Moss v. Atlanta Housing Authority, 62238

Decision Date01 December 1981
Docket NumberNo. 62238,62238
Citation160 Ga.App. 555,287 S.E.2d 619
PartiesMOSS v. ATLANTA HOUSING AUTHORITY.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

C. Lawrence Jewett, Atlanta, for appellant.

Brady D. Green, Marietta, for appellee.

POPE, Judge.

Cora Lee Moss initiated this action against the Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta alleging that she suffered certain personal injuries as a result of the negligence of the Housing Authority in allowing mud to accumulate on a sidewalk at one of its housing projects. Mrs. Moss claimed she slipped and fell on a sidewalk at night while walking from the apartment where she was staying with her daughter to a neighbor's apartment. Further she alleged negligence by the Housing Authority in failing to maintain proper lighting, claiming the security light in front of her apartment would have illuminated the area where she slipped had it not been out at the time of the occurrence.

Mrs. Moss stated by deposition that she became aware during the year she had been staying with her daughter that mud would wash down from a bank and accumulate on the sidewalks near the apartment. She said that it had been raining very hard for several days prior to her fall, so she walked across the yard to avoid the mud that normally accumulated upon the sidewalk. When she stepped from the yard back onto the sidewalk, she fell and injured herself allegedly from slipping on some mud she indicated was at a point on the sidewalk where mud had not always been.

Mrs. Moss contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Housing Authority. In order for Mrs. Moss to recover, two elements must exist: (1) fault on the part of the Housing Authority, and (2) ignorance of the danger on the part of the invitee, Mrs. Moss. Pound v. Augusta National, 158 Ga.App. 166, 279 S.E.2d 342 (1981). " 'The true ground of liability of the owner ... of property to an invitee who is injured thereon is superior knowledge of the proprietor of the existence of a condition that may subject the invitee to an unreasonable risk of harm.' " Sutton v. Sutton, 145 Ga.App. 22, 25, 243 S.E.2d 310 (1978). If the invitee knows of the condition or hazard, there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn the invitee and there is no liability for the resulting injury because the invitee has as much knowledge as the proprietor. By voluntarily acting in view of this knowledge, the invitee assumes the risks and dangers incident to a known condition. Rogers v. Atlanta...

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11 cases
  • Amear v. Hall
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 6, 1982
    ...an invitee to an unreasonable risk of harm. Pound v. Augusta National, 158 Ga.App. 166, 167, 279 S.E.2d 342; Moss v. Atlanta Housing Authority, 160 Ga.App. 555, 287 S.E.2d 619. However, a landowner is not an insurer of an invitee's safety. Watson v. C & S Natl. Bank, 103 Ga.App. 535, 536, 1......
  • Ventura v. Winegardner
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • May 15, 1987
    ...on a wet sidewalk with bare feet assumes a known and well-understood danger. See 325 So.2d at 747. In Moss v. Atlanta Housing Authority, 160 Ga.App. 555, 556, 287 S.E.2d 619, 620 (1981), the Georgia Appeals Court held that the plaintiff, a guest at the defendant's building, assumed the risk......
  • Foster v. Kenimer
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 5, 1983
    ...and slick paint on the steps. Issues of material fact appear to exist as to each of the two elements set forth in Moss v. Atlanta Housing Auth., 160 Ga.App. 555, 287 S.E.2d 619, which must be proven in order for plaintiff to recover ((1) fault on the part of defendants, and (2) ignorance of......
  • Carrier v. City of Huntington, 24140.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • February 25, 1998
    ...permits this Court to apply common law principles developed under premises liability. 7. Huntington cites Moss v. Atlanta Housing Authority, 160 Ga.App. 555, 287 S.E.2d 619 (1981) as authority for applying premises liability principles to the instant case. However, in Moss, the plaintiff in......
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