Moyer v. Clark
| Decision Date | 24 April 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 39419,39419 |
| Citation | 454 P.2d 374,75 Wn.2d 800 |
| Parties | Martin MOYER and Mildred Moyer, his wife, Appellants, v. Leroy CLARK and Jane Doe Clark, his wife; and Russell V. Hokanson and Mildred Hokanson, his wife, and their respective marital communities, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Zelensky, Steere & Baldwin, Eugene D. Zelensky, Seattle, for appellants.
Skeel, McKelvy, Henke, Evenson & Uhlmann, Frederick V. Betts, Seattle, for Clark.
Ogden, Ogden & Murphy, Raymond D. Ogden, Jr., Seattle, for Hokanson.
June 23, 1963, Mildred Moyer, a pedestrian, became the victim of a two-car automobile collision at Fifth Avenue and Pine Street in Seattle.
Her injury and this litigation were precipitated by the following sequence of events. Defendant Russell V. Hokanson drove his Chevrolet station wagon south along Fifth Avenue and proceeded into the intersection at Pine Street with a favorable green traffic control light. Fifth Avenue is reserved for one-way traffic southbound and Mr. Hokanson's vehicle was traveling within the extreme right, or westerly lane, of that avenue. At about the same time, defendant Leroy Clark, drove his Pontiac sedan automobile west along Pine Street, through a red traffic control signal, into the same intersection and there collided with the Hokanson automobile at about the middle of the crosscut. Pine Street is reserved for one-way vehicular traffic westbound and Mr. Clark's vehicle was traveling along the northerly portion of that street.
Defendant Clark's automobile struck the Hokanson vehicle at the left front wheel; the after-end of Clark's car then swung to the right, causing the automobiles to become parallel at which time the Hokanson car was struck again, this time just aft of the left rear door. Debris was found at the scene and Clark's automobile came to a place of rest about 38 feet from that point, facing almost due east. Following the collision, the Hokanson vehicle continued forward at an angle to the right, climbed the curb at the southwest corner of the intersection, struck a light standard positioned there and came to rest. It was then approximately 54 feet from the debris found within the intersection.
At the time of the collision, plaintiff Mrs. Moyer was standing on the sidewalk near the curb where the Hokanson automobile crossed the sidewalk. The car struck her and the injuries she sustained resulted in permanent impairment and disfigurement to her left leg and the amputation of her right leg above the knee.
Plaintiff's cause of action against both defendant Clark and defendant Hokanson was premised on the theory of a violation of the Seattle traffic code, Mr. Clark for failing to yield the right of way and Mr. Hokanson for driving at an unlawful rate of speed. At the close of plaintiff's case in chief, defendant Hokanson moved for an involuntary nonsuit on the basis that his negligence, if any, was not the proximate cause of the accident. The motion was granted and a principal assignment of error relates to the granting of that motion.
Whether or not plaintiff had then produced sufficient evidence to withstand the legal onslaught of defendant Hokanson's motion must be tested in the light of appropriate legal principles. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a motion for involuntary nonsuit, a motion for a directed verdict, or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, admits, for the purpose of ruling on the motion, the truth of the nonmoving party's evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. The motion requires that all evidence be interpreted in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made and most strongly against the moving party. Hellriegel v. Tholl, 69 Wash.2d 97, 417 P.2d 362 (1966); Lockett v. Goodill, 71 Wash.2d 654, 430 P.2d 589 (1967); Smith v. B & I Sales Co., 74 Wash.Dec.2d 153, 443 P.2d 819 (1968). No element of discretion is vested in the trial court in ruling upon the motion. If there are justifiable inferences from the evidence upon which reasonable minds might reach conclusions that would sustain a verdict, then the question is for the jury, not for the court. The motion may be granted only if it can properly be said as a matter of law that there is no evidence or reasonable inference therefrom to sustain a verdict for the nonmoving party. Miller v. Payless Drug Stores of Wash., Inc., 61 Wash.2d 651, 379 P.2d 932 (1963).
An examination of the evidence produced by plaintiff in support of her thesis that defendant Hokanson was negligent was as follows: that the maximum speed allowed for the area in question was not more than 30 miles per hour; 1 that defendant Hokanson's speed was 'somewhere between thirty and thirty-five' miles per hour; that he was going 'about thirty-five miles an hour;' that he was going at 'an unusual rate of speed for that particular spot;' again, by a different witness, that he, Hokanson, was traveling at 'an approximate speed of thirty to thirty-five miles per hour;' that it could 'have been five miles an hour above thirty;' that he 'was going imprudently fast and I would say thirty miles an hour or better;' that and that 'I estimated it about thirty-five miles per hour.'
For the purpose of ruling on the motion for a voluntary nonsuit, the foregoing testimony constituted a sufficient showing of negligence per se against defendant Hokanson. A person engaged in the unexcused violation of a positive law at the time of an accident is guilty of negligence as a matter of law. See Portland-Seattle Auto Freight v. Jones, 15 Wash.2d 603, 131 P.2d 736 (1942), and cases cited therein. According to the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Mr. Hokanson was engaged in an unexcused violation of the speed laws of the city of Seattle. The motion to dismiss should not therefore have been granted.
But negligence standing alone is not sufficient to impose liability on a wrongdoer. The wrongful conduct attributed to him must also constitute a substantial factor in producing the result complained of, I.e., there must have been causation in fact. Defendant Hokanson argues that there was no such causation as a matter of law and that reasonable minds could not conclude otherwise. The trial court adopted his argument. We do not.
Generally speaking, the question of whether or not it was the conduct of defendant that caused plaintiff's harm is a question for the jury, not the court. It is a question of fact and a jury is just as able to decide the issue as is any court, no matter how experienced...
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