facts so clearly that a reasonable jury could view those facts in only one way, those facts should be viewed in the light depicted by the videos.” Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S 372, 380 (2007)). “To the extent that facts shown in videos can be interpreted in multiple ways or if videos do not show all relevant facts, such facts should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. (citing Godawa v. Byrd, 798 F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2015)). “The moving party is entitled to summary judgment when the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Goodman v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgmt., Inc., 954 F.3d 852, 859 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted), reh'g en banc denied (July 1, 2020).
The following material facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. On March 2, 2019, Evans, a deputy at the Crockett County Sheriff's Office, arrested Mosier for public intoxication. (D.E. 1-2.) Prior to his arrest, Plaintiff had consumed over fourteen beers, at least one shot of whiskey, and smoked marijuana. (D.E. 83-1 at PageID 820-23, 859-60.) At the time of arrest, Plaintiff was intoxicated but able to hold himself up and walk. (Id. at PageID 825, 827, 833, 852.) According to the record, officers are trained to interact with intoxicated individuals and often deal with such persons. (D.E. 83-10 at PageID 1288.)
Following the arrest of Plaintiff, Evans transported him to the Crockett County Jail. (D.E. 1-2.) On arrival, Plaintiff exited Defendant's vehicle and entered the booking area. (D.E. 83-3 at PageID 1053-55.) Mosier then cursed at the officer, (D.E. 83-1 at PageID 864), and struggled against being escorted by him. (D.E. 70 at 00:07:39-00:07:50; D.E. 83-1 at PageID 867-68; D.E. 83-3 at PageID 1060-67.) As Defendant led Mosier into the jail, he grasped Plaintiff's overall straps with both hands in response to Plaintiff's active resistance. (D.E. 70 at 00:07:39; D.E. 831 at PageID 921; D.E. 83-3 at PageID 1060.) What happened next is disputed. Mosier insists that Evans “slung [him] to the ground with tremendous force.” (D.E. 82-1 at PageID 434.) In contrast, Defendant maintains that he “intended to use the takedown maneuver to regain control” of Plaintiff without causing him injury. However, Mosier's strap broke resulting in his fall and subsequent injuries. (D.E. 69-2 at PageID 259-60.)
Shortly thereafter, Evans directed a corrections officer to “get a medic.” (D.E. 70 at 00:08:09; D.E. 83-3 at PageID 1108, 1115-16.) He then removed Plaintiff's handcuffs and wiped blood from the arrestee's face. (D.E. 70 at 00:08:10, 00:12:22-00:12:45; D.E. 83-3 at PageID 1107-08, 1119.) As the paramedics did not immediately arrive, Evans left the booking area to again request assistance. (D.E. 83-3 at PageID 1120.) When medical personnel showed up about eight minutes later, the officer informed them that the strap on Plaintiff's clothing broke. (D.E. 70 at 00:13:07, 00:16:44-52; D.E. 83-3 at PageID 1123-24.) Evans was concerned that Plaintiff needed hospital attention, (D.E. 83-3 at PageID 1129, 1135; D.E. 83-10 at PageID 1309), and thus, he called his superior, Lieutenant Roy Mosier. (D.E. 83-3 at PageID 1129; D.E. 83-10 at PageID 1309.) The lieutenant agreed and another patrol officer transported Plaintiff to a hospital. (D.E. 83-3 at PageID 1129.)
The Crockett County Sheriff Office's use of force policy provides, in part, that “[u]nnecessary force is defined as any force in excess of that necessary to accomplish a legitimate task.” (D.E. 69-8 at PageID 367.). It further states that, (Id.) Lieutenant Mosier conducted an investigation into the incident concerning Plaintiff and concluded that Evans did not use excessive force against him. (D.E. 83-10 at PageID 1304-05, 1309-10, 1318-22.)
At all times relevant, Evans was certified by the Tennessee Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission (“POST”). (D.E. 69-7 at PageID 363.) All full-time Crockett County Sheriff's Office deputies are POST certified and must remain POST certified to continue in their roles as deputies. (Id.) POST annually approved Crocket County's training on use of force and access to medical care. (Id. at PageID 364.) Evans received yearly instruction regarding the use of force policy. (Id.; D.E. 83-3 at PageID 1007-08.) Crockett County Sheriff Office's training, including its training on the use of force, met and complied with POST standards and taught officers how to deescalate volatile situations. (D.E. 69-7 at PageID 364; D.E. 83-10 at PageID 1002.)
Section 1983 provides a “private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To prove a claim under the statute, “a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when construed favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” Doe ex rel. Doe v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 35 F.4th 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 595 (6th Cir. 2018)).
There is no dispute that Evans acted under color of law and thus the Court's inquiry will focus solely upon whether his actions deprived Plaintiff of a constitutional right. In bringing a § 1983 claim, Mosier first alleges that Evans violated his constitutional right to be free from excessive force during arrest. (D.E. 1-2 at PageID 14-15.) Because § 1983 does not confer substantive rights, “[i]n addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). The Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments each protect individuals against excessive government force and “[w]hich amendment should be applied depends on the status of the plaintiff at the time of the incident . . . .” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2013). There is no dispute that Mosier was not an inmate at the time of his...
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