Mountain v. Price
| Decision Date | 01 March 1944 |
| Docket Number | 29211. |
| Citation | 146 P.2d 327,20 Wn.2d 129 |
| Parties | MOUNTAIN v. PRICE. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1.
Action by Lillian Mountain against William R. Price to recover upon a foreign judgment. From a judgment against defendant individually and excluding community estate from liability therefor, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Superior Court, Klickitat County; Howard J. Atwell judge.
Schaefer & Hall, of Vancouver, for appellant.
John R McEwen, of Goldendale, for respondent.
During the month of June, 1939, plaintiff, Lillian Mountain instituted this action against the defendant, William R Price, a resident of Klickitat county, Washington, he being the only defendant named, alleging in her complaint that October 1, 1938, in the circuit court of the state of Oregon for Multnomah county, she recovered judgment against defendant for the sum of five thousand dollars, in an action which she had instituted against defendant for the recovery of damages for personal injuries suffered by her as the result of the wrongful use of the highways of the state of Oregon by the defendant. Plaintiff further alleged that no part of the judgment had been paid, and that the entire amount thereof was then due and payable from defendant. Plaintiff prayed for judgment against defendant in the sum of five thousand dollars, together with costs. A copy of the Oregon judgment was attached to plaintiff's complaint.
Defendant answered plaintiff's complaint, denying the material allegations thereof, and by way of an affirmative defense, alleging that, during all the times mentioned in the complaint, the state of Oregon 'had no law known as the community property law,' and that any liability incurred by the defendant in the action described in the complaint filed in the circuit court of the state of Oregon was, and remained, the separate obligation of the defendant. Defendant further alleged that he was a resident of the state of Washington; that he was married to Rena Price; and that any obligation incurred by the defendant to the plaintiff was not a community debt of the defendant and his wife. Defendant pleaded a second affirmative defense with which we are not concerned.
Plaintiff having replied with denials to the affirmative defense in defendant's answer, the action was tried to the court, and resulted in the entry of findings of fact which may be epitomized as follows:
The court found that, July 21, 1938, plaintiff instituted the action referred to in her complaint in this action, Before the circuit court of the state of Oregon for Multnomah county, against the defendant, William R. Price, a resident of Klickitat county, Washington, for the purpose of recovering damages for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff as the result of the use of the highways of the state of Oregon by defendant; that the defendant was duly served with process; that he made default Before the Oregon court; that, October 1, 1938, judgment was rendered against him in that court in favor of plaintiff for the sum of five thousand dollars; that no part of the judgment had been paid; and that the entire amount thereof was due to plaintiff from the defendant. The court further found that the defendant was a married man, his wife being Rena Price, and that the defendant was a resident of the state of Washington.
From the findings of fact, the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment against the defendant, Willaim R. Price, individually, as his separate obligation, in the sum of five thousand dollars, together with interest and costs, and that the community composed of the defendant, William R. Price, and Rena Price, his wife, was not liable on the judgment referred to in the findings, which was recovered in the circuit court of the state of Oregon by the plaintiff in this action against the defendant, William R. Price.
In accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law, a judgment was entered awarding plaintiff judgment against the defendant, William R. Price, individually, in the sum of five thousand dollars, together with interest and costs; the judgment further stating that it was the separate obligation of the defendant.
From this judgment, plaintiff has appealed, assigning error on the entry of judgment against William R. Price as his separate obligation, and upon that portion of the judgment which provides that the judgment is the separate obligation of the defendant.
Respondent, in his answer pleaded that the state of Oregon had no statute similar to the community property law of this state, and that, under the law of the state of Oregon, the obligation incurred by respondent herein to appellant, which obligation had been merged in the judgment entered against respondent by the Oregon court, was the separate obligation of respondent. Pursuant to chapter 82, Laws of 1941, entitled 'An Act relating to judicial notice of foreign laws,' § 1 of the act, Rem.Rev.Stat.1941 Supp. § 1278, providing: 'Every Court of this state shall take judicial notice of the Constitution, common law, civil law, and statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the United States,' the trial court took judicial notice of the fact (conceded by both parties) that the state of Oregon is a common law state and has no law similar to the community property law of the state of Washington.
The law of the place where a tort is committed controls questions in connection with the act, the responsibility therefor, and the nature of a cause of action based thereon. Richardson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 11 Wash.2d 288, 118 P.2d 985; Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, 2d Ed., p. 219, § 89. It follows that, under the law of Oregon, respondent, William R. Price, alone, is liable for damages resulting from the tort which was the basis of the Oregon action.
Appellant in her complaint disclosed that the Oregon action was one to recover for injuries caused by Price growing out of his use of the Oregon highways, and the judgment entered against respondent by the Oregon court, a copy of which is attached to the complaint, states that the action was instituted by appellant 'to collect damages arising from personal injuries inflicted upon' appellant by respondent. Under the laws of Oregon the judgment could not affect Mrs. Price or her property. Appellant argues that the judgment of the Oregon court is a debt of record, and, as such a debt, is governed by the law of the domicile of the debtor, and that the debt, having been contracted or incurred after the marriage of respondent, William R. Price, and his wife, Rena Price, is, under the laws of this state, presumptively a community debt.
Pursuant to the laws of this state, a judgment rendered against a married man is presumed to be a community obligation. This presumption is not conclusive, and, on execution upon such a judgment, the wife may appear and show that the property levied upon is community property and that the judgment in fact is not a community obligation. The fact that an obligation sued upon is not an obligation of the community may also be shown upon the trial of the action.
In the case of Meng v. Security State Bank, 16 Wash.2d 215 133 P.2d 293, it appeared that the defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Deardorff, while residents of the state of Oregon, signed two promissory notes which were later transferred to the plaintiff, Meng. Some years after the execution of the notes, Mr. and Mrs. Deardorff established their residence in the state of Washington, where they continued to reside. Approximately two years thereafter, plaintiff, Meng, sought payment or a renewal of the notes, which were about to become outlawed. After some negotiation, Mr. Deardorff alone signed a new note. In due time, suit was instituted upon this note against Mr. Deardorff, his wife not being a party to the action. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and thereafter, upon execution, certain property which was the community property of Mr. and Mrs. Deardorff, was levied upon. A third party then claimed, under a chattel mortgage, the property seized pursuant to the execution. Mrs. Meng then commenced a new action against Mr. and Mrs. Deardorff and the holder of the chattel mortgage, alleging the rendition of the judgment in her favor against Arthur Deardorff; that the Deardorffs were husband and wife, and residents of Cowlitz...
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...Bank note. The judgment, like the underlying debt, was presumptively a community debt. See Section 40-3-9(B); cf. Mountain v. Price, 20 Wash.2d 129, 146 P.2d 327, 328 (1944) (noting that under Washington's community property law, a judgment rendered against a married man is presumed to be a......
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...spouse. La Selle v. Woolery, supra, and Smyser v. Smyser, 1943, 17 Wash.2d 301, 135 P.2d 455, and cases cited.' In Mountain v. Price, 1944, 20 Wash.2d 129, 146 P.2d 327, the appellant sued in this state upon an Oregon judgment and raised the identical contention now urged by respondent. We ......
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