Motors v. Sadler

• Decision Date: 20 June 1933
• Docket Number: No. 41722.,41722.
• Citation: 249 N.W. 383,216 Iowa 302
• Parties: GREENLEASE-LIED MOTORS v. SADLER.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

216 Iowa 302

249 N.W. 383

GREENLEASE-LIED MOTORS

v.SADLER.

No. 41722.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 20, 1933.

Appeal from District Court, Pottawattamie County; O. D. Wheeler, Judge.

This is an action in replevin to recover possession of a certain automobile. It was a law action but tried to the court without a jury. The court found for plaintiff and entered judgment accordingly. Defendant appeals.

Affirmed.Kimball, Peterson, Smith & Peterson and Tinley & Tinley, all of Council Bluffs, for appellant.

Tinley, Mitchell, Ross & Mitchell, of Council Bluffs, for appellee.

KINTZINGER, Justice.

The plaintiff was engaged in the sale and distribution of Oldsmobile automobiles at Omaha, Neb. One Clayton Crowley was an automobile dealer at Council Bluffs engaged in the business of selling Oldsmobile and other cars in that city, under the name of “Crowley Motors.” One of Crowley's selling agents was one W. Johnson.

On the 11th of April, 1931, Mr. Johnson as Crowley's agent arranged for the sale of the Oldsmobile car on a cash basis, to the defendant John J. Sadler of Council Bluffs. Crowley did not have the model Sadler wanted, so on April 12 he went to the Greenlease-Lied Motors Company's salesrooms in Omaha for the purpose of getting possession of the kind of a car Sadler wanted. He then made arrangements with the plaintiff to get possession of the automobile in question, for the purpose of making a cash sale, but with the specific understanding that he return the car or the cash received from the sale of it by 4 o'clock the same day.

Before Crowley went to plaintiff's to get the car, Mr. Johnson told him that he had arranged to sell the car to the defendant Sadler for $998 on a cash basis with an allowance of $100 for a used Dodge car.

When Crowley called on the plaintiff to get possession of the car, he told them that he had practically made a sale of this car for cash in Council Bluffs; that if they would allow him to take it out he would sell it and come back and pay them the cash or return the car by 4 o'clock that afternoon. Crowley was to return $756.25; the difference between that and the sale price was his commission or profit. The company hesitated in letting him take the car, but finally agreed that he could take it out to sell, with the express understanding that he return the car or the cash therefor by 4 o'clock the same day.

Appellant contends the transaction amounted to a conditional sale, that the agreement was not recorded, and therefore not binding on defendant, and that the sale vested title in defendant.

Appellee contends that the title in the car remained in the plaintiff: (1) Because the transaction between the plaintiff and Crowley made Crowley plaintiff's agent, and the title of the car was in the plaintiff, and that Crowley was only authorized to sell for cash; and (2) that the title of the car never, in fact, passed to the defendant because neither Crowley nor his agent Johnson had any authority to sell the car upon any other terms than on a cash basis.

During the four years prior to the trial plaintiff had sold the Crowley Motor Company many cars. With a few exceptions they were always paid for in cash, or by taking a chattel mortgage thereon. In some instances they let him have cars on his agreement to pay or bring back the car.

In this case the plaintiff authorized Crowley to take the car out to sell for cash, with the distinct understanding and agreement that Crowley would bring back the car, or the cash from its sale, by 4 o'clock the same afternoon. Before Crowley received the car, plaintiff's manager suggested that his assistant accompany Crowley to get the money when the car was sold. It was agreed, however, to let Crowley take possession of the car himself with that understanding.

Crowley then drove the car to Council Bluffs, and turned it over to Johnson to close the sale with Sadler on a cash basis with an allowance of $100 for a Dodge used car.

Johnson had arranged for the sale on that basis the day before. At that time Sadler told Johnson that an assignment of the car would have to be registered, and the license procured in his name, before he would accept the car. These matters were all attended to by Johnson, before delivering the car, but without the knowledge or consent of Mr. Crowley. After doing so Johnson delivered the car, the registered assignment, and the license plates to defendant. Thereupon Sadler gave Johnson the Dodge car, a check for $177.90, and an assignment of an old judgment against Crowley which Sadler had secured from Carl M. Huber, for the balance.

Johnson then took the check, the assigned judgment, the Dodge car, and a copy of the bill of sale, marked “Paid,” to Crowley. Mr. Crowley never authorized Johnson to sell on that basis, and immediately after learning of the unauthorized sale he called at the defendant's store, returned the papers he had received from Johnson, and told Sadler he could not accept anything but cash for the car, as it belonged to the Greenlease-Lied Motors Company of Omaha. Defendant said he had nothing to say, and if he did he would say it in court. He also ordered Crowley to leave his place. Crowley returned the papers, check, and Dodge car Johnson received from Sadler, told him he could not accept them, that the car belonged to the plaintiff, and that he would have to have the cash or the automobile. Defendant told him to try and get the car, and that he had it locked up. Defendant denied that Crowley told him the plaintiff had any interest in the car.

At the time the car was delivered to Crowley, there was no written or expressed oral conditional sale contract entered into unless such an oral contract can be implied from the facts hereinabove set out. Whether or not a conditional sale contract was entered into, or whether or not the transaction resulted in a bailment and agency for the sale, must be implied from the facts hereinabove set out.

The lower court found from the evidence as a matter of fact that the plaintiff company did not intend to part with the title of the car in any manner unless and until they received the cash therefor, that the title of the car never did pass to Crowley, and that Crowley in effect became and was the agent of the plaintiff for the purpose of sale, and that he had no authority to sell except on a cash basis.

[1] If the evidence hereinabove disclosed was sufficient to warrant a jury in finding that Crowley was plaintiff's agent, and that he was not authorized to sell the car upon any other terms than cash, then we are bound by such findings of the trial court. It is the settled law of this state that the findings of the court, on questions of fact, have the same effect as the finding of a jury, and we are bound thereby.

As supporting their contention that plaintiff made a conditional sale to Crowley, appellant cites Crosby v. Paine, 170 Minn. 43, 211 N. W. 947. In that case a bond dealer secured possession of a number of bonds from plaintiff, (1) either for the purpose of exhibiting them to a prospective purchaser of similar bonds, or (2) for the purpose of selling them and returning the same amount of similar bonds later on. Plaintiff claimed the bond dealer was not authorized to sell them, because the bonds were delivered only for the purpose of showing them to a prospective purchaser of similar bonds, and therefore the title never passed. Defendant contended that plaintiff delivered the bonds to the dealer for the purpose of sale, with the understanding that he would receive the same amount of similar bonds from the dealer, in lieu of his bonds later. The question as to the nature of the transaction was submitted to the jury. The jury found, as a matter of fact, that the bonds were delivered to the bond dealer with the power to sell in the ordinary course of business. The bonds were so sold by the dealer to the defendant in that case. Plaintiff sought to recover the value of the bonds from the purchaser. The jury found the facts against the plaintiff and he was not permitted to recover.

Another case relied on is Maxwell Motor Sales Corp. v. Bankers' M. & S. Co., 195 Iowa, 384, 192 N. W. 19, 20. In that case there was also a delivery of an automobile to a local dealer under an express written trust agreement. The agreement gave the local dealer “liberty * * * to exhibit and sell same for its account for cash for not less than $691.25.” In the written agreement the local dealer was to keep the proceeds of the sale separate from their funds and immediately hand the proceeds of the sale to the Maxwell Corporation. In that case, however, a note for $691.25 was also executed to the Maxwell Motor Company payable in three months. The plaintiff contended that its agreement with the local dealer constituted an “agency and bailment.” The note given also provided for its payment before the automobile could be sold or exchanged. This was inconsistent with appellant's theory of a “bailment and agency,” and was given great weight in construing the contract to be a conditional sale. In that case we said: “Mere delivery of the motor vehicle to the dealer with authority to sell the same, under the strict requirement that it immediately account to the Maxwell Motor Sales Corporation for the proceeds thereof may be as consistent with appellant's theory of an agency and bailment as appellee's theory that a conditional sale resulted [italics ours], but the contract must be construed as a whole. The automobile * * * was, upon either theory, delivered to the dealer for sale. He was required to give his note therefor due in three months. It provided that it must be paid before the automobile could be sold or exchanged. This is inconsistent with appellant's theory of a bailment, and must be given great weight in the construction of the contract which we think must be construed as a conditional sale.”

In the case at bar there was no...