Moyer v. Cantieny
| Decision Date | 15 July 1889 |
| Citation | 42 N.W. 1060,41 Minn. 242 |
| Parties | Charles D. Moyer v. Casper Cantieny |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendant from an order of the municipal court of Minneapolis, refusing a new trial after verdict of $ 202.25 for plaintiff.
Order affirmed.
Robinson & Baker, for appellant.
J. L Dobbin, for respondent.
The plaintiff is an attorney-at-law. The action is for the recovery of an alleged stipulated compensation for services in procuring the pardon of the defendant's son, who was imprisoned for a term of years in the state penitentiary. The appellant's contention, that the court should declare the contract to have been illegal, cannot be sustained. The presumption of law is in favor of the legality of contracts and, the object sought to be accomplished being lawful unless it affirmatively and distinctly appears that it was contemplated that means were to be resorted to for its accomplishment which the law would not sanction, the courts cannot declare the contract invalid. There was nothing unlawful or opposed to public policy in simply employing the plaintiff to endeavor, by proper means, to secure a pardon. Chadwick v. Knox, 31 N.H. 226, (64 Am. Dec 329;) Formby v. Pryor, 15 Ga. 258; Bremsen v. Engler, 49 N.Y.S. 172. The grounds upon which the constitutional power to pardon may be exercised are not defined in the constitution; but among the considerations which might properly be brought to the attention of the governor, and influence his action, are some which suggest the propriety of employing the professional services of an attorney for this purpose, and from the mere fact of an attorney being employed to solicit the pardon of a convict it is not to be legally inferred that an unlawful course of conduct was intended. For instance, it would be proper, and often expedient, that an attorney-at-law examine the case upon which the conviction was based, to see whether, notwithstanding the final judgment of the law, the case may not be of such a nature as to justify the exercise of the extraordinary power of pardon. He may direct investigations to the discovery of facts bearing upon the question of guilt, not discoverable at the time of the trial. The attention of prosecuting officers and of the judge who tried the cause may be directed to newly-discovered facts, or to any of the circumstances of the case, and their recommendation in favor of a pardon may be sought. Whatever considerations may properly affect the action of the executive may be urged upon his attention. Even if there was any evidence in this case which would have justified the conclusion, as a matter of fact, that political influence, or any unlawful means, were expected to be exerted for the...
To continue reading
Request your trial