Mounts v. Chafin
| Decision Date | 15 November 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 20017,20017 |
| Citation | 186 W.Va. 156,411 S.E.2d 481 |
| Parties | Ronnie MOUNTS, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. Gerald L. CHAFIN, Sheriff of Mingo County, Defendant Below, Appellant. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The Law Enforcement Training and Certification Act, W.Va.Code, 30-29-1, et seq, requires law enforcement officers to be certified by the Governor's Committee on Crime, Delinquency and Correction as having met certain minimum qualifications as a condition of employment by any West Virginia law enforcement agency.
2. Under W.Va.Code, 30-29-5(f) (1983), the employment of a law enforcement officer who fails to be certified must be automatically terminated.
3. "A writ of mandamus will not issue unless three elements coexist--(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the relief sought; (2) a legal duty on the part of respondent to do the thing which the petitioner seeks to compel; and (3) the absence of another adequate remedy." Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Kucera v. City of Wheeling, 153 W.Va. 538, 170 S.E.2d 367 (1969).
4. " .' Syllabus Point 1, Hechler v. Casey, 175 W.Va. 434, 333 S.E.2d 799 (1985).
5. W.Va.Code, 30-29-5(i) (1983), permits a law enforcement officer or an applicant to challenge decisions of the Governor's Committee on Crime, Delinquency and Correction with regard to law enforcement certification according to the provisions of the state Administrative Procedures Act, W.Va.Code, 29A-5-1, et seq.
6. A license may be revoked for due cause at any time in accordance with provisions in the licensing act or ordinance or in the certificate of license. A license may also be revoked in the exercise of the police power of the state, whether or not the power to revoke is expressly or impliedly reserved in the licensing statute or in the certificate of license.
7. Fraud or misrepresentation in a license application is a ground for revocation of the license.
Michael Thornsbury, Larry E. Thompson, Thornsbury & Thompson, Williamson, for appellee.
William H. Duty, Asst. Pros. Atty., Williamson, for appellant.
This is an appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court of Mingo County, dated July 23, 1990, which issued a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent, Gerald L. Chafin, the Sheriff of Mingo County, to reinstate the petitioner, Ronnie Mounts, to his former position of deputy sheriff with full back pay. We conclude that the petitioner was not entitled to the writ of mandamus, and we reverse.
At issue in this appeal is the Law Enforcement Training and Certification Act (the Act), W.Va.Code, 30-29-1, et seq. This statute requires law enforcement officers to be certified by the Governor's Committee on Crime, Delinquency and Correction (Governor's Committee) as having met certain minimum qualifications as a condition of employment by any West Virginia law enforcement agency. 1 Generally, the Act provides for certification upon completion of a prescribed training course; however, the Act also permits one employed as a police officer on its effective date, July 9, 1981, to obtain certification without such training upon a showing that he was employed as a law enforcement officer "for a period of not less than five consecutive years immediately preceding the date of application for certification." 2 W.Va.Code, 30-29-5(d) (1983). Under W.Va.Code, 30-29-5(f) (1983), a law enforcement officer who "fails to be certified shall be automatically terminated[.]" 3
The petitioner was hired as a deputy sheriff in Mingo County on July 1, 1981. Two months later, the petitioner filed an application with the Governor's Committee seeking certification without completion of a training program under the "grandfather" provisions of W.Va.Code, 30-29-5(d) (1981). At that time, the petitioner's prior law enforcement experience consisted of three years as a constable between 1973 and 1977. For reasons not germane to this case, the application was not processed until June of 1983, 4 when the Governor's Committee received a notarized employment statement from the Mingo County Sheriff's Department attesting that the petitioner had been employed as a deputy sheriff continuously since July 1, 1975. On June 30, 1983, the petitioner was certified as a West Virginia law enforcement officer under the grandfather provisions of the Act.
In 1988, the Governor's Committee reviewed the petitioner's application for certification, and, upon receipt of updated employment records, discovered that the petitioner did not have the necessary years of employment to be certified under W.Va.Code, 30-29-5(d). By letter dated September 5, 1989, the Governor's Committee advised the petitioner that his law enforcement certification was void. The Governor's Committee offered to make a slot available for the petitioner in the next training program in January, 1990, to allow him to continue his employment until the beginning of the program, 5 and to recertify him upon successful completion of the course. A copy of the letter was forwarded to Sheriff Chafin.
The petitioner did not respond to this letter. On October 18, 1989, the Governor's Committee advised Sheriff Chafin that the petitioner had failed to accept the conditions of his continued employment and could no longer be employed as a law enforcement officer. By letter dated November 8, 1989, the sheriff advised the petitioner that his employment would be terminated effective November 15, 1989.
The petitioner subsequently requested a hearing before the Deputy Sheriff Civil Service Commission of Mingo County (Commission) to challenge his removal. At the close of the hearing conducted on April 26, 1990, the two commissioners present disagreed as to whether the petitioner should be reinstated.
On June 21, 1990, the petitioner instituted mandamus proceedings in the Circuit Court of Mingo County to compel Sheriff Chafin to reinstate him. After a hearing, the circuit court granted the petition, primarily on the ground that the Governor's Committee had no statutory authority to revoke the petitioner's law enforcement certification.
The threshold issue in this appeal is whether mandamus was a proper remedy in the proceedings below. The general rule for determining the appropriateness of mandamus was stated in Syllabus Point 2 of State ex rel. Kucera v. City of Wheeling, 153 W.Va. 538, 170 S.E.2d 367 (1969):
"A writ of mandamus will not issue unless three elements coexist--(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the relief sought; (2) a legal duty on the part of respondent to do the thing which the petitioner seeks to compel; and (3) the absence of another adequate remedy."
Accord Halstead v. Dials, 182 W.Va. 695, 391 S.E.2d 385 (1990).
We do not believe that the petitioner has demonstrated entitlement to the writ of mandamus under the standard enunciated in Kucera. The petitioner chose to challenge the sheriff's decision to fire him in proceedings before the local deputy sheriffs civil service commission. W.Va.Code, 7-14-17(a) (1981), provides that no deputy covered by civil service shall be dismissed "except for just cause." Upon request, a deputy against whom adverse action is taken is entitled to a hearing before the civil service commission, at which the burden is on the sheriff to justify the deputy's dismissal. W.Va.Code, 7-14-17(a). Either party has a right to appeal to or to seek a writ of mandamus in the circuit court to challenge the civil service commission's ruling. W.Va.Code, 7-14-17(b).
Clearly, the sheriff met his burden of proof in the proceedings before the Commission. As we have already seen, W.Va.Code, 30-29-5(a), and W.Va.Code, 30-29-5(f), preclude any person who has not been properly certified from being employed as a law enforcement officer in this State. Once the Governor's Committee advised him that the petitioner was not properly certified, Sheriff Chafin not only had just cause to fire the petitioner; he was required to do so by law. To require the sheriff to reinstate the petitioner without such certification would violate the mandatory provisions of the Act. It is a well settled rule that Syllabus Point 3, State ex rel. County Court v. Arthur, 150 W.Va. 293, 145 S.E.2d 34 (1965). See also State ex rel. Board of Educ. v. Casey, 179 W.Va. 733, 349 S.E.2d 436 (1986).
Nor does the circuit court have the power to determine the correctness of the administrative decision to revoke the petitioner's certification. The general rule with respect to the role of courts in administrative proceedings was set out in Syllabus Point 1 of Hechler v. Casey, 175 W.Va. 434, 333 S.E.2d 799 (1985):
" .'
See also Bank of Wheeling v. Morris Plan Bank & Trust Co., 155 W.Va. 245, 183 S.E.2d 692 (1971). In State ex rel. Gooden v. Bonar, 155 W.Va. 202, 210, 183 S.E.2d 697, 702 (1971), we recognized the applicability of the rule in mandamus cases: "Mandamus is available...
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