Moyle v. Moyle, 19800
| Decision Date | 03 April 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 19800,19800 |
| Citation | 204 S.E.2d 46,262 S.C. 308 |
| Parties | Mary G. MOYLE, Respondent, v. Samuel B. MOYLE, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
D. M. Winter, Jr., Columbia, for appellant.
Love, Thornton, Arnold & Thomason, Greenville, for respondent.
In this divorce action the respondent-wife was granted an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion, periodic alimony, custody of and support for the one child who was still a minor and a substantial property settlement, portions of which, the appellant-husband contends to have been lump sum alimony awards. The single exception on the part of the appellant-husband raises the following stated question 'did the court err by ordering the appellant to pay alimony by lump sum and periodic payments?'
The parties were married on June 12, 1948, and lived in Walhalla, South Carolina; four children were born of the marriage, three of whom survive and only one of whom was unemancipated at the time of the trial below. The husband is a prominent physician with a lucrative practice, and on or about January 1, 1971, he deserted his wife and children, without just cause or excuse remaining henceforth away from the family home. The wife instituted this action on March 26, 1972, seeking a divorce on the grounds of desertion and adultery, custody of the two children, then minors, alimony for herself and minor children, reasonable attorney's fees, etc.
The case came on for a hearing on March 27, 1973 and the wife abandoned her cause of action on the ground of adultery and proceeded on the ground of desertion, which was proved and not contested by the husband. At the commencement of the hearing it was stipulated by counsel for the parties 'that the entire matter of properties and support would be submitted to the Court.' An appraisal by a real estate firm of the real properties in which the parties or either of them had an interest, directly or indirectly, was admitted by stipulation as being a correct appraisal. Such real estate consisted of a farm worth approximately $80,000.00, a lot and cottage at Whitewater Lake with a value of $9,500.00, half-interest in a medical center building, where the husband practiced medicine, valued at $50,000.00 and the residence, where the wife and two children still reside, valued at 60,000.00. Of the foregoing properties the residence was in the name of both parties, title to the Whitewater cottage was in the wife's name and, except for very minor interests of the wife therein, the farm and the half-interest in the medical center property belonged to the husband. The only incumbrance against the aforementioned property amounted to approximately $11,000.00 due on the farm and the Whitewater Lake cottage, the net or unincumbered value of the combined real estate holdings being thus slightly less than $190,000.00. The record does not disclose the value of the furnishings in the lake cottage, but the value of the furnishings in the principal residence was found by the lower court to be $20,000.00. Other assets of the parties included life insurance policies on the life of the husband with a face value of $19,500.00, a five year old Oldsmobile the property of the wife and a new Mark IV, the property of the husband.
It is conceded by the wife that she did not furnish directly any part of the purchase price of any of the real property acquired by the parties either jointly or separately. The record, however, leaves no doubt that the wife indirectly contributed to the financial success of, and the acquisition of property by the husband. She was teaching school while he was still in medical college; they lived in her father's house for 18 months after he started to practice and she continued to teach school long after they were married, although the exact period of time that she taught does not appear in the record. Admittedly her earnings of her husband for household and family expenses thus helping to free the earnings of her husband for investment. Additionally the record reflects her to have been a thrifty housewife, operating the household on a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Smith v. Smith
...601 (1981); Stone v. Stone, 274 S.C. 571, 266 S.E.2d 70 (1980); Taylor v. Taylor, 267 S.C. 530, 229 S.E.2d 852 (1976); Moyle v. Moyle, 262 S.C. 308, 204 S.E.2d 46 (1974); see also Hussey v. Hussey, --- S.C. ---, 312 S.E.2d 267 In this instance, the trial judge, after a fashion, determined t......
-
Parrott v. Parrott, 21712
...to the title rule. The parties may by their own stipulation invite the court to divide property without regard to title. Moyle v. Moyle, 262 S.C. 308, 204 S.E.2d 46. Voluntary litigation of "the entire matter of properties," as occurred in Moyle, gave the court access to property that would......
-
Gill v. Gill, 20507
...substantial interest in the property involved, and she could, by petition in this action, have this matter determined. Moyle v. Moyle, 262 S.C. 308, 204 S.E.2d 46 (1974). For the reasons stated, we reverse the order of the trial court, and remand the case with the direction that the trial (......
-
McCullough v. McCullough, 20781
...property division through voluntary litigation, Piana v. Piana, 239 S.C. 367, 123 S.E.2d 297 (1961) or by stipulation. Moyle v. Moyle, 262 S.C. 308, 204 S.E.2d 46 (1974). ...