Mossie v. Pilgrim Self-Service Storage

• Decision Date: 12 July 1979
• Docket Number: No. 58080,SELF-SERVICE,58080
• Parties: MOSSIE et al. v. PILGRIMSTORAGE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 548

258 S.E.2d 548

150 Ga.App. 715

MOSSIE et al. v. PILGRIM SELF-SERVICE STORAGE.

No. 58080.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Argued July 2, 1979.

Decided July 12, 1979.

Moulton, Carriere, Cavan & Maloof, J. Wayne Moulton, Decatur, for appellants.

Jones, Bird & Howell, Truly B. Feinstein, Dow N. Kirkpatrick, II, Atlanta, for appellee.

DEEN, Chief Judge.

The appellants, husband and wife, stored certain property on premises controlled by the defendant before leaving for another state. The defendant, a corporation operating a "convenience warehouse" leased stalls to persons desiring to retain possession of stalls which the latter secured with their own locks and to which they retained an unrestricted right of access. On information received from Mrs. Mossie, who investigated the premises, Mr. Mossie executed a lease agreement for one of the stalls and the parties placed their jointly owned personal furnishings in it, secured it with two padlocks purchased by them and left the state. Thomas, an agent of the defendant living on the premises, discovered during a routine check that the stall had been burglarized and informed the lessees. Claims were eventually made and denied and this litigation followed, resulting in a bench trial. Plaintiffs appeal from an adverse judgment.

1. The fact that the plaintiff spouses jointly owned the personalty here involved and that only the husband signed the agreement for space with appellees has no bearing on the case, as there was ample evidence to sustain the finding that Mr. Mossie's actions were the result of at least an implied agency to act in her behalf in the matter, and also that her opportunity for knowledge of the business arrangements was equal to that of her husband. We therefore make no distinction between the parties on the basis that only the husband was a signatory to the lease. Brogdon v. Hellman, 119 Ga.App. 464(2), 167 S.E.2d 673 (1969).

2. A bailee of property is entitled to its exclusive possession. Code § 12-102. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Baker, 118 Ga. 809(1), 45 S.E. 673 (1903); Goodyear Clearwater Mills v. Wheeler, 77 Ga.App. 570(6), 49 S.E.2d 184 (1948). Where, although an article is turned over generally to be stored on premises owned by another, where the owner retains the right to remove it at will without the knowledge of the person in charge of the premises, no bailment arises. Southeastern Fair Assn. v. Ford, 64 Ga.App. 871(1), 14 S.E.2d 139 (1941). The relationship in this case, where the property was placed in a space the access to which was retained by the owners, a rental agreement rather than a bailment ensued.

3. The agreement controlling this transaction contained the following language: "STORAGE OF ANY AND ALL PROPERTY WITHIN THE STALL SHALL BE AT TENANT'S SOLE RISK AND NO BAILMENT IS CREATED HEREUNDER, and Landlord shall have no liability for loss or damage to any property of Tenant stored in the Stall or otherwise, regardless of whether such loss or damage is caused by the negligence of third parties or Tenant or by acts of God. LANDLORD SHALL NOT BE LIABLE TO TENANT OR ANY OTHER PARTY FOR ANY NEGLIGENCE OF LANDLORD, WHETHER CAUSED BY LANDLORD'S ACTS OR FAILURE TO ACT WHICH MAY BE CLAIMED TO CAUSE LOSS OR DAMAGE TO TENANT . . . LANDLORD SHALL NOT BE LIABLE TO TENANT FOR ANY LOSS OR DAMAGE THAT MAY BE OCCASIONED BY OR THROUGH LANDLORD'S ACTS, OMISSIONS TO ACT OR NEGLIGENCE OR BY ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE OF LANDLORD'S OTHER TENANTS ON THE PREMISES, OR OF ANY OTHER PARTY WHATSOEVER, OR OF ANY ACT OF GOD, it being hereby understood by Tenant that Landlord does not take custody, control, possession or dominion over the contents of the Stall and does not agree to provide protection for the premises, Stall or contents thereof." It was further agreed that the duty to insure devolved upon...