Moulds v. Bradley

• Citation: 791 So.2d 220
• Decision Date: 02 August 2001
• Docket Number: No. 1999-CA-00994-SCT.,1999-CA-00994-SCT.
• Parties: Eric Shannon MOULDS v. Bridget Bushay Fairley BRADLEY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

791 So.2d 220

Eric Shannon MOULDS v. Bridget Bushay Fairley BRADLEY.

No. 1999-CA-00994-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

August 2, 2001.

Gary L. Roberts, Gautier, for Appellant.

Robert Payne Shepard, Lucedale, for Appellee.

EN BANC.

WALLER, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. This appeal involves a father who failed to make court-ordered child support payments and was found guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced to serve thirty days in jail. Bridget Bradley filed a complaint seeking to enforce and modify an earlier child support decree. The complaint was later amended to include the request for the imposition of punitive damages against Eric Shannon Moulds, the father of the couple's child. Although the chancellor refused to award punitive damages, he did find Moulds guilty of criminal contempt, sentencing him to ninety days in the county jail, with sixty days suspended. Finding that the issue of criminal contempt was not properly before the court, we reverse his conviction and sentence. On cross-appeal we affirm the denial of Bridget's claim for an award of punitive damages, but we reverse and remand for the Chancellor to review the award of child support based on the correct amount of Moulds's adjusted gross income.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

¶ 2. On January 12, 1996, the Chancery Court of George County entered a decree finding Eric Shannon Moulds to be the natural father of Randy Moulds. The decree ordered Moulds, at the time a college student and football player at Mississippi State University, to pay weekly child support in the amount of fifty dollars to Randy's mother, Bridget Bradley. The decree also ordered Moulds to provide medical and dental insurance for Randy when he was financially able to do so. Moulds is also the natural father of three other children by other women, for whom he is currently paying child support.

¶ 3. Following his collegiate playing career, Moulds was drafted by the Buffalo Bills of the National Football League, where he earned an annual salary in excess of $1 million. Despite his improved financial condition, between January 12, 1996, and September 21, 1998, Moulds paid Bradley only $350 in child support and provided no insurance. On September 14, 1998, Bradley filed an amended complaint seeking to enforce the earlier child support decree and to increase the weekly support amounts.¹ On January 7, 1999, Moulds finally paid off his child support arrearage by tendering a check to Bradley in the amount of $7,108.29. On January 11, 1999, Bradley filed a second amended complaint seeking, among other things, an increase in the child support amounts and the imposition of punitive damages for Moulds's past failure to pay child support. At the hearing, held May 11, 1999, the Chancellor raised the possibility of jail time as punishment for Moulds. Bradley had not requested incarceration in her pleadings, and, upon being questioned by the Chancellor, specifically said that she preferred that Moulds be required to pay her punitive damages and not face incarceration. The Chancellor nevertheless found Moulds guilty of wilful, contumacious and criminal contempt and sentenced Moulds to ninety days in the county jail, with sixty days suspended. The Chancellor also found Moulds's increased income was a material change in circumstances and increased Moulds's monthly child support obligation from $200 per month to $1,000 per month.

¶ 4. Moulds filed a timely appeal to this Court from the Chancellor's order finding him guilty of criminal contempt and sentencing him to jail. Bradley cross-appealed, arguing that the amount of child support awarded by the Chancellor inadequate and that the Chancellor erred in not awarding punitive damages against Moulds.

DISCUSSION

Whether Moulds was deprived of due process of law when the chancery court convicted him of criminal contempt and sentenced him to jail for 30 days?²

¶ 5. Moulds argues that the Chancellor improperly ordered him incarcerated for criminal contempt without meeting the due process requirements applicable to criminal contempt proceedings. We agree.

¶ 6. The record clearly indicates that the Chancellor found Moulds to be guilty of criminal, rather than civil, contempt. Although a Chancellor has discretion to impose sanctions for both criminal and civil contempt, there is an important distinction between these two forms of contempt. This Court has explained that civil contempt is to coerce action while criminal contempt is to punish for violation of an order of court:

If the purpose of the proceedings is to coerce action or non-action by a party, the order of contempt is characterized as civil. This type contempt proceeding is ordinarily instituted by one of the parties to the litigation who seeks to coerce another party to perform or cease performing an act. The order of contempt is entered by the court for the private benefit of the offended party. Such orders, although imposing a jail sentence, classically provide for termination of the contemnor's sentence upon purging himself of the contempt. The sentence is usually indefinite and not for fixed term. Consequently, it is said that the contemnor `carries the key to his cell in his own pocket.' [citations omitted] On the other hand, a criminal contempt proceeding is maintained solely and simply to vindicate the authority of the court or to punish otherwise for conduct offensive to the public in violation of an order of the court.

Newell v. Hinton, 556 So.2d 1037, 1044 (Miss.1990); see also Sappington v. Sappington, 245 Miss. 260, 147 So.2d 494, 498 (1962)

; Miss.Code Ann. §§ 9-1-17 & 9-5-87 (1991 & Supp.2000).

¶ 7. There are two forms of criminal contempt: direct and constructive. Direct criminal contempt involves words spoken or actions committed in the presence of the court that are calculated to embarrass or prevent the orderly administration of justice. Varvaris v. State, 512 So.2d 886, 887 (Miss.1987). Punishment for direct contempt may be meted out instantly by the judge in whose presence the offensive conduct was committed, though we have stated that it is wise for a judge faced with personal attacks to wait until the end of the proceedings and have another judge take his place. Purvis v. Purvis, 657 So.2d 794, 798 (Miss.1995) (citing Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463-64, 91 S.Ct. 499, 504, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971)).

¶ 8. Unlike direct contempt, constructive contempt involves actions which are committed outside the presence of the court. Coleman v. State, 482 So.2d 221, 222 (Miss.1986); Wood v. State, 227 So.2d 288 (Miss.1969). Because the alleged contempt (failure to make court-ordered child support payments) occurred outside the presence of the court and Moulds had already paid his obligations, the jail time imposed by the Chancellor was for constructive criminal contempt. In the case of constructive criminal contempt, we have held that defendants must be provided with procedural due process safeguards, including a specification of charges, notice, and a hearing. Purvis, 657 So.2d at 798 (citing Wood, 227 So.2d at 290).

¶ 9. The record clearly supports Moulds's assertion that he was not provided with any notice that he would be tried for criminal contempt at the May 11, 1999, hearing. The contempt sought by Bradley was for the imposition of civil, rather than criminal, sanctions. Bradley's complaint repeatedly states, for example, that "the defendant is in wilful contempt of Court, and this Court should take whatever action is necessary to compel the defendant" to take various actions to comply with the previous orders of the court, including releasing tax returns and providing his address and telephone number. A review of the record indicates that when questioned by the Chancellor about the possibility of Moulds being incarcerated, counsel for Bradley emphatically stated, "I do not think he should go to jail.... Incarceration would be counterproductive for my client.... If he goes to jail that could affect his income.... What we asked for in the complaint, we felt sufficient to get his attention without the need of putting him in jail...." Given the language of the complaint and the above exchange, it is clear that what was sought was the use of civil contempt sanctions to compel, rather than criminal contempt sanctions to punish Moulds.

¶ 10. Without notice of criminal contempt sanctions, Moulds's due process rights were violated. Accordingly, we reverse Moulds's criminal contempt conviction and jail sentence.

CROSS-APPEAL ISSUES

I. Whether the trial court erred in awarding Bradley only $1,000 per month child support where Moulds, had an adjusted gross income of more than $750,000.00.

¶ 11. Bradley argues on cross-appeal that the Chancellor erred in requiring Moulds to pay only $1,000 per month in child support. Bradley argues that the Chancellor miscalculated Moulds's adjusted gross income, and the record supports this assertion. In providing his rationale for increasing Moulds's child-support obligation to $1,000 per month, the Chancellor stated, "This Court has looked at the living expenses of the father which is alleged to be $14,170 a month, which is due out of his adjusted gross income of $32,108.57 a month."

¶ 12. Bradley suggests that the Chancellor arrived at the erroneous conclusion that Moulds's annual adjusted gross income was $ 385,302.84 by deducting taxes from Moulds's adjusted gross income provided in his U.C.C.R. 8.05 disclosure statement. Bradley argues that the Chancellor, in reaching his decision, substantially underestimated Moulds's adjusted gross income by more than $300,000 a year:

That the adjusted gross income of the defendant (Moulds) annually was $385,302.84. In fact, the adjusted gross income was $ 761,435.11. The Chancellor apparently went solely by Moulds' 8.05 statement, without comparing it to Moulds' tax returns. As a result, while the monthly salary was stated as $ 54,166.57 plus 5000 for endorsements, the 1997 tax

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