Motes v. State, 43951
Decision Date | 09 March 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 43951,43951 |
Citation | 353 S.E.2d 348,256 Ga. 831 |
Parties | MOTES v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Edwin S. Varner, Jr., Keith H. Salmon, Cowart & Varner, Warner Robins, for Janice Faircloth Motes.
G. Theron Finlayson, Dist. Atty., Perry, George R. Christian, Asst. Dist. Atty., Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Eddie Snelling, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
A Houston County grand jury indicted the appellant, Janice Motes, for murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. A string of events culminated in a trial court order forbidding Motes from raising the affirmative defense of insanity at trial. We granted Motes' application for an interlocutory appeal to consider the following questions:
We reverse.
Following her indictment but prior to trial, Motes filed a notice of intent to raise an insanity defense. The court, pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-130.1, appointed an independent psychiatrist to examine Motes. In its order appointing the independent expert, the trial court stated, in reference to the expert's examination, The court explicitly based its order on OCGA § 17-7-130.1.
When Motes subsequently invoked her right to remain silent and refused to talk to the court's expert, the court issued an interlocutory order forbidding Motes from raising the issue of insanity at trial, and barring the introduction of any evidence relating to that issue at trial. The court based its order upon the premise that an insanity plea constitutes a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights, and that any invocation of the right to remain silent constitutes a waiver of the right to present an insanity defense. In other words, believing the right to remain silent and an insanity defense to be irreconcilably in conflict, the court ruled that Motes would have to choose one of the two options and totally forego the other option.
1. OCGA § 17-7-130.1 requires the trial court, upon notice by the defendant that she intends to pursue an insanity defense, to appoint an independent psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine the defendant. The statute states that the court's expert "shall" testify following the presentation of evidence by the state and the defense. The statute provides for cross-examination of the court's expert by the state and the defense.
OCGA § 17-7-130.1 does not provide for sanctions against a defendant who refuses to cooperate with the court's expert. The statute simply provides authority for the court to call a witness, and for that witness to have limited discovery. OCGA § 16-3-2 and OCGA § 16-3-3 provide the authority for any defendant to assert an insanity defense, and we find nothing in OCGA § 17-7-130.1 which limits that authority.
2. The United States Supreme Court, in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), held that a defendant who introduces expert psychiatric testimony in support of an insanity defense, waives his right to remain silent to the extent that he must make himself available to the state's psychiatric expert for examination. This limited waiver of a defendant's fifth amendment rights simply amounts to a determination that if a defendant wants to tell his story to a jury through the mouth of an expert, the state should have an equal opportunity to tell that story through the mouth of an expert, and that the state could not practically possess this opportunity unless their expert gained access to the defendant. Estelle in no way holds that...
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