Moton v. Harris
| Decision Date | 29 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-5014 |
| Citation | 581 F.Supp.3d 701 |
| Parties | Sean Lamount MOTON v. Brandon HARRIS, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
J. Michael Considine, Jr., J. Michael Considine Jr., PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Sean Lamount Moton.
John P. Gonzales, John L. Lamb, Katherine Ann Cordry, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman and Goggin, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Brandon Harris, Officer Thompson.
McHUGH, United States District Judge Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging use of excessive force, retaliation, and failure to provide medical care to an arrestee, under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. All the claims derive from the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's arrest as he was walking toward his Coatesville home. Plaintiff seeks to characterize the arresting officers’ conduct in taking him into custody and allegedly denying him medical care as retaliatory in nature for his criticizing their actions, thereby violating his First Amendment rights. Defendants seek dismissal of the First Amendment claims under the doctrine of qualified immunity, arguing that there is insufficient precedent to support them. They further seek dismissal of his Fourth Amendment claims for use of excessive force, offering only a minimum of argument and precedential support. Plaintiff's First Amendment claims will be dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend, but in all other respects Defendants’ motion will be denied.1
On September 27, 2019, Plaintiff Sean Lamount Moton alleges that he was headed to his house at 134, N. 5th Avenue in Coatesville, PA, when he was encountered by Defendants—Officer Brandon Harris and Officer Thompson of the Coatesville Police Department. Am. Compl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff "complained about why they were stopping him and tried to explain to them there was no basis for them to arrest him." Id. Next, Officer Harris Am. Compl. ¶ 8. At that point, Officer Harris "picked Plaintiff off the ground and threw him down to the ground with great physical force." Am. Compl. ¶ 9. "Officer Thompson then jumped on Plaintiff's back and put his left arm behind his back, aggravating the injury Plaintiff received when he was thrown to the ground." Am. Compl. ¶ 10.
Mr. Moton alleges that "[a]t no time in his interaction with Defendants did Plaintiff attempt to escape, say he would leave or refuse to cooperate with Defendants." Am. Compl. ¶ 15. Moreover Plaintiff claims that he "never struck Defendants, threatened to physically harm them or took any actions that a reasonable person would consider to be a threat to the physical safety of Defendants or anyone else present." Am. Compl. ¶ 17. He states that he "was never armed in the presence of Defendants nor did he tell them he was armed." Am. Compl. ¶ 18. Furthermore, "[t]here was no emergency at the scene where Defendants arrested Plaintiff nor were there bystanders that posed a threat to the safety of police or the public." Am. Compl. ¶ 20. In addition, "Defendants never asked Plaintiff to extend his hands so they could handcuff him," Am. Compl. ¶ 16, "and the circumstances did not require he be rushed or transported quickly to the police station without being handcuffed." Am. Compl. ¶ 20.
Plaintiff alleges that he "suffered a very painful dislocated shoulder
and/or torn rotator cuff and/or shoulder ligament or related injury and injury to his neck as a result of these actions." Am. Compl. ¶ 11. Despite the fact that he told the Defendants "he had very severe pain in his shoulder and neck and that he had problems using his shoulder," and asked if they would take him to the hospital, "[t]hey made no effort to obtain medical care for him." Am. Compl. ¶ 12. He "was not seen by a doctor until he was in Chester County Farms Prison," where it was confirmed that his shoulder was dislocated. Am. Compl. ¶ 13. There he received pain medication and that "his left arm was put in a sling." Am. Compl. ¶ 14. Now Plaintiff "must use his right arm to lift his left arm. Am. Compl. ¶ 12. The injury requires surgery. Id. Finally, it is alleged that "Plaintiff was not charged with a crime as a result of what occurred September 27, 2019." Am. Compl. ¶ 21.
In this Circuit, motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) are governed by the well-established standard set forth in Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside , 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff appears to argue that the Defendants’ acts, including the arrest itself, the use of excessive force, and the failure to provide medical care, violate his rights under the First Amendment. Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 2, 10, ECF No. 24. Defendants have moved to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 3, ECF No. 21. I will address each claim separately.
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amendment claims under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 3. In assessing whether the Defendant officers are shielded from liability based on qualified immunity, I must accept Plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact as true and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Fowler , 578 F. 3d at 210 (internal citations omitted); see George v. Rehiel , 738 F.3d 562, 571 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Torisky v. Schweiker , 446 F.3d 438, 442 (3d Cir. 2006) ).
"Qualified immunity shields government officials from personal liability for civil damages ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ " George , 738 F.3d at 571-72 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). The doctrine is intended to give officers "breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions." Id. at 572. Consequently, "[a]ny claim of qualified immunity must be resolved at the earliest possible stage of the litigation." Miller v. Clinton County , 544 F. 3d 542, 547 (3rd Cir. 2008). Defendants stress that the doctrine protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) ; Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 3.
To overcome the defense of qualified immunity, Plaintiffs must allege facts showing that the Defendant officers’ conduct (1) "violated a ... constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct." George , 738 F.3d at 572 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) ). Following Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), I do not need to undertake the two-part inquiry in sequential order. Thus I will begin by focusing on the second part of the test concerning whether the law was clearly established for Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims of excessive force and failure to provide medical treatment.
It is Defendants’ burden to establish their entitlement to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See Halsey v. Pfeiffer , 750 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir. 2014) ; see also Richardson v. Barbour , No. 2:18-CV-01758, 2020 WL 4815829, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2020) (). "Thus ... they must prove that the constitutional right in question was not clearly established at the time of the incident." Gaymon v. Borough of Collingdale , 150 F. Supp. 3d 457, 462 (E.D. Pa. 2015). For purposes of this inquiry, the "contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Schneyder v. Smith , 653 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ). In evaluating the state of the law in 2020, the "salient question" is whether the officers had "fair warning" that their conduct was unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer , 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002).
Plaintiff summarily concludes that "[r]etaliation by excessive force for complaints about police behavior is an established claim." Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 4. It cannot be denied that the law was clear back to 1987 that the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers. City of Houston, Tex. v. Hill , 482 U.S. 451, 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987). And the law within the Third Circuit was clear dating back to 2006 that there is a First Amendment right to be free from police retaliation when one complains about officers’ conduct. See Thomas v. Indep. Twp. , 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006).
However, since at least 1989, the proper framework for analyzing excessive force claims pertaining to an arrest is under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). As the Supreme Court instructed in Graham :
Where ... the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right "to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures" of the person.
To continue reading
Request your trial