Moye v. Reddick
| Decision Date | 26 July 1917 |
| Docket Number | 8169. |
| Parties | MOYE v. REDDICK. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
The court did not err in overruling the general demurrer to the plaintiff's petition; and there is no such merit in the special demurrers as to require a reversal, in the interest of justice, because of any harm to the defendant on account of the alleged defects pointed out thereby.
There is no merit in the ground of the motion for a new trial that the court erred in charging section 5749 of the Civil Code relating to the presumption arising where one who has evidence in his power to repel a charge or claim against him fails or refuses to present the same. The defendant herself witnessed the happening, and neither she nor her chauffeur who admittedly was in charge of the car under her direction and who was present at the trial, was sworn at the trial though the chauffeur must have been in a position to know better than any other person exactly what was done by him to prevent the occurrence, and to know the rate of speed at which the car was moving, and the proximate cause that brought about the injury to the plaintiff.
The provision in the act of 1910 (Acts 1910, p. 90; Park's Ann. Pol. Code,§ 828e) that any person operating an automobile on any of the highways of this state shall, "upon approaching a bridge, dam, high embankment, sharp curve, descent or crossing of intersecting highways [italics ours], and railroad crossings," shall so operate the same as that he may "have it under control and operate it at a speed not greater than six miles per hour," is applicable to the public streets of a municipality. "The 'highways of this state as described in this act' include all public roads, streets, alleys, etc.; and * * * the provisions of section 5, limiting the speed of an automobile at a 'crossing of intersecting highways,' would apply to the crossing of intersecting streets, as a street is, by the terms of the act, included as one of the 'highways' of this state." Ware v. Lamar, 16 Ga.App. 560, 566, 85 S.E. 824, 827; Ware v. Lamar, 18 Ga.App. 673, 90 S.E. 364.
(a) The court did not err in giving in charge to the jury the provision of the act of 1910 referred to above, as there was some evidence that the defendant's automobile, when approaching the intersection of another street with the street on which it was being operated was moving at a high rate of speed, greater than six miles per hour, and it appeared, from the testimony, that the child was struck by it not far from the intersection of these streets, and it therefore became a question for the jury to...
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