MP v. Gardner, 4D03-346.
| Decision Date | 12 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 4D03-346.,4D03-346. |
| Citation | 838 So.2d 711 |
| Parties | M.P., a child, Petitioner, v. Janice GARDNER, Superintendent of the Palm Beach Juvenile Detention Center, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Daniel Marshall, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for respondent.
Petitioner, M.P., a juvenile, filed an emergency petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking discharge from secure detention. Petitioner essentially argued that his detention was illegal because the trial court had failed to enter a written order with reasons for his secure detention, a departure from the risk assessment instrument (RAI) which qualified him for nonsecure or home detention. After this court issued an order to show cause and received a State response, the State filed an amended response advising that the trial court subsequently entered an order of detention stating written reasons for petitioner's secure detention. Petitioner now challenges the sufficiency of the order of detention.
The undisputed facts in this case are that petitioner is charged with failure to appear for trial in two cases. At arraignment, the State requested that he be placed on home detention with electronic monitoring. The State submitted a RAI which, as corrected, totaled 11 points, qualifying him for nonsecure or home detention. The trial court heard unsworn statements from petitioner's mother, who said that she never knew where petitioner was, that he had punched holes in the walls and otherwise vandalized her home, and had brought marijuana into her home, exposing her daughter to it. The trial court thereupon orally found petitioner to be a danger to himself and others, and ordered petitioner into secure detention. The trial court subsequently entered a written order of detention, which provided that based on the information provided by petitioner's mother, as set forth in a transcript of the arraignment it attached, as well as petitioner's failure to appear for trial previously, and the court's personal observations of "the child, his attitude, his body movements, his demeanor, his manner, and his answers to the Court, ... the child is committed to secure detention."
Petitioner argues that the order of detention does not satisfy the statutory requirements for departure from the RAI. We agree.
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy where a juvenile is being detained illegally in violation of the risk assessment requirements and the detention statute. See, e.g., A.S. v. Byrd, 777 So.2d 1171 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
. The power to place in detention those charged with or found to have committed a delinquent act is entirely statutory. See J.J. v. Fryer, 765 So.2d 260, 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); S.W. v. Woolsey, 673 So.2d 152, 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
Section 985.213(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), provides, with certain exceptions not applicable in this case, that:
All determinations and court orders regarding placement of a child into detention care shall comply with all requirements and criteria provided in this part and shall be based on a risk assessment of the child....
Section 985.213(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that all determinations and court orders regarding secure, nonsecure or home detention shall be based primarily upon findings that the child:
The RAI prepared in this case did not present these criteria. Neither did the trial court make written findings on them.
Section 985.215(2), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that a child placed into any kind of detention may be continued in detention by the court upon certain conditions, and further provides in part:
Unless the child is detained under paragraph (d) or paragraph (e), the court shall utilize the results of the risk assessment performed by the juvenile probation officer and, based on the criteria in this subsection, shall determine the need for continued detention. A...
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...See A.K., 951 So.2d at 991. Moreover, he made no finding that C.B. acted "willfully" as required by the statute. See M.P. v. Gardner, 838 So.2d 711, 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). It is clear to us from the transcript of the June 6 hearing that the judge's invocation of section 985.255(1)(i) of t......
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KM v. Department of Juvenile Justice, 1D05-1447.
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