Motley v. Williams
| Decision Date | 18 May 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 4248.,4248. |
| Citation | 647 S.E.2d 244 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Anthony Wade MOTLEY, Respondent, v. Clarence WILLIAMS, Appellant. |
Stevens C. Elliott, of Columbia, for Appellant.
George W. Speedy, of Camden, for Respondent.
Clarence Williams appeals the denial of his motion to set aside the master-in-equity's settlement order. We affirm.1
This action emanates from a dispute involving a 9.68 acre parcel of land in Kershaw County. In 1987, Clarence Williams' father contracted to sell the plot at issue to Anthony Motley's father. In 2002, Motley brought suit against Williams seeking transfer of the title of the subject property.2 In his complaint, Motley alleged he was entitled to relief under the theories of specific performance, part performance, and adverse possession. In response, Williams raised the doctrines of statute of limitations, laches, estoppel, waiver, and innocent purchaser as defenses. By consent of the parties, the matter was referred to the Kershaw County master-in-equity.
A hearing before the master was held on June 3, 2005. Although the prior communication between the lawyers and their clients is in dispute, shortly before the trial was set to convene, counsel for both sides met with the master in chambers and informed him they had reached a settlement that they desired to put on record.
When the hearing convened, a proposed agreement was jointly presented by counsel for both parties. During the hearing, the court posed questions regarding the settlement to both sides' attorneys. Motley and Williams were present throughout the entire proceeding. Ultimately, the master reduced the agreement to a written order, filed on September 29, 2005.
Subsequently, Williams retained different counsel, who moved to set aside the settlement order. The master denied the motion. Williams again hired a new attorney, through whom this appeal was filed.
Williams contends the master erred in denying his motion to set aside the settlement order. He alleges his trial attorney mistakenly entered into the agreement against his wishes and specific instructions, therefore invalidating the agreement. We disagree.
To be enforceable, settlement agreements must either be entered into the court's record or acknowledged in open court and placed upon the record. Buckley v. Shealy, 370 S.C. 317, 322, 635 S.E.2d 76, 78 (2006); Galloway v. Regis Corp., 325 S.C. 541, 481 S.E.2d 714 (Ct.App.1997); Kumar v. Third Generation, Inc., 324 S.C. 284, 485 S.E.2d 626 (Ct.App.1995). This requirement is provided by Rule 43(k) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Ashfort Corp. v. Palmetto Construction Group, Inc., 318 S.C. 492, 493-94, 458 S.E.2d 533, 534 (1995) (); Widewater Square Assocs. v. Opening Break of America, Inc., 319 S.C. 243, 245, 460 S.E.2d 396, (1995) (); Reed v. Associated Invs. of Edisto Island, Inc., 339 S.C. 148, 528 S.E.2d 94 (Ct.App.2000). The rule states:
Agreements of Counsel. No agreement between counsel affecting the proceedings in an action shall be binding unless reduced to the form of a consent order or written stipulation signed by counsel and entered in the record, or unless made in open court and noted upon the record. Settlement agreements shall be handled in accordance with Rule 41.1, SCRCP.
"Like former Circuit Court Rule 14 on which it is based, Rule 43(k) is intended to prevent disputes as to the existence and terms of agreements regarding pending litigation." Ashfort at 493-94, 458 S.E.2d at 534. "[A]pplication of Rule 43(k) will increase the certainty of settlement agreements by avoiding disputes." Id. at 494-95, 458 S.E.2d at 535.
It is a long-standing and well-settled rule that an attorney may settle litigation on behalf of his client and that the client is bound by his attorney's settlement actions. See Crowley v. Harvey & Battey, P.A., 327 S.C. 68, 488 S.E.2d 334 (1997); Shelton v. Bressant, 312 S.C. 183, 439 S.E.2d 833, (1993); Poore v. Poore, 105 S.C. 206, 89 S.E. 569 (1916); Arnold v. Yarborough, 281 S.C. 570, 572 316 S.E.2d 416, 417 (Ct.App.1984). "This rule is based on the principles of agency law." Crowley at 70, 488 S.E.2d at 335.
It will never do, in the absence of fraud, to allow the undoubted attorneys of record for a party to a suit to enter into a solemn agreement to settle and adjust the issues and subject-matter of a suit and then later, if it is done, because for any reason the party is dissatisfied, to allow him to repudiate this agreement and employ different counsel to upset and set aside what his first counsel has done.
Poore at 211-12, 89 S.E. at 571.
Shelton at 184, 439 S.E.2d at 834 (quoting Arnold v. Yarborough, 281 S.C. 570, 572 316 S.E.2d 416, 417 (Ct.App.1984)). This court has held:
[E]mployment of an attorney in a particular suit implies his client's assent that he may do everything which the court may approve in the progress of the cause. Upon this distinction in a large measure rest the certainty, verity, and finality of every judgment of a court. Litigants must necessarily be held bound by the acts of their attorneys in the conduct of a cause in court, in the absence, of course, of fraud.
Arnold at 572, 316 S.E.2d at 417 (quoting Ex parte Jones, 47 S.C. 393, 397, 25 S.E. 285, 286 (1896)).
Any communication failure or mistake on the part of an attorney is directly attributable to his client. See Kirkland v. Moseley, 109 S.C. 477, 96 S.E. 608 (1918) (); see also Graham v. Town of Loris, 272 S.C. 442, 451, 248 S.E.2d 594, 598 (1978) (). Relief from such an error rests in an action against the lawyer:
[I]f the attorney has apparent authority to confess, or consent to, judgment, it is ordinarily binding and conclusive on the client, notwithstanding an actual lack of authority unknown to the court or the opposing party, the sole remedy in such a case being against the attorney.
Lord Jeff Knitting Co., Inc. v. Mills, 281 S.C. 374, 377, 315 S.E.2d 377, 379 (Ct.App.1984) (citing 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 200 at 332 (1980); Poore at 212, 89 S.E. at 569); see also Crowley at 70, 488 S.E.2d at 335 ().
In Shelton v. Bressant, 312 S.C. 183, 439 S.E.2d 833 (1993), the appellant and his attorney appeared in open court and advised the presiding judge they had been able to settle their case with the opposing party. The following day, an oral agreement between the two sides was tape-recorded and subsequently transcribed. Shortly thereafter, the appellant attempted to repudiate the settlement agreement, contending it failed to meet his terms. Our supreme court found the agreement binding and held:
[Appellants'] contention that the suit was not settled according to his instructions does not entitle him to rescind the agreement.
When a litigant voluntarily accepts an offer of settlement, either directly or indirectly through the duly authorized actions of his attorney, the integrity of the settlement cannot be attacked on the basis of inadequate representation by the litigant's attorney. In such cases, any remaining dispute is purely between the party and his attorney.
Id. at 185, 439 S.E.2d at 834 (citing Petty v. The Timken Corp., 849 F.2d 130, 133 (4th Cir.1988)) (emphasis removed from original).
In his brief to this court, Williams asserts that he "repeatedly instructed his attorney not to settle the case under any circumstances . . . ." However, during the hearing before the master, his attorney did in fact settle the case and did so directly in Williams' presence. Williams makes no claim of fraud, and offers simply that mistake existed. Although he compares the issue with contract doctrine, stating "there was no meeting of the minds in regard to the settlement agreement," the exact cause of and parties involved in this alleged mistake are never fully articulated. Williams argues:
Undoubtedly, Williams was, or should have been, well apprised that his attorney was entering into a settlement agreement. As detailed in the record:
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