Mosley v. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. CV419-216 |
| Citation | 576 F.Supp.3d 1358 |
| Parties | Stanley MOSLEY, Plaintiff, v. CERES MARINE TERMINALS, INC., Intervenor, Hai Feng 1710 Designated and Hapag-Lloyd AG, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
Before the Court is Defendants Hai Feng 1710 Designated and Hapag-Lloyd AG's ("Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 43), which Plaintiff Stanley Mosley has opposed (Doc. 55). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion (Doc. 43) is GRANTED.
This case arises from an injury Plaintiff Stanley Mosley ("Mosley") sustained while working as a longshoreman aboard the M/V VIENNA EXPRESS (the "Vessel"). (Doc. 1, Attach. 3 at 7-8.) On April 19, 2019, the Vessel called at the Port of Savannah to load and discharge containerized cargo. (Doc. 45 at ¶ 1; Doc. 56 at ¶ 1.) At all times relevant to this case, the Vessel was owned by Defendant Hai Feng 1710 Designated and operated, captained, and crewed by Defendant Hapag-Lloyd AG. (Doc. 1, Attach. 3 at 8; Doc. 9 at 4.)
At the time of the incident, Mosley was employed by Intervenor Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc. ("Ceres"), a stevedoring company with operations in the Port of Savannah. (Doc. 45 at ¶ 1; Doc. 56 at ¶ 1.) Ceres hired Mosley, a member of the International Longshoreman's Association Local 1414 with six years of experience, to assist with the lashing and unlashing of containers onboard the Vessel. (Doc. 45 at ¶ 1; Doc. 56 at ¶ 1; Doc. 53, Attach. 1 at 21.)
On the night of April 19, 2019, Mosley and Mark Norris, his lashing partner, began their cargo lashing operations at approximately 8:36 p.m. (Doc. 45 at ¶ 1; Doc. 56 at ¶ 1.) Mosley testified at his deposition that a nearby crane provided adequate illumination for the area. (Doc. 53, Attach. 1 at 18.) Mosley and Norris completed their lashing work approximately two hours later. (Doc. 45 at ¶ 1; Doc. 56 at ¶ 1.) Around 11:35 p.m., before their 11:45 p.m. lunch break, a Vessel crew member approached Mosley and Norris and indicated that there was a potential issue with the container lashings on the top level of the lashing bridge adjacent to one of the bays that Mosley and Norris had worked earlier.2 (Doc. 45 at ¶ 2; Doc. 56 at ¶ 2.) Mosley and Norris requested that the crew member show them the issue. (Doc. 45 at ¶ 3; Doc. 56 at ¶ 3.) Mosley and Norris also asked the crew member to bring a flashlight, which he did. (Doc. 45 at ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 56 at ¶¶ 3-4.) The crew member then led Mosley and Norris to the subject lashing bridge. (Doc. 45 at ¶ 4; Doc. 56 at ¶ 4.)
To reach the highest level of the lashing bridge, Mosley, Norris, and the crew member climbed two ladders. (Doc. 45 at ¶¶ 4, 6; Doc. 56 at ¶¶ 4, 6.) The first ladder went from the weather deck to the second level, and the second ladder went from the second level to the uppermost third level of the lashing bridge. (Doc. 45 at 4; Doc. 56 at ¶ 4.) Mosley testified at his deposition that lighting levels appeared adequate at the first and second levels. (Doc. 53, Attach. 1 at 12.) After ascending through the manhole to reach the third level of the lashing bridge, Mosley and Norris closed the manhole cover behind them.3 (Doc. 45 at ¶ 6; Doc. 56 at ¶ 6.) Mosley later explained that closing the manhole cover was "mandatory," remarking that he had "heard too many horror stories[.]" (Doc. 53, Attach. 1 at 8.) At this time, Mosley found the third level of the lashing bridge was "pitch black." (Id. at 11.) Since cargo operations had moved elsewhere, no crane lights illuminated the area, and no light source was affixed to the edge of the bridge.4 (Id. at 10-11.) Upon recognizing the lighting issue, Mosley believed it was "too late" to go back down the ladder and retrieve a flashlight. (Id. at 12.) Mosley could, however, see things at a short distance, up to "a body length in front of [him]." (Id. )
Despite the lack of lighting, Mosley and Norris followed the crew member to the offshore side and the containers with potential lashing issues, which Mosley and Norris confirmed were properly secured. (Doc. 45 at ¶¶ 6, 8; Doc. 56 at ¶¶ 6, 8.) Apparently satisfied with the lashing, the crew member responded that everything was "okay." (Doc. 45 at ¶ 8; Doc. 56 at ¶ 8.) Although the crew member was satisfied, Mosley proceeded to check the inshore lashing. (Doc. 53, Attach. 1 at 7.)
At some point, the crew member walked back to the manhole and climbed down, leaving the manhole cover open.5 (Doc. 45 at ¶¶ 8, 10; Doc. 56 at ¶¶ 8, 10.) Norris saw the crew member descend through the manhole, but Mosley did not. (Doc. 45 at ¶ 9; Doc. 56 at ¶ 9; Doc. 44, Attach. 9 at ¶9; Doc. 53, Attach. 1 at 10.) When Mosley was walking back from the inshore side of the bridge, he was looking at Norris, and he fell through the open manhole. (Doc. 53, Attach. 1 at 7, 10; Doc. 44, Attach. 3 at 16-17.) Mosley suffered substantial injuries from the fall. (Doc. 1, Attach. 3 at 8.)
Mosley does not recall notifying the crew member that the walkway was dark, and he did not request additional lighting prior to his fall. (Doc. 53, Attach. 1 at 28; Doc. 45 at ¶ 13; Doc. 56 at ¶ 13.) A Ceres Safety Alert advises employees to "watch out for manhole openings" and "never assume others have closed the covers." (Doc. 45 at ¶ 14; Doc. 56 at ¶ 14; Doc. 44, Attach. 12 at 2.)
On July 2, 2019, Mosley brought this action in the State Court of Chatham County, Georgia, seeking recovery for the injuries he sustained while working on the Vessel. (Doc. 1, Attach. 3 at 612.) In his complaint, Mosley alleges Defendants were negligent because they failed to provide adequate lighting on the lashing bridge, failed to ensure that the manhole cover was closed, and failed to warn Mosley of the open manhole.6 (Id. at 9.) On August 28, 2019, Defendants removed the case to this Court.7 (Doc. 1 at 1.) Now, Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that they did not breach any duty owed to Mosley under Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S. Ct. 1614, 68 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1981). (Doc. 44 at 2.)
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), "[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought." Such a motion must be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The "purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial[.]’ " Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (). Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The substantive law governing the action determines whether a fact is material. DeLong Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986) ).
As the Supreme Court explained:
[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2553 (internal quotation marks omitted). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine issue concerning facts material to its case. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The Court must review the evidence and all reasonable factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S. Ct. 993, 994, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1962) ). However, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (citations omitted). A mere "scintilla" of evidence or simply conclusory allegations will not suffice. See, e.g., Tidwell v. Carter Prods., 135 F.3d 1422, 1425 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1989) ). Nevertheless, where a reasonable fact finder may "draw more than one inference from the facts, and that inference creates a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should refuse to grant summary judgment." Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933-34 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988) ).
ANALYSIS
I. LIABILITY UNDER THE LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT
Mosley's complaint does not specifically invoke the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 - 950. However, Mosley concedes in his response that this case is governed by § 905(b) of the LHWCA. (Doc. 55 at 4.) See Washington v. Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia, 374 F. Supp. 3d 1339, 1344 (S.D. Ga. 2019) (), aff'd on other grounds, 836 F. App'x 846 (11th Cir. 2020). Section 905(b) of the LHWCA authorizes suits by longshoremen injured due to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial