Moye v. Comm'r of Corr.

• Decision Date: 12 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 19271.,19271.
• Citation: 316 Conn. 779,114 A.3d 925
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Marcus MOYE v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

316 Conn. 779

114 A.3d 925

Marcus MOYE

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

No. 19271.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 6, 2015.

Decided May 12, 2015.

John L. Cordani, Jr., assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Sarah Hanna, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and David Clifton, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, McDONALD, ESPINOSA, ROBINSON and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

Opinion

ZARELLA, J.

The primary issue in this case is the extent to which unpreserved constitutional claims may be reviewed on appeal in habeas actions. The petitioner, Marcus Moye, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which, in upholding the denial of his habeas petition, declined to review an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that he raised for the first time on appeal. The petitioner concedes that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is unpreserved but argues that he nevertheless is entitled to have his claim reviewed pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), which allows a party to raise an unpreserved constitutional claim under certain circumstances. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. Joshua Brown was fatally shot in the city of New Haven at approximately 8 p.m. on August 3, 2003. As the police approached the scene of the shooting, a police officer observed a heavyset, black male wearing a white jersey riding away from the scene on a bicycle. During the subsequent investigation, the police learned that Brown had been a member of a local gang that was feuding with another gang at the time of his death. The police also spoke with a number of witnesses who tied the petitioner to the shooting. One such witness was Marvin Gore, who claimed that, between 7 and 8 p.m. on the night of the shooting, the petitioner had approached him on a bicycle, pulled a gun from his pocket, and demanded that Gore give him everything in his pockets. When Gore responded that he had nothing in his pockets, the petitioner struck Gore on the head with the gun. The attempted robbery occurred four blocks from where Brown was shot.

Three years after Brown was shot and killed, the police concluded their investigation, and the petitioner was charged with murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a–54a and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29–35. A jury found the petitioner guilty on both charges, and the trial court sentenced the petitioner to a forty-five year term of incarceration on the murder charge and a consecutive five year term of incarceration on the weapons charge, for a total effective sentence of fifty years incarceration. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction on direct appeal. State v. Moye, 112 Conn.App. 605, 614, 963 A.2d 690, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 906, 967 A.2d 1221 (2009).

After his conviction was affirmed, the petitioner collaterally attacked his conviction by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which ultimately gave rise to this appeal. In his petition, he claimed that his trial attorney had rendered ineffective assistance by failing (1) to investigate and assert an alibi defense, (2) to subpoena certain witnesses who would have assisted in the petitioner's defense, (3) to properly explain to the petitioner the likely outcomes of proceeding to trial versus accepting a plea deal, and (4) to present certain witnesses at his sentencing hearing who were prepared to testify on his behalf. These omissions, according to the petitioner, deprived him of his right to effective assistance of counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. The habeas court rejected the petitioner's claim that his attorney had rendered ineffective assistance and rendered judgment denying the habeas petition.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the petitioner raised for the first time a new theory as to why his attorney had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Moye v. Commissioner of Correction, 147 Conn.App. 325, 326, 81 A.3d 1222 (2013). Specifically, the petitioner argued that his attorney had failed to raise a double jeopardy claim that would have precluded his conviction of carrying a pistol without a permit and the five year term of incarceration imposed in connection with that conviction. See id., at 330, 81 A.3d 1222. The petitioner claimed that, prior to being convicted of murder and carrying a pistol without a permit in connection with the shooting of Brown, he already had been charged with carrying a pistol without a permit in connection with the attempted robbery of Gore.¹ Id. In light of this earlier charge, the petitioner claimed that double jeopardy principles barred his subsequent prosecution for carrying a pistol without a permit at his murder trial. See id. The petitioner conceded that this claim was unpreserved but sought review under Golding. Id.

The Appellate Court declined to review the petitioner's claim on the basis that “Golding review is not available for unpreserved claims of error raised for the first time in a habeas appeal....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 331, 81 A.3d 1222, quoting Hunnicutt v. Commissioner of Correction, 83 Conn.App. 199, 202, 848 A.2d 1229, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 914, 853 A.2d 527 (2004). We thereafter granted certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that review under [Golding ] is unavailable to the petitioner because his unpreserved double jeopardy claim was raised for the first time in his appeal to the Appellate Court?” Moye v. Commissioner of Correction, 311 Conn. 911, 84 A.3d 880 (2014).

On appeal to this court, the petitioner claims that Golding review is available in a habeas appeal for any claim that would have been cognizable in the habeas court. The petitioner argues that Golding review is therefore available for his unpreserved ineffective assistance claim because he could have properly raised that claim in the habeas court. The petitioner also argues that his ineffective assistance claim satisfies the requirements for Golding review and is meritorious. To remedy this alleged violation of his constitutional rights, the petitioner urges us to vacate his conviction for carrying a pistol without a permit and to reduce his term of incarceration by five years, the term to which he was sentenced for that charge.

In opposition, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, claims that, as a general matter, Golding review is available only to address constitutional defects that arose in the underlying habeas proceeding. Thus, the respondent insists that Golding review is unavailable for the petitioner's new ineffective assistance claim because that claim arose out of his criminal trial and not the underlying habeas proceeding. We conclude that Golding review is not available for the petitioner's unpreserved ineffective assistance claim and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. Accordingly, we need not consider whether the petitioner has satisfied the requirements for Golding review or address the merits of the petitioner's ineffective assistance claim.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the standard of review. The question of whether Golding review is available for claims raised for the first time in a habeas appeal is one of law. See, e.g., Crews v. Crews, 295 Conn. 153, 161, 989 A.2d 1060 (2010). Thus, our review is plenary. See id.

To determine the extent to which Golding review is available in habeas appeals, it is necessary to understand the origins of Golding, as well as how our jurisprudence regarding Golding in the context of habeas proceedings has developed in recent years. “Golding is a narrow exception to the general rule that an appellate court will not entertain a claim that has not been raised in the trial court. The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.... Nevertheless, because constitutional claims implicate fundamental rights, it also would be unfair automatically and categorically to bar a defendant from raising a meritorious constitutional claim that warrants a new trial solely because the defendant failed to identify the violation at trial. Golding strikes an appropriate balance between these competing interests: the defendant may raise such a constitutional claim on appeal, and the appellate tribunal will review it, but only if the trial court record is adequate for appellate review.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39, 55, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212, 127 S.Ct. 1328, 167 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007).

In the context of habeas proceedings, our understanding of when Golding review is available has developed over time. Before addressing Golding in the context of habeas appeals, this court addressed it in the context of unpreserved constitutional claims raised for the first time in a habeas petition. In Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 218 Conn. 403, 589 A.2d 1214 (1991), this court decided that the standard in State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973), the predecessor to Golding, did not apply to freestanding constitutional claims first raised in habeas proceedings.² See Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, at 415–19, 589 A.2d 1214. In other words, the court held that a habeas petitioner cannot raise a constitutional claim in the habeas court that he has failed to properly preserve at his criminal trial. See id., at 415–16, 589 A.2d 1214. The court reasoned that, unlike in direct appeals, Golding...