Mott v. Hull

• Decision Date: 05 October 1915
• Docket Number: Case Number: 5496
• Citation: 51 Okla. 602,152 P. 92,1915 OK 718
• Parties: MOTT et al. v. HULL.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1915 OK 718

152 P. 92

51 Okla. 602

MOTT et al. v. HULL.

Case Number: 5496

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: October 5, 1915

Syllabus

¶0 1. OFFICERS -- Performance of Duties -- Negligence -- Liability. Where the duties of an officer are purely ministerial, he may be liable in damages to anyone who can show that he has suffered a special injury because of such officer's failure to perform, or negligent performance of such duty.

2. HIGHWAYS--Officers--Negligence--Liability. An officer may be liable to an individual for negligence in the performance of a purely ministerial duty, although the state or political subdivision thereof which elects him may not, under the law, be liable for his negligence.

3. APPEAL AND ERROR--Verdict--Evidence. Where the evidence reasonably tends to support the verdict of the jury, it will not be disturbed on appeal.

Emery H. Breeden, for plaintiffs in error.

Sam P. Ridings, for defendant in error.

BREWER, C.

¶1 Peter Hull recovered a judgment for damages of $ 42.50 against Henry Mott and Lawrence Knoblauck, and they appeal. The suit was based on a claim that these men excavated for and put in a culvert across the entire traveled part of a public highway, and left the work obstructing the road in such a way as to be dangerous to travelers in the nighttime, and negligently failed to erect sufficient barriers and other forms of notice and warning to prevent persons using the road at night from running into and being damaged by the obstructions; and that plaintiff in so using said highway, because of such negligence of defendants, ran his car into the obstruction and wrecked it, causing the damage. The defendants set up that they were trustee and treasurer, respectively, of the township where the work was done, and were charged by law with the power and duty of repairing the highway; that in so doing they were exercising an official and governmental function, and were therefore not liable in damages at the suit of plaintiff. In Shearman & Redfield on the Law of Negligence (6th Ed.), sec. 312, a distinction is made between nonjudicial public officers, whose duties are of a general public nature, and who act for the public at large, and that class of nonjudicial officers who act, not for the public in general, but for such individuals as may employ them for specific fees, and in discussing the liability of the former class, to which these defendants belong, it is said in section 313:

"* * * So far as their duties are absolute, certain, and imperative, and involve the execution of a set task--in other words, are merely ministerial--they are liable in damages to any one who can show that he has suffered a special injury through their neglect in respect to some right which the law assures to him. It is settled law that a public officer who acts maliciously towards another, or who, in abuse of his office and in violation of his duty, omits to act, or acts negligently, or proceeds without or in excess of authority, is answerable in damages to any one who is specifically injured thereby."

¶2 To sustain the above text, the author cites the following cases, where negligence was the basis of the action: Adsit v. Brady, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 630, 40 Am. Dec. 305; Hutson v. New York, 9 N.Y. 163, 59 Am. Dec. 526; Robinson v. Chamberlain, 34 N.Y. 389, 90 Am. Dec. 713; Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N.Y. 113; Fulton Fire Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 37 N. Y. 648; Conroy v. Gale, 47 N.Y. 665; Johnson v. Belden, 47 N.Y. 130; Stack v. Bangs, 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 262; Kennedy v. Ryall, 67 N.Y. 379; Morse v. Sweenie, 15 Ill. App. 486; Hayes v. Porter, 22 Me. 371; Barry v. Arnould, 10 Adol. & El. 646; Kolb v. O'Brien, 86 Ill. 210; Chouteau v. Rowse, 56 Mo. 65; Nowell v. Wright, 3 Allen (Mass.) 166, 80 Am. Dec. 62. So it seems that the township officers are individually liable to a person who may suffer special damages because of the negligent performance by such officers of a purely ministerial act, not involving the exercise of an official discretion. The question of the necessity for the culvert and its location, size, material, and construction would require the exercise of judgment and discretion; and it may be said in general that officers of whom the law requires the exercise of judicial functions, by whatever name they may be called, enjoy the protection of the judicial privilege...