Moskalik v. Mill Creek Metroparks
| Decision Date | 20 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 15 MA 18.,15 MA 18. |
| Citation | 50 N.E.3d 946 |
| Parties | Mary MOSKALIK, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. MILL CREEK METROPARKS, et al., Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Atty. Gregg A. Rossi, Rossi & Rossi, Youngstown, OH, for plaintiff-appellant.
Atty. Gregory A. Beck, Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, North Canton, OH, for defendants-appellees.
ROBB
, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff–Appellant Mary Moskalik appeals the decision of the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant–Appellee Mill Creek Metroparks. Appellant contends the park was not entitled to immunity under R.C. 1533.181
, the recreational user statute. Only if that contention succeeds does Appellant argue there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the park was entitled to political subdivision immunity under Chapter 2744.
{¶ 2} For the following reasons, we hold Appellant was a recreational user of the park at the time of her injury, and thus, recreational user immunity applies. The trial court's decision is affirmed.
{¶ 3} The park maintains 4,000 acres of property. Part of that property is the Mill Creek Metroparks Farm which encompasses over 400 acres of land at 7574 Columbiana–Canfield Road in Canfield, Ohio. The park leases the original farm and 268 acres from Mahoning County. The remaining acreage was purchased or donated to the park. The property includes a trail, a working farm with animals and fields, farm offices, and an educational hall that can be rented for events. The Mill Creek Metroparks Bikeway runs through the farm property.
{¶ 4} On June 30, 2011, Appellant was walking in grass bordering a gravel trail on the farm property. The trail is called the “Mindy Henning Memorial Trail” and is located west of the bikeway. She stepped in a hole that was hidden from view by the grass and injured her leg, requiring surgery.
{¶ 5} On June 28, 2013, Appellant filed a complaint against the park as the operator of the farm and against the county as the owner of the land. She alleged: the defendants had a duty to keep the grass beside the trail in good repair; the hole was a latent defect on the property; and the defendants should have had knowledge of the defect. Answers were filed raising the defenses of recreational immunity and political subdivision immunity.
{¶ 6} The park filed a motion for summary judgment based upon these defenses. The park asserted immunity under the recreational user statute as Appellant had permission to enter upon the premises without the payment of a fee to engage in recreational pursuits such as hiking or walking a trail. See R.C. 1533.181(A)
; R.C. 1533.18(B). The park alternatively asserted political subdivision immunity urging that none of the exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B) applied.
{¶ 7} An affidavit, which incorporated a map of the farm, was attached to the motion. The property features were outlined. It was disclosed that the park does not require its maintenance crew to make regular inspections of the property for holes due to its size of 4,000 acres, but if a defect was discovered, such as while mowing, the maintenance crew would address it. The affidavit also pointed out that the park has animal holes and that a working farm has constantly changing ground conditions. The affidavit asserted that the farm was unaware of the hole in the grassy stretch along the trail prior to the incident. It has since been determined that the hole was created by the collapse of a portion of a clay tile drainage system from the 1930's or 1940's, when the property was used as an orchard. (Appellant's evidence shows that this was long before the park opened at the site in 1990.)
{¶ 8} Appellant filed a response in opposition to summary judgment. As to recreational immunity, she argued: public land does not meet the statutory definition of “premises” in R.C. 1533.18(A)
; the character of the farm is not consistent with the recreational pursuits contemplated by the recreational user statute; and the court should create a public policy exception where a hazard is manmade and/or where there is actual knowledge of the condition. Regarding political subdivision immunity, Appellant claimed that immunity was stripped by two exceptions in R.C. 2744.02 :(B)(2) negligent acts with respect to a proprietary function (maintaining the hall at the farm, which could be rented, was akin to a social center and the farm is different than a traditional park); and (B)(4) employee negligence on the grounds of a public building or a buildings used for the performance of government functions (offices in buildings at farm involved in operating the park or farm itself is a government function).
{¶ 9} The park replied: Ohio Supreme Court case law holds that recreational immunity applies to public land; the character of land is the type encouraged to be made available to recreational users; and there are no exceptions to the statute. The park concluded that further analysis of political subdivision immunity (and its exceptions) was not necessary due to the application of the recreational user statute, which eliminates any duty to keep the premises safe.
{¶ 10} On November 25, 2014, a magistrate granted summary judgment in favor of the park. The magistrate found that the park, including its farm, is held open to the public for recreational use, that Appellant was a recreational user, and that owners of premises held open for recreational use have immunity from liability for injuries sustained by persons using those premises. The magistrate alternatively stated that as a political subdivision, the park is generally not liable for injuries under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1)
, unless an exception in division (B) applies. The magistrate found that the exception in (B)(4) was inapplicable because the hole was not on the grounds of the buildings. The magistrate also concluded that Appellant failed to demonstrate negligence of a park employee.
{¶ 11} Appellant filed timely objections. Appellant argued that recreational immunity should not apply because the farm does not meet the definition of “premises” under the plain language of the statute and the character of the land is not a traditional park due to the working farm and/or its educational hall. Alternatively, Appellant proposed that a public policy exception to recreational immunity should be created because the park had actual notice of the clay tile drainage system which is an unnatural, manmade condition.
Finally, Appellant's objections posited that the farm falls under the exception to political subdivision immunity applicable to the grounds of buildings used in connection with the performance of a government function. The objections referred the court to the prior brief in opposition to summary judgment “for a complete analysis.”
{¶ 12} On January 26, 2015, the trial court overruled the objections, adopted the magistrate's decision, and entered summary judgment in favor of the park. Appellant filed the within appeal (after voluntarily dismissing the claim against the county). Appellant's sole assignment of error provides: “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO APPELLEE, MILL CREEK METROPARKS.” Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in applying recreational immunity. If this court agrees, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in alternatively applying political subdivision immunity.
{¶ 13} Summary judgment can be granted when there remains no genuine issue of material fact and when reasonable minds can only conclude that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civ.R. 56(C)
. In determining whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact to be resolved at trial, the court is to consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Jackson v. Columbus, 117 Ohio St.3d 328, 2008-Ohio-1041, 883 N.E.2d 1060, ¶ 11. Doubts are to be resolved in favor of the non-movant. Leibreich v. A.J. Refrig., Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d 266, 269, 617 N.E.2d 1068 (1993). A court “may not weigh the proof or choose among reasonable inferences.” Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio St.2d 116, 121, 18 O.O.3d 354, 413 N.E.2d 1187 (1980).
must be construed in a manner that balances the right of the non-movant to have a jury decide claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact with the right of the movant to demonstrate, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis. Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 26–27, 2006-Ohio-3455, 850 N.E.2d 47, ¶ 11, citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant has the initial burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Byrd, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 850 N.E.2d 47, at ¶ 10, citing Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 294, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). The nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden. Id. The non-movant's response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶ 15} “The material issues of each case are identified by substantive law.” Byrd, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 850 N.E.2d 47, at ¶ 12
. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id., quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). We consider the propriety of granting summary judgment under a de novo standard of review. Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, ¶ 8.
{¶ 16} The recreational immunity defense is contained in R.C. 1533.181
and the pertinent definitions are contained in R.C....
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