Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Chamberlain

• Decision Date: 01 September 1991
• Docket Number: No. 48,48
• Citation: 326 Md. 306,604 A.2d 919
• Parties: MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION v. Stephen B. CHAMBERLAIN. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 306

326 Md. 306

604 A.2d 919

MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION v. Stephen B. CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 48, Sept. Term, 1991.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 14, 1992.

Edward R.K. Hargadon, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued and on brief (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. on brief), Glen Burnie, for petitioner.

James A. Bonifant, argued and on brief (Clarke, Crawford and Bonifant, on brief), Gaithersburg, for respondent.

Argued before ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ., and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Judge of the Court of Appeals (Retired) Specially Assigned.

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge.

The issues presented in this case involve determining what advice a police officer is required to give a driver detained on suspicion of driving while intoxicated or while under the influence of alcohol pursuant to Maryland Code, § 16-205.1(b) of the Transportation Article ¹ and whether the remand hearing in this case was scheduled in compliance with § 16-205.1(f)(5)(vi). The Circuit Court for Montgomery County found that (1) Stephen B. Chamberlain ("Chamberlain") had been inadequately informed of the consequences of refusing to take a chemical test to determine alcohol concentration, see § 16-205.1(a)(iii), or of taking and failing that test, i.e. the test results reveal an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, and (2) the Motor Vehicle Administration ("MVA") failed expeditiously to schedule the probable cause hearing required by § 16-205.1(f)(5). ² We granted the writ of certiorari at the request of the MVA to consider these matters of public importance. We shall reverse.

I.

Chamberlain was stopped by a police officer for speeding and on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. After conducting a roadside investigation, consisting of several field sobriety tests, the officer placed Chamberlain under arrest. He subsequently advised him in accordance with § 16-205.1(b), ³ reading verbatim from the DR-15, an advice of rights form:

You have the right to refuse to submit to the test. Your refusal shall result in an administrative suspension of your Maryland driver's license or your driving privilege if you are non-resident. Suspension by the Motor Vehicle Administration shall be 120 days for a first offense and one year for a second or subsequent offense.

If you submit to a test which indicates an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, it shall result in an administrative suspension of your Maryland driver's license or your driving privilege if you are non-resident. The suspension by the Motor Vehicle Administration shall be 45 days for a first offense and 90 days for a second or subsequent offense.

The officer did not tell Chamberlain that if he met certain conditions, even though he might fail the test, the suspension may nevertheless be modified or a restrictive license issued. See § 16-205.1(m). ⁴

Chamberlain refused the test. His license was thereupon confiscated and he was issued a temporary 45-day license. Having been advised in accordance with § 16-205.1(b)(3)(v) of the right to do so, he timely requested a hearing. For a discussion of the scheduling of the administrative hearings, see Motor Vehicle Administration v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 460-62, 597 A.2d 939, 942 (1991).

At the hearing, Chamberlain raised several issues, including the adequacy of the advice he was given concerning the consequences of refusing or failing the test. He also questioned whether the hearing had been scheduled timely. See § 16-205.1(f)(5)(i) and discussion infra. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that Chamberlain refused the test after being "advised of the administrative penalties [sic] that shall be imposed upon refusal, or having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more." Consequently, he ordered Chamberlain's driver's license suspended for 120 days, specifically stating that § 16-405 ⁵ would have been considered, but that "it doesn't apply in this situation under the new law with refusal." Thus, Chamberlain's suspension was neither modified nor an employment restrictive license issued.

On appeal, Chamberlain argued that he was not adequately advised of the consequences of refusing or failing the test, and that the ALJ did not adequately "review and consider all evidence presented to make [that] determination...." When the record and transcript of the administrative hearing were forwarded to the circuit court, it was discovered that a segment of the hearing was not properly recorded. As a result, the case was remanded to the MVA for a new hearing.

The hearing on remand was held on November 1, 1990. At its conclusion, the ALJ entered essentially the same order: Chamberlain's license was suspended for 120 days for refusing to take the test, that suspension being without possibility of modification or issuance of a restrictive license. Again, Chamberlain appealed, this time raising only two issues: (1) whether the remand hearing was rescheduled expeditiously in accordance with § 16-205.1(f)(5)(vi) and (2) whether the police officer adequately advised him of the consequences of refusing to take the test or of failing it. The circuit court's Opinion and Order concluded, in pertinent part:

The record establishes that the administrative hearing was not held expeditiously as required by Maryland Annotated Code, Transportation Article § 16-205.1(f)(v) (1990 Cum.Supp.) and that the delay amounted to a denial of due process as required by the United States and Maryland State Constitutions.

The record further establishes that Appellant was not fully advised of all pertinent administrative procedure enacted in Maryland Annotated Code, Transportation Article, § 16-205.1 (1990 Cum.Supp.) since he was not informed by the arresting officer that he might possibly obtain a restricted license for work and alcohol education purposes if he agreed to take the breathalyzer and received results indicating an alcohol concentration of .10 or more ... which failure amounted to a denial of due process. (Emphasis added)

The ALJ's decision was reversed.

II.

Chamberlain correctly perceives the issue to be how much advice the Legislature intended the police to give a detained driver concerning the consequences of refusing or failing a chemical test for alcohol. And the canons of construction offered to assist in determining that intent are those we have enunciated previously, and often. Thus, because the issue is the meaning of the word "sanctions", as used in §§ 16-205.1(b) and (f), see infra, he asserts that the court's task is one of statutory construction, the "ultimate aim [of which] is to effect the legislative intent." Revis v. Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, 322 Md. 683, 686, 589 A.2d 483, 484 (1991).

Agreeing with the MVA that advising drivers of the different consequences applicable to failing the test and refusing to take it encourages drivers to take the test and, consequently, facilitates their prosecution, see Shrader, 324 Md. at 464, 597 A.2d at 944, Chamberlain focuses on the replacement of the word "penalties" in subsection (b)(2)(iii) of the prior law, with the word "sanctions", Acts 1989, Ch. 284, on the word "fully" in subsection (b)(3)(viii)3, id., and on subsections (f)(7)(i)3, id., and (f)(8)(i)3, which were added by Acts 1990, Chs. 11 and 413, and which track the language of subsection (b)(3)(viii)3. Chamberlain points out that the word "sanctions" is broader than the word "penalties", encompassing "that part of the law which is designed to secure enforcement by ... offering a reward for its observance." Black's Law Dictionary 5th ed. p. 1203. ⁶ By its insertion of the word "fully" to describe the amount of advice the police must give a driver, subsection (b)(3)(viii)3, and by using identical language in subsections (f)(7)(i)3, describing the issues to be considered at the hearing, and (f)(8)(i)3, pertaining to the findings necessary to sustain a suspension, Chamberlain asserts, the Legislature intended that more advice be given a detained driver under the present statute than under the former. He infers from these provisions that, in addition to the length of the suspension, the detained driver must be told of at least one other reward or incentive which flows from failing the test, but not from refusing it, i.e., that a driver who fails the test may be eligible to have his suspension modified or for a restrictive license.

The MVA, of course, takes the opposite position: the police need only advise the driver in accordance with subsection (b)(2)(iii); it is enough that he or she be told of the disparity in the length of the suspension for refusing to take the test and for failing the test. Moreover, the MVA maintains that these are the only "administrative sanctions that shall be imposed." It reasons, in order that § 16-205.1(m) apply, not only must the driver request a hearing and meet all of the prerequisites there set out, but, even then, whether to modify the suspension or issue a restrictive license is still within the discretion of the ALJ. Possible eligibility for a restrictive license or modification of the suspension is not, it argues, a "sanction". ⁷ In any event, neither modification of the suspension nor issuance of a restrictive license is possible until the mandatory suspension triggered by failing the test has been imposed.

III.

In Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 170-72, 596 A.2d 648, 651-52 (1991), we reiterated the role of statutory construction in the determination of legislative intent To determine legislative intent, "we look first to the words of the statute, read in light of the full context in which they appear, and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence." Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989). See also State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 92, 581 A.2d 9, 12 (1990); Davis [v. State], 319 Md. [56,] at 60, 570 A.2d [855,] at 857 [1990]; Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, ...